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ENERGY AS A FACTOR FOR TURKISH-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT 
	
Saltuk Buğra Karahan 
Old Dominion University, 2015 
Director: Steve A. Yetiv  
	
This dissertation started with a simple question: What was the main source of 
Turkish-Russian rapprochement seen generally after the end of the Cold War, specifically 
within the last 15 years (2001-2015)? A review of the literature on the subject revealed 
three explanations for Turkish-Russian rapprochement: (1) Perception of the U.S. as a 
threat in the Black Sea and Caucasus region, (2) Deterioration of Turkey’s relations with 
the West, and (3) Turkey’s need for energy. Thus came the main question for this work: 
To what extent does Turkey’s need for energy play a role in Turkish-Russian 
rapprochement? Although each of the explanations are analyzed in detail as variables in 
this study, the focus is on energy, primarily from a Turkish foreign policy perspective.  
Once the variables were explored with their respective influence in Turkish-
Russian relations, they were further tested on the foreign policy choices of Turkey in two 
specific regions of interest for Turkey: the Middle East and the South Caucasus. In the 
case studies, with the consideration that each country’s specific conditions played a role 
in its relations with Turkey, energy was found to be a significant factor. The findings 
from the case studies further supported the role of energy beyond any other factor in the 
making of Turkish foreign policy, and thus also support the main argument that Turkey’s 
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After the Cold War, global relations transformed the world. This is certainly true 
of relations between two of the most important countries in the world: Turkey and 
Russia. They have experienced a major rapprochement, especially since the beginning of 
the new millennium, which has impacted regional and global politics. This warming of 
relations has been reflected in mutual high-level official visits, the expansion of 
cooperation in several areas, and an overall increase in the political dialogue. 
This study explores the nature of rapprochement between Turkey and Russia from 
2000 to 2014 and attempts to determine to what extent Turkey’s energy need serves as an 
explanation for this rapprochement.  Three possible explanations are determined as the 
sources (variables) of rapprochement: (1) Deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the 
West, (2) Common perception of the U.S as a threat to the regional powers in Caucasia 
and the Black Sea, and (3) Turkey’s rising need for energy. Although the rapprochement 
process has been initiated by both sides (Russia and Turkey), the focus in this study is on 
Turkish foreign policy.  
Background of Relations 
It is useful to understand the background of Russian-Turkish relations in order to 
comprehend the central thrust of this dissertation. The end of the Cold War and the 
redefining of world politics significantly influenced specific parts of the world. 
Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union and Turkey shared borders and both 
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maintained global political influence. Russia, the heir to the Soviet Union, had to redefine 
its foreign policy and adapt to the new environment. Although Turkey was not one of the 
two main actors in the Cold War, it was a prominent ally for the other actor, the U.S., and 
survived the Cold War era as a frontline state for NATO.  Naturally, the end of the war 
brought significant changes to the foreign policies of these two states. Russia, lacking the 
glorious days of the past, had to reorient its foreign policy after a collapse, and Turkey, 
not as much needed with respect to Russia (yet still seen as a strategic ally for other 
security problems and the problems in the Middle East) had to reconsider its political and 
economic assets and foreign policy options in this new era.  
Turkey lost its unique position as an indispensable Western ally against Russian 
power. However, in addition to its connection to the Middle East, its proximity to 
important energy sources created new opportunities. Within this new setting, Turkey 
increased its relations with most of its formerly unfriendly neighbors, and initiated a 
number of agreements with regional powers. The most significant among these relations 
was rapprochement with Russia, which happened to be an unchanging rival and enemy 
even centuries before the start of the Cold War.  The decade following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was not particularly significant in terms of rapprochement. Following a 
decade-long hesitation and negligence period, the rapprochement process took hold with 
the new millennium. Since the end of 2000, Turkey and Russia have approached each 
other in several issue areas, and the foundation laid in the last decade seems to have a 
promising influence for the coming years.  
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 Turkey’s Evolving Foreign Policy after the Cold War 
Turkey had a stable foreign policy during the Cold War. The period offered fairly 
limited options for Turkey’s foreign policy choices. Instead of working on a delicate 
balance as in the early years of the Republic, Turkey had a rather simple choice: to align 
itself with the West against a possible Soviet aggression or dominance. Throughout the 
Cold War years, Turkey took critical steps by becoming a founding member of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1948); a member of 
the Council of Europe (1949); a member of NATO (1952); and an associate member of 
European Economic Community (EEC) (1963), in order to integrate itself with the West. 
The end of the Cold War opened a new era for Turkish foreign policy, and within the last 
two decades we have seen signs of this change.  
Turkey was seen as one of the “most immediately affected states” in this new 
environment.1 It was expected that with its connection to the newly liberated Turkic 
peoples, the geopolitical force of Turkey would be much greater than in the past.  Turkey 
was expected to become a role model in the region. Especially with its “economic 
enterprise and the aid that it could provide in the region,” such a role was seen 
appropriate for Turkey.2 Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy, which was affected by the East-
West conflict for decades, had new determinants and a new orientation.3   
By the end of the 1990s, this change was even more significant and was referred 
																																																								
1 Graham Fuller and Ian O Lesser, Turkey's new Geopolitics  (Westview Press, 1994). 163.  
2 Andrew Mango and Heath W Lowry, Turkey: The challenge of a new role  (Praeger Westport, 
CT, 1994). 
3 Yasemin Çelik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy  (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999). 
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to as “new activism,”4 with a status between “daring and caution.”5 By the time these 
assessments were made, the policies were still in line with most Western (American and 
European) policies. It was still in many respects a limited, Western-oriented 
independence and activism. The Iraq War in 2003 changed the magnitude of this sphere 
of independence. The aftermath of the war, in which the U.S. encountered several 
objections from its European allies to its foreign policy choices in the region, served as an 
environment for the practice of a significantly more independent foreign policy.  
In this new environment, Turkey’s more independent foreign policy activism was 
met with caution in the Western world. At the end of the first decade of the millennium, 
some commentators started questioning Turkey’s Western orientation.6 The new policies 
were seen as too ambitious and sometimes dangerous for Turkey.7 The practice of this 
rather daring foreign policy requires a strong economy and Turkey seems to be well 
aware of the importance of energy for such a strong economy.8  Taking these necessities 
into account, the new approach in Turkish foreign policy was more obvious in Turkey’s 
relations with Russia. The almost non-existent relations between Turkey and the Soviet 
Union were replaced by the tremendously increasing Turkish–Russian relations within a 
decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its replacement by Russia.   
																																																								
4 Alan Makovsky, "The new activism in Turkish foreign policy," Sais Review 19, no. 1 (1999). 
5 Malik Mufti, Daring and caution in Turkish strategic culture: republic at sea  (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009). 
6 Soner Çağaptay, "Is Turkey Leaving the West? An Islamist Foreign Policy Puts Ankara at Odds 
With Its Former Allies," Foreign Affairs 26(2009). 
7 Morton Abramowitz and Henri J Barkey, "Turkey's transformers: The AKP sees big," Foreign 
Affairs (2009). 
8 TurkishMinistryofForeignAffairs, "Turkey's Energy Strategy," ed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
	 5	
 Turkish–Russian Relations in the Post Cold War Setting 
The Russian and Ottoman Empires have fought along their borders in Caucasus 
and Balkans for centuries. One of these two empires has taken its place in the pages of 
history by opening a new era for a young republic. Modern Turkey, with its post–imperial 
nation-state status, looked for a peaceful existence in the early stages of the republic.9 In 
the early years of the republic, a friendly neighbor in the northeast was Soviet Russia, 
soon to become the Soviet Union. In a sense, the Soviet Union was the continuation of 
the last existing empire, and survived almost until the end of the twentieth century.  The 
friendly relations within the brief early period of the Turkish Republic were frozen 
throughout the Cold War years when Turkey was forced to take a side in the war, and 
found refuge in the West, especially after the aggressive demands of Stalin’s Soviet 
Union.  
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new environment for both Turkey and 
Russia, in which the three key variables of this study gained much greater meaning. 
While it might be possible to consider the end of the Cold War as a variable, it makes 
more sense to examine the more specific variables that it helped shape. The end of the 
Cold War and the consequent opportunity for a more independent foreign policy 
definitely was the major variable that changed relationships. However, this study focuses 
on more specific variables in order to weigh their importance while acknowledging that 
none of these variables would be possible in a Cold War environment where Turkey’s 
																																																								
9 Mustafa Aydin, "The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European 
Vocation," The Review of International Affairs 3, no. 2 (2003). p. 318 Aydin notes that,  
“Ataturk’s foreign policy was clearly an extension of his domestic policies. He realized that a 
peaceful foreign policy was needed in order to achieve his far-reaching reforms inside Turkey.” 
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foreign policy was strictly tied to its allies, specifically the U.S. Thus, this study 
scrutinizes the specific variables within the broader environment that made these 
variables possible.  
In the post Cold War setting, Russia abandoned its formerly ambitious and hostile 
policy in search of prestige as well as friendly powers in the region. Turkey, with its new, 
relatively independent foreign policy, saw this new setting as an opportunity for 
developing relations with its long-time rival. Although the first years after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union were spent in instability and caution, the transition period was replaced 
with mutual agreements beginning in 2000. In September 2000, then Turkish Prime 
Minister Ismail Cem and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov came together 
in the U.N. General Assembly in New York. During the conversation, the two ministers 
discussed the relations between their respective countries and areas of bilateral 
cooperation were discussed in more detail.10 A visit by the chairman of the Russian 
government to Ankara took place a month later. Since then, the relations between the two 
states have developed in several issue areas from tourism, to trade, to energy. 
Furthermore, a convergence in foreign policies of the two states is also evident. 
History and Nature of Rapprochement Between Russia and Turkey  
The starting point for the process that created the deepening of political dialogue 
between the two states is seen in the Eurasia Action Plan of 2001 between then-foreign 
																																																								
10 Further information about this conversation can be found in the Russian Federation’s website 
of Ankara Embassy. (http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/34.html) 
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ministers Ismail Cem and Igor Ivanov.11 Within the same year, Cem and Ivanov met 
several times, an agreement on the establishment of Blackseafor Task Force was signed, 
and the construction of Russia-Turkey Blue Stream Gas Pipeline saw significant 
progress. Since then, the cooperation between Turkey and Russia was improved in a 
broad range of issues, including energy, trade, tourism, and defense. The year 2005 was 
seen as the most significant with respect to the rapprochement. In Kiniklioglu’s words, it 
was an “annus mirabilis” from a bilateral political perspective. As he notes, within that 
year,  
President Putin and Prime Minister Erdoğan met four times, 
including a seven-hour private meeting on the Black Sea. Putin’s 
visit in December 2004 marked a monumental event in itself, as he 
was the first Russian head of state to visit Turkey in 32 years. The 
visit was crowned by the signing of a Joint Declaration on the 
“Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership” 
between Turkey and the Russian Federation. The declaration refers 
to a wide range of common interests and specifically accentuates the 
increasing confidence and trust established between the sides in 
recent years; calls for the diversification of actors in the quest of 
deepening the relationship and notes that both countries are Eurasian 
powers which value security and stability.12  
																																																								
11 Suat Kiniklioglu, "The Anatomy of Russian-Turkish Relations," (Ankara: German Marshall 




This study attempts to evaluate the influence of three variables that are 
hypothesized to have triggered the rapprochement process. Namely, these variables are 
(1) Deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the West, (2) Common perception of the U.S. 
as a threat in the Caucasus and the Black Sea, and (3) Turkey’s increasing need for 
energy (the development in the Turkish economy and Turkish aspirations for an energy 
hub status).  
This study will examine the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey in two 
cases identified below, the Middle East and the South Caucasus. To do so, this work will 
examine the following indicators of rapprochement: the number of high-level official 
visits between Russia and Turkey, the increase in the number of agreements made, and 
the increase in political dialogue (mutual discussion of the regional/international issues 
and an increase in bilateral relations) within the fourteen-year timeframe.  
This study makes use of prominent Turkish newspapers (mostly Hurriyet, Milliyet 
and Sabah newspapers) in addition to the information obtained from the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry, the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, and Turkish Statistics 
Institution. The frequency and the content of the Russian- related news in the newspapers 
within the fourteen-year timeframe provide insight into the nature of rapprochement and 
the factors behind it. The information obtained from the government sources depicts the 
development of rapprochement and the explanatory power of Turkey’s energy need 
within the period. In addition to these sources, information obtained from the embassies 
of both countries is used for an overall understanding of the relations between Turkey and 
Russia. 
	 9	
a. Structured-Focused comparison method is used for the case studies. As 
explained by George and Bennett, this method is “structured” such that the 
researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and 
these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize 
data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and accumulation of 
the findings of the cases possible. The method is “focused” in that it deals 
only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined.13  Thus, this study 
seeks answers to the questions about the influence of each variable in the 
cases to be examined. And the focus is on the influence of these variables on 
the rapprochement. 
This research asks the following questions: 
(1) Is there a significant change in Turkey’s need for energy within the last 10 
years? 
(2) Is there a significant change in Turkey’s political relations with the West? 
(3) Is there a significant change in the perception of the U.S.? (Is it perceived 
as a threat in the region by Russia and Turkey?) 
(4) What is the causality mechanism behind each change and the 
rapprochement? 
(5) How did each variable affect Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East? Is 
there a similar connection between any of the variables and Turkish foreign 
policy in the Middle East? (Did the need for energy, changing threat 
																																																								
13 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social 
sciences  (Mit Press, 2005). 
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perceptions, or a disappointment in the relations with the West affect Turkey’s 
foreign policy in the Middle East?) 
(6) How did each variable affect Turkish foreign policy in the Caspian 
region? Likewise, did any of these (the need for energy, changing threat 
perceptions or a disappointment in the relations with the West) affect 
Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East? 
This method allows us to concentrate on the most similar sample regions 
where we can test our focus area (rapprochement) by employing several 
variables (need for energy, deterioration of relations with the West and 
perception of the U.S. as a threat) instead of relying on a single historical case.  
b. The two cases to evaluate these variables are the Middle East and the South 
Caucasus. These are the regions that both Turkey and Russia are interested in 
and consider to be within their influence area. Turkish foreign policy changes 
in these two regions will help us understand the explanatory power of the 
variables. Each case will be analyzed with the perspective of “how the 
relations in this case would develop with each variable and how it actually 
did” and this analysis will bring us back to the explanatory power of that 
specific variable in Turkish-Russian rapprochement.  
c. The three explanations for rapprochement have been determined with the 
literature review on the subject. Although there was not a consensus on the 
main explanation for rapprochement, there was a concentration on these three 
variables of rapprochement. This study analyzes each of them  as well as their 
respective theoretical backgrounds with their explanatory power. A number of 
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indicators will be used to understand their respective influences.  
(1) The indicators for Turkey’s need for energy are: A change in Turkey’s 
GDP, a change in the amount of Turkey’s imported oil and natural gas, a 
change in the amount of oil and natural gas transported via Turkey, and a 
change in the global price of oil and of imported natural gas.  
(2) The indicators for deterioration of Turkey’s political relations with the 
West are EU reports on the accession process of Turkey; political 
statements by high-level Turkish government officials; the number of 
president/prime minister visits from Turkey to European nations and to the 
U.S, and vice versa; and opinion polls about the EU and the U.S. 
(3) The indicators for the Russo-Turkish perception of the U.S. as a threat in 
the region are Russian and Turkish government responses to the invasion 
of Iraq, responses to the color revolutions in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, the responses to the U.S. attempts to get actively involved in the 
Black Sea, and political statements against the U.S. 
d. This study is completed with onsite research in Turkey.  
While each variable will be analyzed with its explanatory power, it would be 
unrealistic to argue that there is a single dimension behind rapprochement. For that 
reason, even if a variable seems to have a relatively weak explanation, its influence is 
also studied in depth. Although both sides of the coin (Russian and Turkish perspectives) 
are analyzed, the focus is on the change in Turkish foreign policy towards Russia. 
Since studies of Turkish–Russian relations typically point to the rapprochement as 
having begun in the early 2000s, I focused on the period from 2000 to today. Thus, the 
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comparison between the years 2000 and 2014 will explain the increased level of 
rapprochement. Despite the consequences of the end of the Cold War, and Russia’s rise 
as a new state that started almost a decade earlier, the first 10 years were ones of 
hesitation for Russia’s foreign policy orientation. A comparison and analysis of the 
journeys of each of the foreign policies of the two countries will provide a better 
understanding of the nature of rapprochement between these two countries.  
Three Variables for Rapprochement 
First Variable: Deterioration of Turkey’s Relations with the West 
One variable that might have triggered the rapprochement is the change in 
Turkey’s political relations with the West in this period. Although the deterioration was 
not reflected in economic relations, the political discourse of the governments and high-
level officials revealed a suspicion against the U.S and the EU. The relations with the 
West were mostly affected by the EU accession process (with respect to EU) and the 
2003 Iraq War (with respect to the U.S.). 
Turkey has embraced EU membership as a major foreign policy goal. This goal 
has been in line with the century-long Westernization project of Turkey. Turkey found 
itself quite close to this goal when the EU agreed to open accession negotiations with 
Turkey at its summit in Brussels in December 2004. However, these early hopes were 
replaced by frustration. In 2005, the Constitutional Treaty was rejected by France and the 
Netherlands; this was a strong indicator of the public opinion against enlargement of the 
EU. Furthermore, others like Bulgaria and Romania were accepted soon after, in 2007, 
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giving the impression that even if there would be an enlargement it could hardly involve 
Turkey. The situation was expressed in a RAND report with the following statement, 
The deterioration of relations with the United States and Europe has 
not only reinforced a growing sense of nationalism but also sparked 
a search for new options. Some parts of the AKP [Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)]have begun to 
look to the Middle East as a means of compensating for weakening 
relations with the West, while others have suggested that Turkey 
should look more to Russia. Some have also advocated a “Eurasian 
option,” which would exploit Turkey’s economic and cultural ties 
with the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. 
Similarly, a CSIS report sees “enlargement fatigue and concerns about Turkey’s 
political and social direction” as the source of leadership and public reluctance for further 
negotiations.14 The overall European approach certainly created a frustration on the 
Turkish front as well. The accession of Cyprus to the EU in May 2004 also added to the 
complication of the relations. As noted by Açıkmeşe and Triantaphyllou, this change in 
the structure of the EU complicated EU–NATO relations as well.15 All these factors 
caused a rise in frustration towards the EU.  Even the support for EU membership has 
declined in Turkey. In 2004, 73 percent of the Turkish population supported EU 
membership; in 2006, that portion dropped to 54 percent.16 
This variable by no means suggests that Turkey’s associations with the West 
would be replaced by the Eastern actors like Russia and China. As, Turkey’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs declares in its website, Turkey still considers the West as the only focus 
																																																								
14 Final Report of the CSIS U.S.-Turkey Strategic Initiative, March 2009  
15 Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, "The NATO–EU–Turkey trilogy: the 
impact of the Cyprus conundrum," Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 12, no. 4 (2012): 
p.555. 
16 Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2007, Washington D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the 
United States, 2007 p.22 
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in its political and economic goals and .17 Within this period, still, most of the trade was 
with Europe, and all governments in this period had embraced the EU membership as a 
major foreign policy goal. However, it depicts the need Turkey felt to reassess its 
relations with the West and to diversify its foreign policy. In some cases this resulted in 
better relations with the Middle East and in some cases it meant more trade with Russia, 
China and Iran.   
Within this period, the EU was not the only entity with which relations 
deteriorated. Relations with a more permanent ally, the U.S., were also in decline. 
Following the terrorist acts in the U.S. on September 11, 2001, Turkey (like many other 
members of the international community) offered full support for America’s war on 
terror. However, as America’s war on terrorism extended to its immediate neighborhood 
with a questioned legitimacy, relations began to deteriorate with the U.S. as well. The 
first sign was the rejection of the authorization of the use of Turkish facilities for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 1, 2003. Later, the arrest of Turkish Special Forces 
personnel in Iraq increased the feelings of disappointment. The political tension between 
the two countries was seen in public opinion as well. According to a poll in July 2005, 
some 50 percent of the respondents in Turkey held “absolute negative view” of the U.S.18 
The long-lasting PKK terror in Turkey also played a role in the deterioration of 
relations.19 The perception of a U.S reluctance to act against PKK inside Iraq was seen as 
offensive by many Turks. It also implied a double standard in the “war on terror.”  
																																																								
17 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), "Turkey-EU Relations,"  
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa. 
18 “Turkish Public Opinion about the USA and Americans,” ARI Movement, sponsored by Koç 
Holding, July 5, 2005 ( www.ari.org.tr) 
19 Banu Eligür, "Turkish-American relations since the 2003 Iraqi war: a troubled partnership," 
Crown Center Middle East Brief, no. 6 (2006): p.2. 
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Second Variable: Common Perception of the U.S. as a Threat in Caucasia and the Black 
Sea 
Another variable that might have triggered the rapprochement is the common 
perception of the U.S. as a threat in the Black Sea and Caucasus region. For sometimes 
converging and sometimes diverging reasons, both Turkey and Russia distanced 
themselves from the U.S. involvement in the Black Sea and Caucasus region. The 
American activity in Black Sea and Caucasia were seen as dangerous by Russia and 
Turkey.20 In particular, after the Iraq War and the resulting chaos in Iraq, Turkey and 
Russia got more anxious about the developments in this region.  
Russian attitudes were a product of their desire to maintain their dominant power 
in the region. This was reinforced with the post Cold War humiliation and a resulting fear 
of a U.S. and European penetration of the region. Hill and Taşpınar argue that with this 
concern about its regional and global position, Russia “pursued the creation of its own 
single economic space in Eurasia focused on major regional trading partners like Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan.”21 Already having lost several former satellites to organizations like the 
EU and NATO, Russia  worried about losing its influence in the immediate 
neighborhood. Even the situation with territorial conflicts in the Caucasus region was 
preferable to Russia over a long-term settlement that could bring further uncertainties.  
The U.S. policy for color revolutions brought regime change in Georgia in 2003, 
in Ukraine in December 2004, and in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005; all these were also 
																																																								
20 Ariel Cohen and Conway Irwin, "US Strategy in the Black Sea Region," Backgrounder 
Backgrounder Backgrounder, no. 1990 (2006). 
21 Hill and Taspinar, “Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus: Moving Together to Preserve the 
Status Quo ”,  ifri Research Programme Russia/NIS, January 2006 
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observed with concern by Russia and Turkey.22 Likewise, neither Russia nor Turkey was 
enthusiastic about the membership of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO. Russia did not 
want to lose its sphere of influence and Turkey preferred a slower pace.  
Similarly, following the chaos in Iraq after the 2003 Iraq War, the Black Sea 
turned into another region of paranoia. The U.S. involvement in the Black Sea was seen 
as a possible intervention to Russian and Turkish seas, and was met with caution. Due to 
this perception, the United States’ request for an observer status in the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was not accepted by Russia, and Turkey did not make 
any effort toward its acceptance.  
Russian fear concentrating on the threat to its current interests in the Black Sea 
and Caucasus region and Turkish fear concentrating on a possible instability within the 
region (possibly created by the U.S. democratization agenda) caused emergence of a 
strong will on both sides to preserve the current status quo in the Caucasus and the Black 
Sea. 
Third Variable: Turkey’s Increasing Need for Energy (Developing Turkish Economy and 
Turkish Aspirations for an Energy Hub Status)  
The development in the Turkish economy has increased the need for energy. 
Furthermore, Turkey has aspirations to become a regional energy hub by using the merits 
of its geographic location. So, Turkey needs Russian oil and natural gas not just for its 
own use, but also as a means of gaining status through its trade.  
Energy has always played a role in foreign policy. The weight of energy in 
																																																								
22 Hill and Taspinar “Axis of the Excluded,” Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp 81-92 
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foreign policy has changed according to the states and regions. While Russia has been 
criticized for using energy as a weapon in its relations, the U.S. was criticized for not 
integrating energy and foreign policy. Kalicki and Goldwyn summarize the issue in 
Energy and Security: Introduction: The Need to Integrate Energy and  Foreign Policy.   
Foreign energy producers—particularly those in the Arabian Gulf 
and increasingly Russia—have been able to integrate their energy 
development policies more effectively with their own economic and 
foreign policy interests. Saudi Arabia has long traded oil for U.S. 
military protection and for bearance on its domestic policies. China 
has used the power of its enormous market to trade oil for arms and 
to access supply where U.S. sanctions have banned U.S. companies 
from operating.23  
As a developing economy, Turkish economy is in need of energy and almost 
totally dependent on outside energy sources in terms of oil and gas.  Turkey lacks the 
strategic stocks for oil and gas (Tables 1 and 2 show the oil and natural gas resources in 
Turkey) and—in terms of natural gas—is mostly dependent on two sources, which have 
proved unreliable in earlier events: Russia and Iran. Despite the lack of its own energy 
sources, Turkey has the advantage of its geographical location (Graphs 1 and 2 show the 
crude oil and natural gas supply mix for Turkey). Turkey is located in close proximity to 
72 percent of the world’s proven gas and 73 percent of oil reserves, in particular those in 
the Middle East and the South Caucasus.24 
 
																																																								
23 Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, Energy and Security: Introduction: The Need to 
Integrate Energy and Foreign Policy   
24 Turkish Ministry of ForeignAffairs, "Turkey's Energy Strategy."  
(http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa) 
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Figure 1: Turkey's Crude Oil Supply Mix 
	
Source: U.S. EIA27 
Figure 2: Turkey's Natural Gas Supply Mix 
	
Source: U.S. EIA28 
Turkey’s new independent foreign policy requires a delicate balance, and energy 
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is a significant component of this balance. There are three pillars of energy relations 
between Turkey and energy exporting countries. The first pillar is the consumer–producer 
relationship between Turkey and these countries. The second is Turkey’s role as a transit 
country for the energy from these countries to other consumers. And, the third pillar is 
the global market’s pressure on the nature of energy relations. Each of these pillars has a 
specific effect on the level of cooperation between Turkey and energy exporting 
countries. 
Furthermore, in addition to its role as an energy consumer, Turkey has the 
geographic location advantage of being close to 70 percent of the world’s oil and gas 
resources. As a result, an energy hub status is embraced by Turkey and the desire is to 
become a bridge between the major producers in the Caspian Sea basin and the Middle 
East regions and the major consumers in Europe.   
Literature Review: How This Dissertation Will Contribute 
There is not a rich literature specifically on the rapprochement between Russia 
and Turkey. However, there has been a wider spectrum of work on the changes in the 
foreign policies of the two countries since the Cold War. The literature about the recent 
rapprochement between Turkey and Russia looks into the same picture with different 
perspectives. The general imperatives for the rapprochement are accepted by most 
scholars, but the weight they attribute to each of these explanations differs. Hill and 





and other areas of trade as well as “removing several bones of contention” in the security 
area between the two states.29  
The results of the 2003 Iraq war and the relations between Europe and these two 
states led the rapprochement to be described as “the axis of the excluded” by the same 
scholars.30 While pragmatism and a sense of being excluded is mentioned by some, a 
change toward an ambitious foreign policy for the two states has also been seen as a 
factor of rapprochement. Laurelle concentrated on Eurasianism and its acceptance by 
certain circles in Turkey. She emphasizes the growth of nationalist and anti-Western 
movements in both Russian and Turkish political circles.31 According to her, Eurasianism 
is “a very relevant example of a prolonged ‘post-imperial trauma’ that both Turkey and 
Russia have due to their historically geographical and cultural dilemma vis-à-vis the 
West.”32 Kiniklioglu, on the other hand, emphasizes that the modest start of the relations 
in trade has evolved with the energy dimension and spread to several areas, while the 
external factors brought the political and strategic dimension.33 He adds that this is still a 
defensive rapprochement in nature.34 Rzayev sees the similarity in geopolitical situations 
as a source of rapprochement. Russia’s disappointment in being excluded from the 
European security architecture and the perception of threat from EU and NATO 
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Marshall Fund of the United States) 
	 23	
enlargement coincided with Turkey’s disappointment in EU accession talks and 
deterioration of ties with the United States especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003.35  
While the literature on Turkish-Russian rapprochement is limited, a number of 
authors have written about the change in the foreign policies. Among these, Belopolsky 
has examined the Russian alignment with China, Iran, and Iraq and used four different 
theories for the explanation of these alignments.36 Her explanations included Alliance 
Theory/Balance of Power, social constructivism, economic neo-liberalism, and 
governmental politics.  
Brenda Shaffer has written about the pipeline politics of Turkey, and indicated her 
concern about the lack of a strategic plan and little integration of energy issues into 
Turkey’s overall foreign and security policies.37 Her interest in energy security brought 
the energy perspective into the scene.  
Turkey’s new position after the Cold War, and the importance of energy relations 
between Russia and Turkey, have been popular subjects for the think tanks. However, the 
issue has not been as vigorously discussed in the academic arena. Two of the studies by 
CSIS38 and RAND39 analyzed the post Cold War change in Turkish foreign policy. 
Similarly, a conference, held by the Brookings Institution, analyzed the relationship 
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between Turkey, Russia and Regional Energy Strategies emphasized the importance of 
energy in relations and was discussed by academics in an audience of business people as 
well as diplomats.   
Energy security has gained increasing academic attraction within the last decade. 
However, the main focus was on the great power politics and its relationship with energy. 
This study looks into the issue from a middle-power perspective. Especially in the uni-
polar and multi-polar environments following the Cold War, energy’s integration with 
foreign policy was not analyzed in depth. This study will contribute to our understanding 
of the effects of energy on foreign policy of the middle powers and the flexibility it 
provides in a multi-polar security environment. 
There is little in literature about the post Cold War rapprochement between Russia 
and Turkey. Certainly, this dissertation will not be the only work on the rapprochement 
between Turkey and Russia. However, with its more comprehensive nature, it brings an 
in-depth analytical approach for determining which explanation is the best and why it is 
so. The contribution of this work will be on comparing the explanations and analyzing: 
• The weight/importance of Turkey’s energy need in the post Cold War security 
environment. 
• Changing contours of Turkish foreign policy towards Russia after the Cold War. 
• Explanatory power of energy need in middle-power relations in the post Cold War 
setting. 
• Turkish foreign policy in the two other regions of direct Turkish interest: the 
Middle East and the South Caucasus. 
• Turkish-Russian rapprochement in a wider timeframe than specific policy 
	 25	
changes at certain moments.  
Several scholars who have written about this rapprochement have emphasized 
different importance levels for these main explanations. However, their respective 
influences have not been studied with an analytical approach by looking into how they 
were influential in other cases of foreign policy. This study looks into two regions of 
interest for Turkey and attempts to evaluate the variables of rapprochement by testing 
them in these two regions. Thus, the cases to be used as a test are the foreign policy 
choices of Turkey in the Middle East and the South Caucasus. Turkey has direct 
relationships in these two regions and this study seeks to determine whether these 
explanations are valid in the changing contours of foreign policies in these two regions. 
Each variable/source of rapprochement is examined with its relative influence in the 
foreign policies in these two regions, and a conclusion about the main variable for 




TURKISH - RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT 
Historical Background of Turkish-Russian Relations 
The neighborhood and early official encounter of the Turkish and Russian states 
goes back to 1475 when Ottomans conquered the Genoese fortress of Caffa and became 
neighbors to the Muscovite Princes.1 Since then, the more than 500 years of history has 
moments of cooperation as well as of severe confrontation. While some consider this 
history as developing on the basis of “mutual distrust fed by fear,”2 some are inclined to 
consider the total 50 years of war as a negligible part of the Turko-Russian relations.   
In fact, since 1568, there have been 13 wars between the two, not to mention the 
long Cold War. There was geographical, cultural, and economic rivalry between the two 
states throughout centuries. This rivalry and its resulting  confrontation have been 
supported by negative perceptions that passed from generations to generations.3 
However, there were brief periods of rapprochement interspersed throughout the 
confrontation. Imanov lists three periods of rapprochement before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union: First rapprochement between 1798 – 1805, second rapprochement between 
1833 – 1838 and the third rapprochement between 1920 – 1935.4 The third period of 
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	 27	
rapprochement emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the first decade 
of hesitation following the collapse, the relationships already established in terms of 
shuttle trade and cultural/tourist visits were made more concrete by the officials of both 
countries.5 This chapter aims to analyze the nature of this last rapprochement between the 
two states under five main subtitles: approach to directly or indirectly related political 
issues, bureaucratic level dialogue represented in working groups or high-level official 
visits, areas of economic cooperation, military dialogue, and cultural dialogue.  
Approach to Directly or Indirectly Related Political Issues 
There have been a significant number of political issues in which both states were 
directly involved. Some were more fragile for one and less for the other like Chechnya 
for Russia and Cyprus for Turkey. The Iraq War was also important for its related 
international political dispute. Within the common neighborhood of the two states, the 
relations with Georgia and Armenia attracted significant attention as well. 
Chechnya 
A concurrence–if not a convergence–was experienced in the approach to the 
Chechnya problem. In the early uncertainty period of the post-Cold War era, both Turkey 
and Russia accused each other of supporting separatist movements within their states.6 
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Several Caucasian diasporas living in Turkey had an important lobbying effect on the 
Turkish foreign policy relating to Chechnya. However, Turkey came to realize that the 
ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus could have ramifications within Turkey and create 
instability in the broader region. So, despite the lobbying pressure of several Caucasian 
diasporas within Turkey, a growing apprehension was observed in Turkish foreign policy 
towards Chechnya.7 Although, in 2001, a hostage crisis caused some tension in relations 
between the two states, Turkey made some positive steps toward good will to help Russia 
in this problem.8 The expulsion of B.Z. Arslangereyev (a person claimed to be a Chechen 
terrorist by Russia) from Turkey, the banning of the entry of leaders of terrorist 
formations operating in Chechnya9, and the talks between the CHODs of the two states 
on this issue were all signs of this new attitude.10 
Cyprus 
As the change in the Turkish attitude toward Russia’s Chechnya problem, 
Russia’s approach to the Cyprus problem also moved into a friendlier zone within the last 
decade. Cyprus has been one of the most important problems of Turkish foreign policy. 
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In 1960, a partnership state between Turkish and Greek Cypriots was established in 
accordance with the international agreements signed by the Turkish, Greek and British 
governments, and the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Following the disagreements and 
problems between the two partners in the island and an annexation attempt of the island 
to Greece, Turkey intervened and moved its troops to the island in 1974. Consequently, 
Turkish Cypriots set up their own republic, while continuing the search for 
reconciliation.11  
Since then, there has been a continuous stalemate in the island, and due to its 
cultural roots with Greek Cypriots and economic relations with the southern part of 
Cyprus, Russia is seen as favoring the Greek side of the conflict. Turkey experienced a 
Cyprus Missile Crisis when the Greek Cypriot Administration made a deal with Russia to 
buy some S-300 surface to air missiles in early 1997 and when there were talks on buying 
more T-80 Russian tanks.12 Although Russia was not seen as one of the sides of the crisis 
this event had a deteriorating effect on relations. Likewise, intensification of Turkey’s 
relations with Israel caused worries in Russia with regard to its overall Middle East 
policies.13 Thus, due to some economic, political and cultural reasons, Russian policies 
were mostly in favor of the Greek side in the Cyprus conflict.  
However, Russian approaches to the Cyprus issue have become more neutral in 
the last ten years, or, in some cases, have changed to favor the Turkish side. This has 
been recorded as the first divergence from the Cyprus policy in 31 years.14 As a 
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consequence of this change, in addition to the several consultations held between Turkey 
and Russia before the 2005 referenda on the island, Russia later made statements to lift 
isolation on Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and emphasized unfair 
isolation as well.15   
Iraq War  
Another case where a similarity was observed in the foreign policy choices of the 
two states was their approach to the 2003 Iraq War. Both Turkey and Russia had 
supported the U.S. War on Terrorism, and the war in Afghanistan after 9/11. However, 
their support wavered when it came to the WMD arguments and invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Kremlin cooperated in the war in Afghanistan in terms of neglecting its earlier objections 
to the U.S. presence in the region, arming the Northern alliance and even sharing 
intelligence.16 However, this stance did not last long, and after a covert period in which 
France and Germany mainly objected to the invasion of Iraq, Russia sharply voiced its 
objection as well.17 Furthermore, there was sharp criticism from Putin, who called the 
invasion “a direct violation of international law, and a major political blunder” and added 
that "Russia was seeking to stop military action as soon as possible.”18 Several objectives 
were sought in Russian policy before, during, and after the Iraq War. These included the 
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assertion of Russia as an important global actor, the protection of positive U.S.–Russian 
relations after 9/11, and, most importantly, the protection of economic interests.19 
Although this might seem natural for a longtime U.S. rival, interestingly, Turkish foreign 
response to the Iraq war was another surprise for the U.S. government. Turkey, a long 
time ally, also had supported the war in Afghanistan. As a secular country with a 
substantial Muslim population, Turkey was seen as a role model for many, and quickly 
assumed a high-profile role in the war in Afghanistan.20 When the International Security 
Assistance Force was established in Afghanistan, the second commander of the Force 
was a Turkish General.21 However, like Russia, Turkey’s approach to the Iraq War was 
not sympathetic. To America’s surprise, Turkish parliament rejected the motion presented 
by the AKP government to make Turkish territory available for a northern front. Some 
referred to this as the power of the parliament since the decision was made despite the 
cabinet.22 Some attributed the rejection to the “realpolitik security considerations to 
counter-balance Iran and the U.S.” as well as political motivations of the ruling Justice 
and Development party.23 And, some explained the situation with “the impact of identity 
politics and historical narratives on perceptions of interests.”24 Whatever the underlying 
cause, Turkey and Russia were once more finding themselves on the same ground in 
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another international issue.  
Caucasus 
Although there was not a direct convergence of approaches in the Caucasus 
politics of the two states, the relative lack of turbulence in the region in terms of 
conflicting interests was another sign of the rapprochement. Historically, in Caucasus 
there was a clash of Turkish and Russian interests. In the South Caucasus, there was a 
particularly unfriendly border. Among the three states of the region, Armenia was mostly 
in the same bloc with Iran and Russia, while Georgia and Azerbaijan were on the 
Western-oriented Turkish side. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was the 
long-lasting problem of the region. Furthermore, in 2008, Russia’s war with Georgia 
became another source of tension.  
However, despite the vast differences between Russia and Turkey, the 
relationship between the two states was not drastically affected by the tensions in the 
region. Caucasus became an area of contact and cooperation for Turkey, Russia and the 
U.S. following years of rivalry.25 There were even signs of new Turkish activism in the 
region that seemed to have jeopardized the U.S. interest in the South Caucasus. Turkey’s 
efforts to mend fences with Armenia and the regional initiative of Caucasus Platform for 
Cooperation and Stability that Turkey started were indicators of changing policies in the 
region.26 The Turkish efforts for normalizing relations with Armenia even caused 
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troubles with Azerbaijan.27 From a political, legal, and social perspective it would be 
hard to consider the Caucasus as an integrated region. From a political perspective, the 
North Caucasus is part of the Russian Federation; the southern part of Caucasus is formed 
of northern provinces of Iran and Turkey and Azerbaijan; and Armenia and Georgia have 
been independent republics since the end of the Cold War. Among these states, Armenia 
has always had significant support from Russia, while Azerbaijan and Georgia were 
oriented to the West. Naturally, with the effect of a long Soviet period, these two states 
were fragile to domestic conflicts and their minorities have enjoyed the support and 
protection of Russia.28   
Within the last 10 years, a change in the Turkish diplomacy was deeply felt in its 
relations with Armenia. President Gül’s visit to Yerevan for a soccer game, for example, 
showed that the earlier slow diplomacy in the region was improving. However, this 
attempt did not last long, due primarily to domestic reasons and sensitivity of relations 
with Azerbaijan.29 From an interest-focused perspective, within this period, Russia’s 
policy–considered to be based more on realpolitik– had the tendency towards “subtle 
balancing” and successfully caused the deterioration of Turkey’s relations with 
Azerbaijan and the West. This resulted in the leaning of Azerbaijan and Armenia more to 
Russia.30 
																																																								
27 E. Uslu, "Ankara-Yerevan Rapprochement Strains Turkey’s Relations with Azerbaijan,”" 
Eurasia Daily Monitor 6, no. 68 (2009). 
28 E. Ismailov and V. Papava, "A new concept for the Caucasus," Southeast European and Black 
Sea Studies 8, no. 3 (2008): 283. 
29 M. Reynolds, "Turkey’s Troubles in the Caucasus," Middle East Strategy at Harvard (Olin 
Institute: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs) 31(2008): 19. 
30 I. Torbakov, "Russia and Turkish-Armenian Normalization: Competing Interests in the South 
Caucasus," Insight Turkey 12, no. 2. 
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High Level Bureaucratic Dialogue 
Parallel to the change in approaches to political issues, there has been a significant 
increase in the size and number of bureaucratic-level dialogue between the two states. 
This dialogue has been represented in cooperative work of the officials as well as the 
mutual visits from foreign ministers, prime ministers, and presidents of the two countries.  
In September 2000, the year Russia’s Exports Capabilities-2000 was held in 
Istanbul,31 the two ministers of Foreign Affairs met in the 55th session of the UN General 
Assembly and discussed a broad range of issues from the situation in the Persian Gulf to 
the Palestinian–Israeli dialogue, the situation in Afghanistan, and the state of affairs in 
Cyprus. 
In the next meeting of the two ministers, the bilateral issues were discussed in 
more detail, and at the close of the meeting, the ministers signed a Plan of Action to 
Develop Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey.32 
With this document a new mechanism of consultation was created—the High Level Joint 
Working Group, made up of the representatives of the ministers of foreign affairs. For the 
first time in a Russian–Turkish document, the fields of dialogue and cooperation were set 
forth extensively. The consultations between the two countries covered many aspects of 
the international agenda, and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, 
expressed the similarities of the views at a press conference following the signing of the 
																																																								
31 Embassy of the Russian Federation in Turkey, "A Russia's Export Capabilities-2000 Exhibition 
to Be Held in Istanbul, Turkey,"  http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/33.html. 
32 Transcript of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov’s Remarks at 
Press Conference Following the Signing of a Russian – Turkish document. (New York, 
November 16, 2001) 
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document. He stated that, “The two countries agreed to cooperate actively in the Eurasian 
area, including with a view to assisting the political resolution of conflict situations, 
reinforcement of stability and the certain conditions for sustainable development in the 
region.”33 
Within this context, the high level joint working group (HLJWG) meetings were 
held in 2003, 2004, and 2005. In 2003, a Turkish delegate met with Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Ivanov and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Saltanov, in 
Moscow. In this meeting, issues about mutual cooperation and issues concerning the 
Middle East, specifically Iraq, were considered. The Eurasian interests of both states and 
the struggle against international terrorism were the other two issues on the agenda of this 
first meeting. 
Consequently, another significant joint working group was held in Ankara in 
2004. In this fifth meeting, which took place December 5-6, 2004, the representatives of 
the foreign ministries of the two countries exchanged views on topical questions of 
Russian-Turkish relations as well as on a number of major international problems 
affecting the interests of Russia and Turkey. These included the situation in the South 
Caucasus, Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan, and issues of cooperation in the Black Sea 
region and of Middle East and Cyprus settlement.34 In the course of this HLJWG 
meeting, prospects for the further development of Russian-Turkish relations in the 
political, economic and other fields were examined. The sides also discussed some 
pressing regional and international problems, among them Middle East settlement and the 
																																																								
33 ibid. 
34 Embassy of the Russian Federation in Turkey, "Russian-Turkish High-Level Joint Working 
Group Meets in Regular Session "  http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t76.html. 
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situation in Iraq, conditions in the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus and Central 
Asia, and Cyprus settlement.35  
There were also visits from the foreign ministers of both countries within this 
period. Some of the meetings took place as visits and some happened as lengthy meetings 
in an international setting. As part of this dialogue, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sergei Lavrov visited Turkey in 2006. During this visit, several Turkish newspapers, 
including Sabah, Milliyet, and Hürriyet, published interviews with Lavrov. In 2007, more 
consultation was held between the foreign ministers. Another visit from Lavrov took 
place in 2008, which was followed by a visit from Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu’s to Russia in 2009. 
Finally, at a higher level, sometimes even in a personalized way, dialogue could 
be observed at the president or prime minister level visits made by both countries. In July 
2005, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and Russian president Putin met in Sochi, Russia. 
In the Fall of the same year, Putin was in Samsun, Turkey for the opening ceremony of 
Blue Stream Gas Pipeline. In June 2006, Putin and Turkish President Ahmet Necdet 
Sezer met in Moscow.36 The dialogue in 2006 continued as new presidents took office. 
Russian president Medvedev and Turkish president Abdullah Gül met in Astana, 
Kazakhstan in 2008. Another significant event indicative of this high-level dialogue was 
the teleconference held among Putin, Erdoğan and Berlusconi in 2009. 
All the indicators of high-level bureaucratic dialogue were signs of 
																																																								
35 Embassy of the Russian Federation in Turkey, "Regular Meeting of the Russian-Turkish High-
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36 Embassy of the Russian Federation in Turkey, "President Vladimir Putin met with President of 
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rapprochement between Russia and Turkey. The bureaucratic approaches were very often 
accompanied by substantial economic relations, which were sometimes reinforced by 
these official visits. The next section of this chapter will focus on the economic aspect of 
Turkish–Russian rapprochement.   
Areas of Economic Cooperation: Turkish–Russian Rapprochement in Economics 
Very often, Turkish—Russian rapprochement was reflected in the economic 
relations between the two countries. The economic relations were observed in a number 
of differing areas. In this section, I will touch upon four main areas of economic 
cooperation: trade, energy, construction, and tourism. In each of these areas, a significant 
increase in the relations between the two countries was observed. 
Trade 
Trade was the first significant form of relationship between Turkey and post Cold 
War Russia. The earliest form of trade between the two countries was the shuttle trade∗ 
that started right after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Over time, registered trade 
replaced this form of trade. Once the shuttle trade came under control, it was easier to 
check and the amount of trade between the two countries has shown a significant increase 
in recent years. From the second half of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the trade 
was also reinforced due to the complementary character of the Turkish and Russian 
																																																								
∗ Shuttle trade is a term used for a Russian economic practice in which traders shuttle backwards 
and forwards across the country buying goods from cheap sources, major port cities, or outside 
Russia, and selling them in the Russian interior. 
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economies.37 Turkish exports to the Russian Federation were mostly composed of 
manufactured goods such as textiles, chemicals, food, and vehicles. On the other hand, 
Russian exports were mostly raw materials such as oil, natural gas, and metals. This 
difference in the nature of exported goods caused high elasticity of the Turkish exports 
and has been disadvantageous for Turkey.  
The trade imbalance between the two has shown fluctuation throughout the years 
especially in times of economic crises. The 1.5-billion-dollar volume of trade between 
Turkey and the Russian Federation in 1993 increased to 4.2 billion dollars in 1997. 
Within this period, the trade revenues of Turkey and the Russian Federation were 
relatively equal. After the 1998 economic crisis in the Russian Federation, the amount of 
Turkish exports to the Russian Federation declined sharply—34.4 percent in 1998 and 
56.3 percent in 1999.38  
 
Table 3: Turkey's Bilateral Trade with Russia 
Years Export Import Balance Volume 
2007 4,7 23,5 -18,7 28,2 
2008 6,4 31,3 -24,8 37,7 
2009 3,2 19,7 -16,5 22,9 
2010 4,6 21,5 -16,9 26,1 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) 
	
																																																								
37 Gulten Kazgan, "A Survey of Turkish-Russian Economic Relations in the 1990s," Insight 
Turkey 4, no. 2 (2002). 
38 Cihangir Gürkan Şen, "Türkiye - Rusya Federasyonu Ekonomik ve Ticari İlişkiler." 
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Figure 3: Turkish Export to Russia 
	
Source: Compiled by the Author from the Turkish Statistical Institute 
Figure 4: Turkish Import from Russia 
	


















































































At first, due to the unregistered shuttle trade, it was not easy to quantify the level 
of trade between Turkey and Russia. However, once the shuttle trade came under control, 
it was easier to determine the trade level and the amount of trade between the two 
countries has shown a significant increase in recent years. Although there were periods 
when the crises in the two countries affected their relations, mostly there has been an 
increase in the level of trade between the two.  
The increase in trade was very often supported by the governmental-level 
approaches to using diplomacy for economic goals. Turkish and Russian leaders used to 
travel with a group of businessmen. For example, in 2004, Turkish Foreign Minister 
Abdullah Gul was accompanied by 150 businessmen during his visit to Moscow. In that 
specific visit, four protocols were signed on different issues. 
Although both countries had strong economic relations with one another, there 
has always been a trade imbalance between the two. This was mainly due to the nature of 
goods exported by Turkey and Russia. The raw materials that Russia exported had a low 
level of flexibility, while the manufactured goods exported by Turkey had a high level of 
flexibility. 
Energy 
Energy and construction have been the two main areas of investment for Turkey 
and Russia. While the Turkish construction firms started operating in Russia right after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of the Turkish energy in terms of oil and natural 
gas was provided by Russia.  
This section will briefly touch upon another area of economic cooperation—
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energy. Russia, with its vast resources of oil and natural gas, was a perfect supplier for 
the rising Turkish economy, which was hungry for energy. In 1990, Turkey’s oil 
consumption was 22,700 million tons and the demand for the natural gas was 3,148 
million m3. The demand for oil increased up to 30,669 million tons and the demand for 
the natural gas also increased.  
Between 2010 and 2020, a 32.8 percent increase in Turkish oil consumption is 
expected with demand rising steadily from an estimated 640,000b/d to 850,000b/d by the 
end of the 10-year forecast period. Refining capacity between 2010 and 2020 is set to 
increase by 164.8 percent, reaching 1.62mn b/d by 2020. Gas consumption is expected to 
climb from an estimated 34bcm to 62bcm, depending largely on imports. LNG imports 
are expected to virtually double from an estimated 6.5bcm to 12.0bcm during the forecast 
period.39 
The Russian sale of natural gas to Turkey has gone through three stages: the 
period between 1984 and 1992, the period between 1992 and 1997, and the period from 
1997 to the present. In the first period, the relationship was both an economic and a 
political one. In the second period, the issue of energy became a commercial one with 
less focus on political and strategic concerns. In the third period, economic relations 
began to have a political face again.40 Overall, there were increasing economic relations 
between Russia and Turkey surrounding the energy issue as Turkey began relying even 
more heavily on Russia.  
																																																								
39 Business Monitor International, "Turkey Oil and Gas Report Q2 2011,"  
http://www.marketresearch.com/Business-Monitor-International-v304/Turkey-Oil-Gas-Q2-
6279354/. 
40 Natalya Ulçenkko, ed. Rusya ve Türkiye'nin Stratejik Güvenliğinin Sağlanmasında Enerji 
Hammaddeleri İhracat ve İthalatının Rolü (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003). 
	 42	
Construction 
Turkey has recently made a big impact in the construction sector across the world, 
and Russia has been one of the main countries in which Turkish construction companies 
are employed. According to a statement made by the Izmir Chamber of Commerce, ‘’in 
the last 30 years, the construction sector has undertaken nearly 6,000 projects worth 
around $200 billion in 89 countries and only in 2010, this figure was more than 500 
projects worth of $20 billion in 48 countries, Turkmenistan, Libya, Iraq and Russia being 
the leading countries.’’41 
The employment of construction companies in Russia started with the Russian 
state, but continued with local administrators, energy companies and banks. However, 
there were discontinuities in this sector due to the economic crisis in Russia and the 
consequent insufficient funding for the construction projects.42 
In his analysis of the Turkish–Russian multidimensional partnership Aras notes 
that the Turkish construction sector’s market share in Russia has continuously increased. 
Turkey’s construction sector is active in Moscow and has continually increased its market 
share in Russia since 2005. Turkish contractors finished 59 construction projects worth 
$3.6 billion in Russia in 2007. Further, Turkey’s construction sector was involved in 
business worth $20 billion in 2008. In addition, there are thousands of Turkish workers in 
the construction field in Russia. The number of Turkish workers sent to Russia through 
																																																								
41 Hürriyet Daily News, "Turkish construction sector has 500 projects in 48 countries," Hurriyet 
Daily News, 28 March 2011 2011. 
42 Şen, "Türkiye - Rusya Federasyonu Ekonomik ve Ticari İlişkiler." 
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the Turkish Employment Organization is 15,696.43 
Tourism 
A fourth dimension of the economic relations between Turkey and Russia is the 
tourism sector, which has prompted an increasing cultural dialogue as well. There has 
been an growing interest by Russian tourists in Turkish resort towns. As the numbers of 
entrance to Turkey from Istanbul and Antalya indicate, tourism has been the second 
biggest reason (the first is trade) for Russian visits to Turkey. 
A General Assessment of the Areas of Economic Cooperation 
With the above-mentioned economic background, there happened to be an 
increasing economic cooperation between Russia and Turkey. This cooperative area was 
mentioned in Russian Federation Ivanov’s meeting with Turkish business circles in 2001. 
In his speech Ivanov expressed that in addition to the increase in economic relations, 
Turkey and Russia could improve their relations of partnership with cooperation in third 
countries’ markets. While tourism, trade, and construction have served as significant 
areas of economic cooperation, energy happened to be the prime area of economic 
cooperation between the two countries.  
Cultural Dialogue: The Cultural Dimension of Turkish–Russian Rapprochement 
 
																																																								
43 Bülent Aras, "Turkey and the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multidimensional 
Partnership," in SETA Policy Brief (Ankara: SETA, 2009). 
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To a lesser extent, the improvement in political and economic relations were seen 
in the cultural area as well. Tourism, being the most important medium for cultural 
dialogue between the two states, has played the most important role. The two peoples of 
both states came to understand each other better through more interactions (tourism or 
trade oriented). 
With Russia’s rapprochement with religion as well, it applied for an observer 
status in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and this was also granted with 
efforts by the Turkish Secretary General of the organization, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu. 
İhsanoğlu’s open dialogue approach was further reinforced by Putin’s invitation and 
İhsanoğlu’s four-day visit to Russia. Although İhsanoğlu represented the OIC rather than 
the Turkish Government, his attempts for Russian involvement in the OIC were likely 
encouraged by the developing cultural dialogue between Russia and Turkey. 
Intermarriages have also increased among Turkish and Russian citizens. 
Interestingly, these two formerly alienated nations found out how common their 
understandings were. Intermarriage was later even advocated by Turkish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu. 44  
Both nations were, in a sense, divided between East and West. Both were neither 
completely Western nor Eastern. This is why the famous Turkish novelist Alatlı argued 
that Russia should be observed carefully to understand what is happening to Turkey. This 
was more valid for the approach of intelligentsia in both countries.45 It can also be argued 
that the similarities in the modernization process of both countries have played a role in 
																																																								
44 Fikret Bila, "Davutoğlu: “Rus gelinlerin sayısı artsın istiyorum”," Milliyet, 27 January 2012. 
45 Kubilay Ünsal, "Alev Alatlı ve Gogol'un İzinde," Turkish Studies International Periodical For 
the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic 4, no. 1-2 (2009). 
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the cultural affinity between both. 
Another significant indicator of rapprochement in the cultural arena has been in 
the area of education. Although Turkology has been taught in Russian universities for 
decades, Russian language and culture have not been afforded significance in Turkey.  
Within the mentioned period, several courses have started in Turkey, and Russian 
language was added to the curriculum of several universities. However, a comparison 
between the two countries still shows that Turkey is the one that lags in terms of cultural 
education.46 
Several cultural centers were established in both countries for the betterment of 
relations in this period. Among these is the Turk Rus Center, established in 2010.47 In 
2003, in the Joint Declaration of the Third Meeting of the Republic of Turkey-Russian 
Federation Joint Strategic Planning Group, the ministers from both countries stressed 
that, “increasing humanitarian and cultural contacts would significantly help developing 
bilateral relations in all fields, agreed on the importance of completing all necessary 
procedures by all relevant institutions so as for the cultural centers to be established 
between the two countries to commence their activities as early as possible.”48 
Intermarriages between Turkish and Russian citizens also served as a reinforcing 
factor for the cultural bonds between the two countries. It is estimated that there are tens 
of thousands of intermarriages between Russians and Turks. In the large resort town of 
																																																								
46 Habibe Özdal et al., "Turkey Russia Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Current Dynamics, 
Future Prospects," (USAK, 2013). 
47 Rus - Türk Kültür Merkezi,  http://www.rusturkcenter.com/VakifHakkinda.aspx. 
48 "Joint Declaration of the Third Meeting of the Republic of Turkey-Russian Federation Joint 




Antalya, Russians made up the highest percentage of intermarriages made in 2012 (590 
of 1,414).  Likewise, Russian citizens led the way in the purchase of real estate in 
Turkey.49 
Military Dialogue: (Security Dimension of Turkish–Russian Rapprochement) 
The security dimension of the Turkish–Russian rapprochement was the least 
significant one, yet, still, there has been an unexpected increase in military relations 
between the two states.  
A decade after the end of the Cold War, the first signs of cooperation were seen 
on security issues. The establishment of the Blacksea Naval Cooperation Taskforce 
(Blackseafor) was such a step. Within the scope of the Blackseafor agreement, six states 
bordering the Black Sea created a regional multinational formation of navies with flexible 
functions intended for use in emergency situations in the Black Sea, exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. The new task force was also considered to be a school of naval skill 
for participating navies.  
In January 2002, during Chief of General Staff of the RF AF Anatoly Kvashnin’s 
visit to Turkey, the Turkish and Russian sides signed a Framework Agreement on 
Cooperation in the Military Sphere, as well as the Russian-Turkish Treaty on 
Cooperation in Training Military Contingents. As an additional step for consolidating 
cooperation and stability in the Blacksea region, a document on Confidence and Security 
Building Measures in the Black Sea Area was signed in Kiev on April 25, 2002. The 
																																																								
49 Hakan Aksay, "Türkiye'deki Gizli Rus Ordusu (Secret Russian Army in Turkey)," 
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document formed an integral mechanism of naval interaction in the region.  
Within the same year, Turkish Chief of the General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu 
visited Moscow and met with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. Kıvrıkoğlu and 
Ivanov discussed the status and prospects of bilateral military and military-technical 
cooperation. 
In December 2004, during president Putin’s first official visit to Turkey, the sides 
moved toward a wider contractual base of bilateral military-technical cooperation—the 
two countries signed documents on the protection of intellectual property related to 
military technology and classified information. 
Meanwhile, NATO’s relations were also developing with Russia. Following a 
decade of US/NATO negligence and humiliation of Russia, there were attempts to 
strengthen relations with Russia. The NATO/Russia council came as part of such an 
attempt. 
After the 2003 Iraq War, the security-related cooperation developed between 
Russia and Turkey due to similar approaches to security problems, specifically in the 
Middle East region. Following the use of force in Iraq in 2003, Russia advocated a heavy 
UN hand on the international security issues and emphasized the importance of 
international law. Both Russia and Turkey envisioned a new multipolar world after the 
decade-long unipolarity in world politics. 
The visits of top officials from both sides went far in promoting cooperation in the 
military sphere. In June 2007, Commander of the Turkish Air Force Faruk Cömert visited 
Russia; in November 2008, RF Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov visited Turkey; in 
2009, Director of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia, Commander of the border 
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guards of the CIS countries (First Deputy of FSB RF Director) Vladimir Pronichev; and 
in July 2010 Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky paid 
official visits to Turkey increasing the military dialogue between the two countries. 
The Indicators of Turkish–Russian Relations in Turkish Media 
The increase in Turkish–Russian relations is also clearly indicated in the mention 
of Russia in mainstream Turkish newspapers, and in the Russian Embassy’s list of events 
concerning Turkish-Russian relations. Two prominent Turkish newspapers have 
increasingly written issues related to Russia, detailed in table four below. The list of the 
events showing Turkish–Russian relations is expressed in Appendix A .  
 
Table 4: Issues Related to Russia in Turkish Media 
YEAR Number of News Stories in Milliyet 
Number of News Stories in 
Hurriyet 
2001 241 1822 
2002 402 1896 
2003 367 2015 
2004 543 2336 
2005 627 2477 
2006 842 3489 
2007 822 3672 
2008 3441 4737 
2009 2952 4534 
2010 2689 4875 




LITERATURE REVIEW AND THREE VARIABLES FOR RAPPROCHEMENT 
Three Explanations for Rapprochement 
As expressed in chapter two, in several areas a rapprochement was observed 
between Turkey and Russia. Although there has been a consensus among many scholars 
on the genuinity of the change in Turkish–Russian relations, the explanations for the 
rapprochement or the weight they attribute to each explanation has differed among 
scholars.  This chapter will focus on the explanations of the rapprochement and will 
recapitulate these explanations under three main titles. Thus, the review will focus on the 
Turkish–Russian relations literature and will simply reiterate different opinions from 
scholars on the nature and background of the rapprochement between the two states. The 
theoretical aspect of each explanation will be analyzed in chapters four through six.  
Explanation 1: U.S. as a threat in the region 
Explanation 2: Turkey’s deteriorating relations with the West (U.S. and the EU) 
Explanation 3: Turkey’s need for energy 
Explanation 1: U.S. as a Threat in the Region 
It is argued that the rapprochement was a direct consequence of changing threat 
perceptions in the region. A decade after the end of the Cold War, there came the wave of 
newly democratizing states that triggered so-called color revolutions in the region. While 
this has been observed as a natural change in world politics, it has also been regarded as 
an emerging U.S. dominance in the world.  Once the Soviet threat eroded, neither Turkey 
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nor the new Russia wanted a new and uninvited player, specifically in the Black Sea and 
Caucasus areas.  
Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, a prominent Turkish scholar, expressed this as  “the deep, 
perhaps systemic, instabilities that have engulfed the neighboring regions that these two 
states abut” and, according to her, “Russia, still the pre-eminent power in Eurasia, 
strongly resists a greater regional role for external actors primarily because of the 
conviction that the former Soviet space in Eurasia is Russia's backyard.”1 Probably due to 
the same reason, the skepticism in Russian against Turkey persisted as well.  
Advocates of this view argued that Russia, being aware that it could no longer 
exist in the region as a superpower, opted for developing links among  the non-Western 
powers, thus replacing the U.S. hegemony with a multipolar world order. This was 
reflected in Putin’s 2007 Munich speech in which he sounded like the representative of 
the non-Western world. This was also seen as coming from the only world leader who 
could openly challenge the U.S. global power.2  
There have been a number of factors promoting the threat perception, namely the 
effects of so-called color revolutions, willingness to protect the status quo for the status 
of the Black Sea, and the emerging ideology of Eurasianism in certain decision-making 
circles within both countries.  
																																																								
1 Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, ed. Russia: The challenges of reconciling geopolitical competition with 
economic partnership, Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power (London: 
Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2001), 151. 
2 Dimitri Trenin, "Russia Reborn," Foreign Affairs 88, no. 6 (2009). 
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Color Revolutions 
Following the decade of unrivaled U.S. hegemony, there were revolutions in 
former CIS countries, and this environment raised suspicions about a possible U.S. 
intervention in the region. Kiniklioglu and Morkva argue that, “The revolutions in 
Georgia and Ukraine added to the sense of Turkish ‘encirclement’ as Romania and 
Bulgaria were admitted to NATO in 2004.”3 In their view, the traditionally realist 
Turkish foreign policy was not buying into the “democracy promotion rhetoric.”4 
Following the Iraq War, Turkey’s caution against U.S. policies increased due to the 
Turkish losses, and any attempt for further democratization in the region was considered 
another tool for increasing the U.S. influence in the region.5   
With this perception on the Turkish side, Russia was naturally dismayed by the 
U.S. influence seen in the revolutions. This Russian belief was shared by Turkey. Mosler, 
Richter, and Kuhn explain, “Despite a shared interest in combating terrorism, Russia 
remains opposed to expanding U.S. influence in the region and views Turkey as the most 
favorable and valuable partner to promote its national interests.”6  
While the Turkish attitude was seen as a “low profile attitude,” attempt at 
avoiding the struggles between Russia and the West,7 the consequent role Turkey played 
in the transformations of Georgia and Ukraine showed that Turkish policy making also 
opposed a possible U.S. intervention in the region. This was still a fragile balance since 
																																																								
3 Kiniklioğlu and Morkva, "An anatomy of Turkish–Russian Relations." 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 David Mosler and Katharina Richter Sascha Kuhn, "Energy Cooperation in the Caucasus: 
Continuity and Change in Russian-Turkish Relations," (2010). 
7 Aras, "Turkey and the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multidimensional Partnership." 
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Turkey did not want to openly endanger its relations with the U.S. and the EU.  
Status of the Black Sea 
Another common view shared by Turkey and Russia was the status of the Black 
Sea. The perception of the U.S. as a threat was more obvious when it came to the status 
of the Black Sea. Several attempts by the U.S. to move into the Black Sea were blocked 
by Turkey and Russia. Kiniklioglu and Morkva argue that, “Turkey uses every 
opportunity in NATO to block further NATO/U.S. penetration into the Black Sea.”8 
The current status of the Black Sea is preserved with the Montreux agreement. 
Interestingly, Montreux was a disputed subject between Turkey and the Soviet Union for 
decades. However, the U.S. attempts for more involvement in the Black Sea brought 
these two states to the same line. The status of the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits has 
been one of the most important subjects of disagreement between Russia and Turkey. 
When the U.S. defined the Black Sea Basin as an area of security gap, and attempted to 
discuss the need for a U.S. military existence in the region, despite the support from 
Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia, Turkey and Russia participated on the same front to 
oppose this approach.9  
Both Turkey and Russia openly express their resolve on the subject. Both states 
argue that the issues related to the Black Sea should be solved by the littoral states and 
that third parties should not be involved. Due to this approach, Ankara and Moscow 
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opposed the U.S. attempt to extend the mission area for Operation Active Endeavour, 
which operated in the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Turkey finds it unnecessary to 
include the Black Sea for a NATO counter-terrorism operation, and instead argues that 
the operation should be conducted within the scope of the Blackseafor and Operation 
Black Sea Harmony.10  
The Emerging Ideology of Eurasianism 
Another factor promoting the threat perception was the rising ideology of 
Eurasianism in both countries.11 Eurasianism is defined as the ideology that, “among 
other things, promotes historical and cultural affinity between Russia and Turkey.”12 
The ideology of Eurasianism was revived after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
due to some intellectual efforts and perceptional changes in the Turkish and Russian 
societies. Laruelle defines Eurasianism as, “a Russian ideology born in the 1920s and 
1930s and reformulated after the fall of the USSR, which proclaims that Russia’s mission 
is in Asia.” According to Laruelle, Eurasianism “contends that Russian identity, as it 
were, straddles both Europe and Asia, and can only be realized by rejecting the European 
model and strengthening ties with Asia.” Within this perspective, partisans of this 
ideology are thought to act as informal think tanks and try to influence the Russian 
foreign policy.13  
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Interestingly, the close connection between Alexander Dugin, a prominent figure 
of this ideology and some Turkish political circles famous for formerly pro-Soviet and 
currently anti-American attitudes is a significant indicator of the anti-Americanism 
integral to this ideology. Eurasianism even brought together the formerly opposing 
intellectuals and politicians with nationalist and socialist political views. 
Sener Akturk recently defined Eurasianism as a fourth style in Turkish politics. 
Referring to the three choice options put forward by Yusuf Akcura, a famous intellectual 
and one of the founders of Turkish nationalism as, “Islamisim, Turkism and Ottomanism” 
and Samuel Huntington’s “Islamism, Turkism and Westernizm,” Akturk emphasizes the 
rise of a fourth style adopted by several intellectuals as Eurasianism.14  
In this new setting, some political circles in both countries shared their views of 
the American influence in the regions as a threat to the national identities. The fact that 
these views resonated in public opinion eventually also shaped the foreign policy choices 
of both countries. 
Explanation 2: Turkey’s Deteriorating Relations with the West (U.S. and the EU) 
Another explanation apart from the threat perception has been the circumstances 
that pushed Turkey away from the West. The deterioration of the relations occured in 
several ways. First, Turkish aspirations to become an EU member state were followed by 
disappointments within the mentioned decade, and, second, the fact that Turkey’s new 
foreign policy orientation formalized as “zero problem with neighbors” caused notable 
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policy changes from the previous almost unconditional Western orientation.  Third, the 
anti-Americanism fueled by the Bush presidency after 9/11 affected the overall public 
opinion in Turkey and this had some consequences in Turkish foreign policy choices. 
An indicator of this change was obsereved when Turkey did not allow the use of 
its land for the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. This type of foreign policy choice was in 
line with the new “deepening cooperation with Moscow,” as put by Aaron Stein.15   
There were other components behind the deterioration of relations with the West. 
The post 9/11 environment, which fueled anti-Americanism in the world, and the 
increasing influence of public opinion on foreign policy specifically for Turkey had 
consequences in Turkish foreign policy. Thus, the “declining favorable Turkish public 
opinion toward the United States,” mostly due to the U.S. foreign policy choices after 
2000, also had an effect on the deterioration of the relations.16   
Due to the deterioration of these relations, Stein argued that, “in the near to 
medium term it seems likely that Turkey is intent on pursuing a balanced foreign policy 
that maximizes its political self-interest, even in spite of its traditional Western allies.”17  
Furthermore, according to him, “Moscow was intent on limiting Western attempts to 
circumvent Russian oil and gas pipelines, in order to maintain its geo-political influence 
in Europe. At that point, according to Stein, ‘’conditions for the deepening of relations 
between Russia and Turkey seemed mature enough and this coincided with the Turkish 
political standpoint, in which deepening cooperation with Moscow fit nicely with 
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Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ foreign policy, while serving a number of Turkey’s immediate 
foreign policy goals.”18   
Likewise, Bal argued that more individualized, Ankara-centered, foreign policy 
was pursued by Turkey. Turkey, despite being a NATO member state, started to say 
“No” and to make more specific decisions. The two examples of this are the vote against 
the U.S. on March 1, 2003 regarding the Iraq war, and the prevention of the U.S. Navy 
involvement in the Black Sea following the Russia Georgia war in 2008.19 
Bal’s argument for change in the Turkish foreign policy includes seven 
characteristics of the new Turkish foreign policy: (1) Newer interpretation of Ataturk’s 
“Peace at home, peace in the world” principle, (2) interpretation of the Westernization in 
terms of Western principles rather than geography, (3) a new perception of Russia, (4) a 
new perception of Greece, (5) new self-perception in terms of society, history and 
strategy,  (6) more unique decision making (being able to say “No” to offers from the 
West) and (7) a change parallel to the overall developments in democratization and 
pluralism within Turkey.20  
According to Kuhn, Mosler, and Richter, there were “two decisive turns in 
Turkish foreign policy that heralded change in the relations to Russia.”21 These two turns 
were the denial of the use of Turkish territory to the U.S. forces in the invasion of Iraq in 
2003 and the change in Turkish domestic politics represented with AKP (Justice and 
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Development Party). The first caused the deterioration of the relations with a permanent 
ally, the U.S., while the second turn caused faltering in the relations with the EU. 
However, it should be noted that The Justice and Development Party was quite eager in 
developing the relations with the EU when it first came to power. It campaigned hard to 
reestablish the negotiations with the EU within the first couple of years of its tenure, and 
shifted its orientation mostly due to the stalling negotiations and the resulting 
disappointment. Thus, the dominance of Western orientation in Turkish foreign policy in 
the 1990s was replaced by a diversification of the relations and a focus toward the East, 
and more specifically toward the Caucasus, in the 2000s.22 
Kiniklioglu also addresses these two issues and points out the sense of Turkish 
encirclement with the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, and sees the rapprochement as 
a response from Turkey to the Russian attempts for collaboration.  
Political dialogue on the Black Sea/Caucasus region intensified 
when it became clear that the U.S. is pushing for a larger role for 
NATO in the region. The revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine added 
to the sense of Turkish ‘encirclement’ as Romania and Bulgaria 
were admitted to NATO in 2004. Troubled by the growing 
uncertainty vis-à-vis its European aspirations Turkey responded to 
insistent Russian overtures to collaborate in the region. Turkish 
opposition to extra-regional penetration of the region is mostly 
explained by two factors: First, that there is no need for NATO to 
enter the region as existing regional structures are adequate and in 
concert with NATO operations; second, that any regional initiative 
must include Russia. 23 
Ozbay argues that the refusal of the use of Turkish territory in 2003 has caused 
Russia to reconsider Turkey as a trustworthy, strong, and independent decision-making 
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country that can assert its political will in line with its own interests rather than as a 
classical U.S. ally. In his opinion, for Russia, a Turkey which can act independent from 
the Atlantic world was a state with which relations can be developed and which can be 
taken into account. He sees the several high-level mutual visits following March 2003 as 
an indicator of this changing relationship.24 
Sadik argues that the combination of several factors (domestic and international) 
has led to a significant influence of public opinion in Turkish foreign policy choices and 
notes the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkish public opinion between 2000 and 2006.25 
His analysis also considers the anti-Americanism in the first years of the millennium as a 
given in Turkish–American relations.  
As expressed by Stephen Larrabee, another important factor for the deteriorations 
of the relations with the U.S. was the diffidence of Washington in Turkey’s fight against 
terrorism. He argues that this 
 “(Washington’s diffidence in Turkey’s fight against terrorism) has 
contributed to an alarming rise in anti-American sentiment 
throughout Turkey. (A poll conducted by the Pew Charitable Trusts 
in June 2006 showed that only 12 percent of Turks viewed the 
United States positively.) Many Turks consider Washington's 
position to be tacit support for the PKK and evidence of a double 
standard: as they see it, the United States has invaded two 
countries—Afghanistan and Iraq—to eliminate terrorist safe havens 
but now refuses to help Turkey do the same.26 
This sentiment was further supported with the American invasion of Iraq and 
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consequent conflicting issues between Turkey and the U.S. in the northern territory of 
Iraq. In fact, many have noted that nothing has affected Turkish-American relations as 
much as the American presence in Iraq.27 Menon and Wimbush argue that anti-
Americanism has started to influence Turkish political thinking regardless of the political 
orientation of the policy makers in Turkey. They note that, 
 “the possibility that Turkey, whether Kemalist or Islamist, could 
reassess its long-standing alliance with the United States is quite 
real. Indeed, some of Turkey’s foreign-policy choices—which are 
being discussed forthrightly in influential Turkish circles—involve 
reducing its reliance on the United States, or even turning away from 
Washington, and deepening ties with America’s competitors. 
Accompanying Turkish discussions about a new strategic 
orientation has been the growth of a deep anti-Western, and 
specifically anti-American, mood, one that now shapes the thinking 
of Turks, regardless of political persuasion, and that has sunk deep 
roots among the Kemalists, America’s traditional interlocutors.” 28 
Explanation 3: Turkey’s Need for Energy 
Another important variable that can explain Turkish–Russian rapprochement is 
Turkey’s need for energy and the Russian capacity and willingness to meet this need. 
While this argument is sometimes seen as a part of the bilateral trade between the two 
countries, it is actually about energy security.  
A significant increase in the trade volume between Turkey and Russia has been 
observed since 2000. As noted by Stein, 
 “Much of the growth in trade volume is due to Turkey’s growing 
energy imports from Russia. Turkey finds itself at the center of the 
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energy-rich Middle East and Eurasia region and has made it a 
priority to establish itself as Europe’s oil and gas hub. Russia, which 
is keen on controlling natural gas supply routes to Europe, sees 
Turkey as a vital strategic choke point and is intent on making a 
number of diplomatic inroads to ensure that its energy and economic 
interests are protected.”29 
When this strong dependence on Russian energy is considered, it is expected that 
Turkey would try to diversify its supplies and find alternative sources; this did not turn 
out to be the case. Mostly due to the insecurity of other sources like Iran, Turkey’s 
relations with Russia in terms of energy has only increased over time.30 As expressed by 
Eichenmüller, “a recently secured agreement regarding the construction of a nuclear 
power plant by Russia points into another direction.”31 Eichenmüller adds that, “Russia’s 
rejection of alternative energy supply routes through the Caucasus and Turkey’s wariness 
of increased gas imports from Iran due to respect for its relations with its American and 
European partners might have also been pivotal factors behind this decision.”32  
For some commentators, Turkish dependence on energy has denied Turkey 
leverage in its relations with Russia. Kuhn, Mosler, and Richter argue that,  
“Initiated by the Turkish side, BLACKSEAFOR, BSEC and CSCP 
illustrate a somewhat unbalanced engagement in regional 
cooperation, as Turkey immediately stands to gain from cooperative 
arrangements while Russia has to a certain extent long been 
interested in preserving the status quo, that is, relative regional 
hegemony. Russia has more power to opt out than Turkey, as it holds 
more energy resources, and is less dependent on Turkey due to a 
larger set of trading partners. This might account for Moscow’s 
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rejection of the 2000 proposal, and helps understand why Turkey 
initiated CSCP without US or EU involvement.”33 
Parallel to the approach above, Mozur simplifies the common perception in 
Turkish–Russian energy relations as Turkey’s high level of dependence on Russian 
energy. He adds that this dependence is expected to increase over time. The growing 
dependence is seen as a result of two trends that complement each other: the high 
percentage of natural gas as a source in meeting Turkey’s primary energy supply and 
Russia’s share in Turkey’s total natural gas consumption.34 This is also supported with 
the increasing amount of natural gas consumption in Turkey and the almost insignificant 
percentage of indigenous production. 
Kuhn, Mosler, and Richter’s analysis of the shift “from Russian hegemony in the 
region to increased balance of power between Russia and Turkey” explains the change 
with liberal institutionalism.35 Since such a shift was expected to increase the security 
dilemma, it led to more cooperation between the two countries, making them believe that 
liberal institutionalism has more explanatory power in the changing nature of Turkish–
Russian relations. They argue that, 
 “Through intergovernmental negotiations and bargaining both 
actors managed to maximise their utility in the energy sector. The 
outcome of negotiations was and is dependent on relative bargaining 
power, which is much more balanced now than it was in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. Both countries saw a need in altering the status quo, 
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as ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ has significantly decreased, as 
an increase in relative bargaining power has reduced Turkey’s 
dependence on Russia.” 
 They add to these the internal pressures existing in both countries from the 
private business circles and different interest groups. 36 
Kuhn, Mosler, and Richter thus see “Pipeline Politics” as a very relevant factor 
for power distribution in the region. Their analysis, however, does not simply see this 
factor as Turkey’s need for energy. Instead, while Russia has the supply, Turkey’s 
involvement came from being a relevant transit point for Caspian resources and providing 
Russia alternate routes bypassing Ukraine.37  
Kınıklıoğlu also sees energy as the “most significant aspect of the Turkish-
Russian relationship.” According to him, in addition to being an important consumer 
country for Russian energy, Turkey can potentially provide new access areas for Russia 
in terms of energy. Turkey can facilitate the access to the energy markets in Greece, 
Spain, Italy, and North Africa. In addition to this, Turkey’s enthusiasm to present itself as 
a transit country and as an energy hub motivates the Russian officials “to make liberal 
use of language that would confirm Ankara’s ambitions.”38 
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CHAPTER IV 
DETERIORATION OF TURKEY’S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST 
 
An important element in the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey is the 
deterioration of the relations between Turkey and the West. There have been two 
dimensions of the relations with the West for Turkey: first is the 60-year alliance with the 
U.S. since Turkey joined NATO, and the second is Turkey’s relations with the European 
Union, specifically its aspirations to be a full member of the EU. 
This explanation depends on a constructivist approach, where the development of 
the relations is bound with the social aspect of international relations, rather than the 
material aspect. To the adherents of constructivism, the social and political world is very 
much related to the human consciousness and therefore the study of international 
relations should take ideas and beliefs into consideration since they shape the choices of 
the political actors in the scene.1 In the case of Turkish–Russian rapprochement, it can be 
argued that the relations with the West throughout the first decade of the 21st century 
developed the non–Western aspect of the identity of Turkey and consequently led to the 
foreign policy choices that reflect this change in forms of more cooperation and 
rapprochement with non-Western powers.  
When analyzing the change in Turkish foreign policy some scholars have chosen 
to explain it with values rather than power. Mufti argues that, “the dynamics of Turkish 
security policy during the past two decades cannot be explained adequately by external 
systemic pressures.” According to him, “Neorealist theory itself, after all, does not assert 
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that systemic factors determine state behavior; they merely impose incentives and 
disincentives for various courses of action—incentives and disincentives that are in 
practice often overridden by other factors at the individual or domestic political levels.”2 
At this point, it is essential to look into the constructivist arguments first and then 
to analyze at what points there was a change in Turkish identity perception, how 
Turkey’s relations with the West deteriorated, how Turkish public opinion has changed 
against the United States and the EU, and how similar factors worked on the Russian side 
as well.  
Constructivist Theory 
As mentioned above, constructivism’s focus is on the ideas and norms rather than 
material (military or economic) power in international relations. Alexander Wendt, the 
prominent scholar of social constructivism, emphasizing the common commitment of 
realists and liberalists to rationalism, argues that, “rationalism offers a fundamentally 
behavioral conception of both process and institutions: They change behavior but not 
identities and interests.”3 On the other hand, some liberalists adhere to the conception of 
process in which “identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a 
rationalist-behavioral one in which they are exogenous.”4 Thus, Wendt’s constructivism 
attempts to build the bridge between these two understandings by looking into the so-
called causal mechanism between self-help and anarchy.  
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Wendt argues that, “self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or 
causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due 
to process, not structure.”5 He goes on to say, “anarchy is what states make of it.” 
Guzzini and Leander argue that Wendt has stayed within the parameters of the discipline 
in terms of defining identity, and that he refers to the states as the main actors as well. 
Thus, according to them, “Wendt undermines two key theoretical positions in IR which 
are the methodological and ontological individualism and materialism.” He is noted as 
having based his theory on idealism and holism.6 In other words, Wendt’s approach is 
defined as an attempt to bind loose ends in IR by accumulating knowledge to reach the 
essence of international relations.7  
While the focus of realism is on the anarchy and distribution of power as the main 
drivers of international relations, the constructivist argument emphasizes the importance 
of inter-subjective ideas as an important factor in shaping world politics. Ideas determine 
the behavior of the actors by redefining the identities and interests of the actors.8 The 
constructivist argument has also been used by other scholars like Finnemore, Sikkink, 
Ruggie, Katzenstein and Hopf. 
Parallel to this approach, Finnemore and Sikkink have analyzed norm dynamics 
and political change. Their work, surveying the scholarship on norms and ideas, makes 
three arguments. First, they defend the validity of the ideational turn of the 1990s, 
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regarding it more than a simple turn to the traditional understandings. Second, they 
provide propositions about three aspects of norms (their origins, their implementation 
mechanisms, and the conditions for their influence). And, third, they refute the tendency 
to consider norms as an opposition to rationality.9 According to their approach of 
“strategic social construction,” rationality is still a part of determining political choice, 
identity or the social context. They argue that, “Actors strategize rationally to reconfigure 
preferences, identities, or social context. Rationality cannot be separated from any 
politically significant episode of normative influence or normative change, just as the 
normative context conditions any episode of rational choice.”10  
Similary, in defense of institutionalism (or, as an attack on Mearsheimer’s 
realism), John Gerard Ruggie notes that the ideas play an important role in the 
construction of the post World War II security environment.11  
All of these studies were attempts at understanding a post Cold War world, in 
which most IR traditions lacked an explanation. Katzenstein, who offers a sociological 
perspective, is another advocate of the importance of norms, identities, and culture in the 
definition of national security.12 His approach, which depends on the insufficiency of 
other IR theories, depicts the dilemma of the post Cold War world’s security 
environment. He states,  
“The Soviet Union has ceased to exist, and its successor states, 
organized in the Commonwealth of Independent States, are in the 
process of creating a new regional international system while at the 
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same time attempting to affect transitions from authoritarian 
socialism to democratic capitalism. The international positions of 
the United States and Japan have changed greatly as international 
competitiveness and financial power shifted away from the United 
States in the 1980s and away from Japan in the 1990s. China is 
undergoing a fundamental transformation in its economic structure 
and in its links to the international system. And the European Union 
(EU) appears to have been perhaps an overambitious attempt to 
accelerate the pace of European integration in the face of German 
unification. In South Africa, the Middle East, Central America, and 
Western Europe, long-standing violent conflicts that only a few 
years ago appeared to be simply unsolvable are now finding 
negotiated settlements. And in Europe, Central Asia, the Islamic 
world, and Africa, new conflicts are breaking out.”13 
Touching upon the skepticism of mainstream scholars (mostly from a realist or 
neoliberal institutionalist tradition) about constructivism, Ted Hopf mentions three main 
reasons for the misperception: 1) Mainstream scholars tended to see constructivism as 
postmodern and anti-positivist, 2) Constructivism itself was not very clear about its being 
placed within the framework of mainstream social science, and 3) The failure of 
constructivism to offer an alternative research program.14  
Hopf clarifies constructivism claims by summarizing the differences between 
“conventional” and “critical” constructivism, and suggesting a research agenda. He 
further argues that critical constructivism is more related to the critical social theory. He 
offers a research program of conventional constructivism that brings “alternative 
understandings of a number of the central themes in international relations theory, 
including: the meaning of anarchy and balance of power, the relationship between state 
identity and interest, an elaboration of power, and the prospects for change in world 
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politics,” including, “a constructivist reconceptualization of balance of threat theory, the 
security dilemma, neoliberal cooperation theory, and the democratic peace.”15 According 
to Hopf,  
“Although conventional and critical constructivism share a number 
of positions—mutual constitution of actors and structures, anarchy 
as a social construct, power as both material and discursive, and state 
identities and interests as variables-conventional constructivism 
does not accept critical theory's ideas about its own role in producing 
change and maintains a fundamentally different understanding of 
power”.16 
Likewise, Wendt’s emphasis is on the differences in how people define the 
concept of structure in international relations. When neorealists understand anarchy and 
distribution of material capabilities, Wendt argues, assumptions should be made about the 
distribution of interests. In addition, he argues that interests are constituted by ideas, and 
thus social system, according to Wendt, is structured by distributions of knowledge.17 To 
clarify cultural structures, Wendt points out “a typology based on three distinctions: (1) 
between two levels on which they are organized, micro and macro, manifested as 
common and collective knowledge respectively; (2) between their causal and constitutive 
effects; and (3) between their effects on behavior and on identities and interests.”18 
Wendt’s real contribution to constructivism, and the issue more related to the 
subject of this chapter, is his classification of three cultures of anarchy. In Social Theory 
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I proposed that anarchy can have at least three distinct cultures, 
Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, which are based on different role 
relationships, enemy, rival, and friend. These structures and roles 
are instantiated in states' representations of Self and Other (role 
identities) and ensuing practices, but it is at the macro-level, 
relatively autonomous from what states think and do, that they 
acquire logics and tendencies that persist through time. Cultures are 
self-fulfilling prophecies that persist through time. Cultures are self-
fulfilling prophecies that tend to reproduce themselves. Thus, even 
though defining the structure of the international system as a 
distribution of ideas calls our attention to the possibility that those 
ideas, and with them the “logic of anarchy,'' might change, it is no 
implication of this model that structural change is easy or even 
possible in given historical circumstances.19 
The overall constructivist approach, with its emphasis on the importance of 
norms, cultures and identities, and with its differing approach to the structure of the 
international system, offers an explanation for the significant policy change between 
Russia and Turkey. This explanation mostly assumes that the redefinition of Turkish and 
Russian identities (both ambiguous and undecided between East and West) has become a 
determinant factor in the change of political culture between these two states and the 
consequent change in their roles. In other words, it can be argued that the relationship 
between Russia and Turkey has existed in a Hobbesian culture for a long time. However, 
in the post Cold War environment, this Hobbesian culture has moved into Lockean, and, 
even in some cases, a Kantian one. Naturally, at least on the Turkish side, this change 
happened with two significant developments: more tensioned relations with the U.S., 
especially after the rejection of the use of Turkish soil in the invasion of Iraq, and the 
disappointment in Turkey’s EU accession process. These two occurrences prompted an 
identity reevaluation in Turkey, leading to a move from a Hobbesian culture to a Lockean 
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or Kantian one. The next section evaluates these two cases and their effects on Turkish 
foreign policy. 
Relations with the U.S. 
Throughout the 2003 Iraq War and in the aftermath U.S.–Turkish relations were 
the worst they had been since the end of the second world war. Beginning with the denial 
of the use of Turkish soil for the northern front in the invasion of Iraq, there have been 
resentments on both sides, several of which even caused conflicts in this period.  
By the late 1990s, there was mistrust in Turkey regarding the American moves in 
the region regarding the Iraq war.20  In 1998, while Turkey was dealing with its own 
Kurdish separatist terror problem, Washington had brought together two rival Iraqi 
Kurdish groups and kept Turkey out of the negotiation process.21  Although the 
governments were realistic enough to let the U.S. use Incrilik AFB for the missions 
related to the no-fly zone in northern Iraq and the continuous air strikes against the high-
valued targets in Iraq, concerns were expressed by the then foreign minister Ismail 
Cem.22  
In 2003, a dozen Turkish Special Forces personnel were arrested by U.S. troops in 
the outskirts of Kirkuk, adding to the mutual feeling of aversion.23 The arrest, and the 
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attitude of the U.S. soldiers during, caused great public uproar in Turkey. As Barkey 
argued, although there was a consensus between Turkey and the U.S. on the containment 
of Iraq by the United States in the 1990s, some unpredictable events during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom caused resentment in Turkish decision makers and in the public as well.24   
Rubin has described the issue as “comedy of errors.” According to him, although 
the March 1 vote and the July 4 arrest of Turkish Special Forces personnel had powerful 
consequences, they cannot solely explain the U.S.-Turkish tension. He sees the tension as 
a result of “misguided U.S. diplomacy in the run-up to the war and an American failure to 
properly address PKK terrorism, as well as counterproductive Turkish strategies 
regarding Iraqi Turkmen and Kurds.”25  
Looking into the history of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-American 
relations, Isyar notes the reactionary aspect of Turkish foreign policy and argues that 
“anti-American initiatives and reactions in Turkish foreign policy essentially exhibit 
spasmodic and conjuncture characteristics.”26  
When George W. Bush made the “Axis of Evil” speech and referred to Iraq, Iran, 
and North Korea as the axis of evil, the reaction raised by General Tuncer Kilinc, 
secretary general of the National Security Council was to offer new options for Turkey 
that might fit its national interests better. And, this option included a new cooperation 
with Russia and Iran.27  
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Makovsky notes that the tensions between the two countries caused significant 
change in the circles of the U.S. House of Representatives as well.28  Isyar supports this 
argument with the increasing number of dissident senators in the U.S. and gives the  
example of the Republican Senator Bruce Jackson’s accusation of the AKP government 
for growing hostility against America in Turkey.29  
Another important tension area between the U.S. and Turkey was the approach to 
Kurds and Turkmens in Iraq. Almost all Turkish governments had an interest in the 
Turkmen community, which has formed business and professional elite among the Iraqi 
population.30 Turkey has always argued that it was mistreated regarding the forced 
demographic change in the Turkmen-populated cities of Kirkuk and Telafer in northern 
Iraq. And, Turkey was offended by the U.S. choice to deal only with northern Iraq, the 
fact that it took a position favoring the Turkmen population.   
On the other hand, Turkey has accused the U.S. for favoring the Kurdish 
population in Kirkuk and has been disappointed in the U.S. reluctance to deal with PKK 
terrorism in northern Iraq, causing a further deterioration in relations. Banu Eligur sees 
the Kurdish issue as the main source of tensions in Turkish-American relations. 
According to her, 
 “Changes in United States policy on the issue of PKK terrorism, 
and the rift between the U.S. and Turkey over measures to be taken 
against the presence of the PKK in northern Iraq, deeply divided the 
former close allies. Turkish policy-makers, along with the Turkish 
military and the Turkish public, increasingly regard the U.S. as 
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having selectively targeted certain terrorists while turning a blind 
eye to the rise of PKK terrorism in Turkey.” 31 
EU Accession Process 
The United States was not the only Western ally with whom relations 
deteriorated. Although the third millennium started with great expectations about the 
accession of Turkey to the EU, several occurrences caused disappointment and frustration 
on the Turkish side.  
Turkish foreign policy has always had a strong European orientation. Since the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, westernization was one of the most 
influential determinants of Turkish foreign policy. However, Turkey’s European journey 
has always been full of disappointments, and the late 1990s to 2000s saw a particular 
increase in this disappointment. As noted by Kramer, “disappointment of short-sighted 
expectations of the benefits of the customs union with the EU and even more so the 
decision of the European Council in Luxembourg in December 1997 not to include 
Turkey in the list of candidate countries for EU membership have led to widespread 
political disappointment in Turkey.”32 Furthermore, this attitude was reinforced with the 
policy of Turkish government to freeze political relations with Europe in 1998.33  
A brief timeline of Turkey’s EU accession process is described below as 
displayed on the EU’s web site:  
09-01-1959  Turkey applies for associate membership in the European Economic 
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09-01-1963  Association agreement ("Ankara Agreement") is signed, aiming at 
bringing Turkey into a customs union with the EEC and, ultimately, membership. 
04-01-1987  Turkey applies for full EEC membership. 
01-01-1995  Turkey-EU Association Council finalises agreement creating a 
customs union. 
12-01-1997  Luxembourg Council summit declares Turkey eligible to become 
EU member. 
03-01-2001  Council adopts Accession Partnership for Turkey. 
05-01-2003  Council adopts revised Accession Partnership for Turkey. 
12-01-2004  Council defines conditions for opening accession negotiations. 
10-01-2005  Council adopts negotiating framework, and negotiations are 
formally opened. 
10-01-2005  "Screening process" begins to determine to what degree Turkey 
meets the membership criteria and what remains to be done. 
06-01-2006  Negotiations are opened and closed on Chapter 25 (science and 
research). 
12-01-2006  Because Turkey refused to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol 
to the Ankara Agreement, Council decides that eight chapters will not be opened. 
02-01-2008  Council adopts revised Accession Partnership for Turkey. 
06-30-2010  Negotiations are opened on Chapter 12 (food safety, veterinary and 
phytosanitary policy). 
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05-17-2012  Positive Agenda intended to bring fresh dynamics into the EU-
Turkey relations was launched. (EU Enlargement Interactive Timeline).34 
Clearly, the process was extensive and, at certain periods, Turkey was not sure if 
the EU was ready to accept Turkey as a full member. This led to the loss of momentum, 
and in some cases, direction, in Turkey’s relations with the European Union. Although 
the EU and Europe in general had been the top priority for Turkish business circles, 
military leadership, and the dominant traditional political elites of Turkey, foreign policy 
was shaped with the less European-oriented nationalist circles, which had been in search 
of venues other than Europe.35  
Significant information was provided by European politicians supporting Turkish 
suspicions about the EU membership process. Although many former Eastern bloc 
countries were considered for membership, Turkey was left out. In 1997, following a 
meeting held in Brussels, leading European Christian Democrats described the European 
integration as a civilization project and thus considered Turkey out of this project as a 
Muslim country.36  
On the other hand, some commentators in Turkey put the blame on the governing 
Justice and Development party, arguing that the anti-European roots of the political team 
emerged at certain points despite the great strides they achieved due to the “opportunism 
and pragmatism that lies at the center of the political identity of the (mentioned) political 
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team.”37 
Several incidents fueled Turkish frustration with the EU. These included the 
granting of visas to citizens of Balkan countries before they became EU members, the 
accession of Greek Cyprus to the EU, and the EU’s stance on the terror problem in 
Turkey. As described by Buzan, the old game between Turkey and Europe involved 
promises for full membership, strong expectations, and unfulfilled or slowly implemented 
commitments on both sides.38 In the 2000s, more of the slow implementation could be 
blamed on the European side and from a constructivist perspective the frustration with 
the European Union process caused Turkey to reconsider its identity as well as its foreign 
policy choices. 
The discontent with the EU process was not only about the unexpected negligence 
from the European Union, but was also shaped by the EU’s disillusionment with itself. 
This was described by Meral and Paris in the following statement: 
“The slowdown and disillusionment with the EU has convinced 
more and more Turks that the project may not work out in the end, 
leading Turkey to diversify its investments beyond the EU in case 
Turkey’s bid for EU membership completely collapses. This 
possibility runs parallel with new concerns over the European 
economy, its internal political turmoil, and lack of a unified, 
coherent, and effective foreign policy. Turks rightfully wonder 
whether, after years of struggling to become a member, all that effort 
will turn out to be a bad investment in a weak EU organization 
without much to offer to Turkey.”39  
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Although economic relations increased, the share of imports from Europe 
decreased during this period. Below, Figures 5 and 6 depict the change in the share of 
imports in Turkey. 
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Figure 5: Share of Imports in Turkey in 2004 
	
Source: Compiled by the Author from the Turkish Statistical Institution 
Figure 6: Share of Imports in Turkey in 2013 
	
Source: Compiled by the Author from the Turkish Statistical Institution 
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From a Hobbesian to a Kantian World 
Based on the constructivist approach, it can be argued that the anarchic 
environment or culture that defined relations between Turkey and Russia has undergone 
some change due to the circumstances that affected Turkish identity perception. 
Turkey, frustrated by its deteriorating relations with the West, positioned itself in 
a different neighborhood. With regard to Russia, one of the main alternatives for building 
relationships, this has caused the move from a Hobbesian world to a Lockean, and even 
to a Kantian world.  
This world was first created with a new Turkish identity perception due to 
frustration with its centuries-old journey to the West, reinforced by the public opinion 
that somehow affected the foreign policy choices at several points. A similar process 
occurred on the Russian side throughout the post Cold War period.  
Having reviewed the relations with the U.S and the EU, we will evaluate the link 
between public opinion and Turkish foreign policy. Also included is a brief evaluation of 
the Russian dimension of the process, which will elucidate the constructivist argument on 
Turkish–Russian rapprochement.   
Public Opinion and Turkish Foreign Policy  
One other dimension of the change in Turkish foreign policy is the link between 
public opinion and foreign policy. According to Sadik, the changing structure of 
international relations and the transformation of communication technologies prompted 
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the link between public opinion and foreign policy making.40 Looking into the issue in 
2006, Ian O. Lesser states that, “Public opinion now counts in Turkish foreign 
policymaking, and as polling results suggest, this opinion has turned distinctly anti-
American in recent years.”41  
With regard to Turkish–American relations, Sadik reviews “how American 
foreign policy can influence Turkish public opinion toward the United States [and] what 
American policies may contribute to the rise or fall of anti-Americanism in Turkey.” His 
analysis measures the effects of U.S. military and economic assistance, U.S. FDI, and 
bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey on Turkish public opinion against 
the United States.42  
The Russian Dimension 
On the other hand, it is also argued that the Russian side of the coin took a similar 
path. This argument is based on the rise of Eurasianism in Russian politics. Eurasianism 
is defined as “a Russian ideology born in the 1920s and 1930s and reformulated after the 
fall of the USSR, which proclaims that Russia’s mission is in Asia.”43 According to 
Laruelle, “It contends that Russian identity, as it were, straddles both Europe and Asia, 
and can only be realized by rejecting the European model and strengthening ties with 
Asia. Partisans of neo-Eurasianism seek to influence Russian political power and think of 
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themselves as a sort of informal think tank.”44 Laruelle argues that with the network of 
Alexander Dugin, this approach found counterparts in Turkey, and these circles aided in 
the rapprochement process between Russia and Turkey. 
Looking into the orientalist perspective of Eurasianism, Laruelle describes the 
interaction between ideology, philosophy of history, and orientalism: “Eurasianism knew 
how to create an original interaction between geographist ideology, philosophy of 
history, and orientalism. It developed a positive but general discourse about Orient: 
Russia would be closer to Asia than to Europe, Orthodoxy would be an oriental religion, 
Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism were appreciated for their mysticism, ‘fundamentalism,’ 
and ‘organicism.’”45 
Ironically, Eurasianism was also considered a reaction to Pan-Turkism. As a 
people whose ideology was constructed for the integration and territorial safety of Russia, 
the Eurasians felt themselves threatened by Pan-Turkic movements in the early 1900s. 
Thus, as in Turkey, an understanding of “false nationalism” and “true nationalism” were 
adopted. According to this understanding, Russian nationalism and Pan-Slavism were 
versions of “false nationalism,” and a nationalism taking the national culture as its basis 
was the “true nationalism.” A century after the emergence of Eurasianism, this time, 
especially in Turkish intellectual circles, the voices that reacted against the nationalist 
thoughts in the Cold War came together in their separate “true nationalist” approaches 
and this time the West, being foreign to the national culture, was the target of this new 
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version of nationalism.46  
This explanation naturally dictates that domestic politics influence the making of 
foreign policy. In the Russian case, the effects of domestic politics are very often cited, 
especially in the post Cold War environment. Even Kissinger, in his analysis of “the 
estrangement” in U.S.–Russian relations, acknowledges that, “a major challenge is the 
degree to which Russia’s internal evolution should affect U.S.–Russia relations.”47 In the 
Turkish and Russian cases, domestic politics seems to play a significant role in the 
development of foreign policies.  
A number of factors have been put forth as the sources of Russian foreign policy. 
While some analysts see Russian foreign-policy choices as the reflection of the personal 
interests of a handful of oligarchs, some others consider the “hostility to the U.S.” as a 
central motive of Russian foreign policy. According to the second group of analysts, no 
matter the source of Russian foreign policy, its main axis is its nature as an opposition to 
the U.S. interests. The latter also argue that Russia uses both political and economic tools 
in order to influence the neighboring states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.48 
It should be noted that there are also scholars who attribute the constructivist 
explanations of Russian foreign policy to temporary circumstances. In this respect, 
Christian Thorun looks into both realist and constructivist analyses, and contends that 
mostly realist analysis of Russian foreign policy was more explanatory. However, 
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according to him, due to the weakness of Russia immediately after the Cold War, the first 
period was mostly occupied with cooperative foreign policy, and the transition in foreign 
policy choices was not as smooth as some analysts would assume.49   
Overall Assessment of the Deterioration of Relations with the West 
From the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923 on, Turkish foreign policy has 
had a western orientation. While different forms of westernization projects have been 
criticized by opposing political circles in Turkey, there has been a common 
understanding that Turkey deserves a place in the developed Western world. After the 
second world war, and throughout the Cold War, also affected by the memories of 
Russian enmity in its recent history, Turkey did not hesitate to embrace this orientation. 
However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as in many parts of the 
world, Turkey’s political identity was reassessed from a cultural perspective. Due to the 
2003 Iraq War and the EU accession process, this new assessment caused Turkey to 
reconsider its positioning in the world arena. With a constructivist perspective, it can be 
argued that the new Turkish identity caused a rapprochement between Turkey and 
Russia. While this argument has some basis in terms of a changing identity, Turkey did 
not seem willing to reorient its foreign policy in such a short period. 
On the Kurdish issue, American indifference, which caused frustration, was 
benign when compared to the Russian support. Russia did not recognize the PKK as a 
terrorist organization because it did not commit any terrorist act on Russian soil, even 
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though the U.S. has kept it on the terrorist organizations list for quite a while. Thus, PKK 
had several meetings and organizations in Russia.  
 Although public announcements of encouragement were made by some officials 
for more cooperation with Russia and China, the reflection of these announcements in the 
economic and military areas were limited and were not to the level of Western 
satisfaction. Furthermore, the government rhetoric on the issues seems to be directed at 




COMMON PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. AS A THREAT IN THE CAUCASUS 
AND THE BLACK SEA REGION 
 
Another strong explanation for the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey has 
been the new perceptions of threat in the region. According to this explanation, after the 
Cold War, the hegemonic American power started to dominate different geographies in 
the world. Two such areas were the areas from which the former Soviet Union states 
emerged (Caucasia and Central Asia) and the Black Sea. In particular, Caucasia and the 
Black Sea regions have been the historical rivalry arena for Turkey and Russia, and these 
two states, faced with a new global power in this region, decided to come together against 
this common threat.  
This argument has its roots in the realist strand of international relations theories, 
and is mostly based on balance of power, or, more specifically, balance of threat 
approach. Below, a look into the realist approach will be delineated and the theoretical 
foundation of the “Threat Perception” explanation in the Turkish–Russian rapprochement 
will be discussed. 
 The Realist Argument  
Realism has its own strands and all the separate approaches within realism have 
some differing perspectives. Realism has always looked at the world from a material 
power perspective and has developed its argument mostly around material (military and 
economic) power. All realist explanations have a conflictual character, and they all 
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emphasize national security.  
The classical realism, mostly represented in the writings of Thucydides, Thomas 
Hobbes and Machiavelli, took insecurity and conflict as the basis for human condition.1 
They all had a pessimistic view of the world due to their belief of the nature of mankind 
and international politics. Furthermore, they viewed power as the most significant basis 
of their argument and noted that power relations between states has been the focus point 
of any objective analysis of international relations.2 This focus on power has resulted in 
power rivalries and realists have always tried to explain the relations between states in 
terms of power and national interests.  
In its neoclassic version, realism focuses on these relations from a systemic 
perspective, mostly represented in the writings of Kenneth Waltz. Seeing the issue as a 
systemic one rather than considering the actors, Waltz has always argued that eventually 
there would be rivalry and balancing within the anarchic system.  
Waltz sees competition and rivalry as the main ingredients of the anarchic system 
and, according to him, the changes after the Cold War were only changes within the 
system, not of the system. Thus, according to him, there would be either competition or 
an alliance against a third power in the international system.3 
Waltz further argues that an attempt for a great power to gain hegemony in its 
own region or in some other part of the world will eventually cause the other powers to 
come together as a balancing coalition against this great power.4 He argues that, “The 
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excessive accumulation of power by one state or coalition of states elicits the opposition 
of others. Therefore, states can seldom afford to make maximizing power their goal. 
International politics is too serious a business for that.”5  
The realist perspective has explanatory power in the rapprochement of Turkey 
and Russia in all its strands. A theoretical explanation can be found in the writings of 
Stephen Walt and his Balance of Threat theory, which serves as an alternative to the 
Balance of Power theory. 
 Stephen Walt and Balance of Threat  
One explanation of the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia is Walt’s 
Balance of Threat theory. In his approach, Walt diverged from Waltz and argued that 
rather than balance of power, balance of threat is the main concept defining the structure 
of international relations. 
Walt’s identification of the four criteria that he sees as the sources of threat 
perception are the strength of a state, its offensive capability, its offensive intentions, and 
its geographical proximity.6 Until the end of the Cold War, at least for Turkey, only two 
of the above were valid sources of a U.S. threat to the region. Still, the circumstances that 
put Turkey and the U.S. in the same camp made these two issues irrelevant when there 
was an open threat from the Soviet Union. As things changed, in addition to the first two 
criteria, the latter two also became a source of concern for Turkey after the Cold War. 
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Starting with the war in Iraq, the U.S. gained much more visibility in the region and, at 
least in terms of perception, gained a geographical proximity. Furthermore, more 
involvement in the Black Sea region, and the perceived support of the turmoil in the 
neighborhood with so-called color revolutions raised suspicions about intentions as well.  
A Brief History of the Balance of Power in the Region  
Caucasia and the Black Sea region have always been areas of rivalry between 
Russia and Turkey (and, in some cases, Iran). Considering the conflict in Caucasus and 
the Black Sea region, in addition to the multiethnic structure of the region, the strategic 
importance of the region has also been a reason for the attention of the regional and 
international actors.7 Hunter notes that, “Historically, sectarian and religious 
characteristics have affected the orientation of Caucasian peoples toward outside forces 
and powers. Thus the region’s Christians have traditionally gravitated towards Russia and 
see it as a natural ally and protector against their Muslim neighbors. The Muslims, 
meanwhile, have gravitated toward either Iran or Turkey.”8 Hunter also notes that, 
“Having lost its influence in the Baltics and in the former Warsaw pact regions, while 
facing China to the East, Russia is concerned that the loss of its influence in the Black 
Sea region would once more turn it into a semi-landlocked country.”9 
 The disintegration of the Soviet Union created a power vacuum throughout 
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Eurasia.10 The following period was filled with the revived rivalries of regional and 
international actors in the region. Considering the multi ethnic structure of the relatively 
low-density population of the Caucasus, the major powers in the region like Iran, Russia, 
and Turkey all had some sort of influence on the relatively weak populations in the area. 
Thus, even if no other reason existed, there would always be a power rivalry amongst 
these countries. 
The bipolar nature of the Cold War just suppressed regional powers. However, 
once the Cold War was over, a struggle between the regional powers for supremacy 
began again. In this new environment, Turkey’s isolationist foreign policy was replaced 
with activism, especially in the regions that were added to its foreign policy (Middle East, 
Caucasus and the Balkans).11 
Indicators of Post Cold War Threat Perception  
The post Cold War threat perception had different phases. The first decade after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union was a decade of hesitation. In this period, Russia was too 
weak to pursue an ambitious political agenda, and was perhaps mismanaged.  
Regarding this first phase of post Cold War politics, Thorun argues that due to its 
limited foreign policy choices, Russia chose to cooperate with the determined Western 
powers rather than to choose confrontation. Taking the realist approach as his point of 
departure, Thorun argues that, “a major contention of realist scholars in the field of 
Russian foreign policy analysis is that during the first decade after the end of the Cold 
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War, Russia’s foreign policy options were significantly constrained due to the country’s 
weak power position vis-à-vis the Western states.”12 
He further suggests that, “in cases where Russia’s leadership faced a stark choice 
between cooperation and confrontation with the West, it chose cooperation.” According 
to him, in these cases, external limitations were very dangerous, as there was a consensus 
among the Western states about the determination to follow their interests. Thorun still 
takes ideational and domestic factors into account, however, and argues that, “the 
presence of external constraints was the single most important factor determining Russian 
foreign policy outputs.”13  
 Over time, the hesitation was replaced with an awakening in Russia and the 
subsequent rivalry in the region. In particular, the fact that Turkey was depicted as a 
model in Central Asia by the Western powers caused an unrest in the Russian political 
circles and the military elite. The ambitious rhetoric about the “Turkish Model” was seen 
as evidence of Turkish intentions to fill the gap of influence in the region. In this period, 
the concept of “near abroad” also became an important element of Russian foreign policy 
thinking and Russia started to seek more influence in the region again.14  
Turkey, embracing a more passive role, especially after the death of President 
Ozal in 1993, and his replacement, the very conformist Demirel, almost fully pulled back 
and abandoned Russia’s “near abroad” until it realized that another actor, the United 
States, was more occupied with the region.  
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Color Revolutions and the Threat Perception in the Caucasus  
In the first phase of the post Cold War environment, a number of conflict areas 
existed between Turkey and Russia. The new environment pushed Turkey into a rather 
daring and forward-leaning foreign policy. Despite the signing of the Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation by Demirel in 1992, the Turkish side reconsidered the 
situation after some Russian advances. Ankara’s desire to counter Russia without 
provoking it ended in some covert interventions in the Caucasus.15   
As noted by Cooley,  
“Although most Western commentators and policymakers 
understood the electorally induced regime changes in Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan as victories for democratic forces, in 
Eurasia these same events were largely viewed as U.S.-sponsored 
efforts to topple regimes and replace them with pro-Western clients. 
Accordingly, soon after the Orange and Tulip Revolutions, a variety 
of Eurasian regimes, with strong backing from Moscow, adopted a 
series of measures to counter the activities of external democracy 
actors so as to avoid a replay of the sequence of events which led to 
the overthrow of these governments.”16  
Threat Perception in the Black Sea and Responses to the U.S. Involvement in the 
Black Sea Region  
The Black Sea has always been an area of confrontation, and this was more true 
during the Cold War when it was one of the prominent theaters of global confrontation. 
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Despite all the hope, the end of the Cold war did not bring any cooperation at all. In 
addition to its vital status as Russia’s gate to the warm seas and Turkey’s control over the 
straits, other factors were also added by its status, providing an energy gate to Europe, its 
proximity to new geopolitical crisis areas, and the suspected external involvement.17 
After 9/11, there were numerous U.S. attempts to become involved in the Black 
Sea. One such attempt was the request for expansion of NATO’s “Operation Active 
Endeavour,” which was developed in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. This mission included 
monitoring and boarding of thousands of suspicious commercial ships. Several member 
state navies were involved in the mission, including Britain, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, and the United States. In 2006, when the U.S. requested the 
expansion of the operation into the Black Sea, Turkey opposed this attempt alongside 
with Russia.  
Ariel Cohen has observed this shaky nature of Turkey-U.S. relations on this issue.  
“The U.S. presence currently has the support of Bulgaria and 
Romania, but U.S. relations with Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine are 
on shaky ground. Neither Turkey nor Russia supported U.S. 
operations in Iraq, and relations with both countries have taken a 
downturn ever since then. Ukraine has adopted a more pro-Russian 
stance since Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich took office. Georgia 
is under severe economic and political pressure from Russia and 
preoccupied with internal conflicts and is thus ill-equipped to act as 
a strong U.S. ally. This tangled web of interests and alliances and 
the recent rapprochement of Russia and Turkey, which has anti-
American implications, may hamper U.S. activities in the area.”18 
																																																								
17 Arnaud and Vaquer I. Fanes Dubien, Jordi, "Security and Energy Securityin the Blacksea 
Region," ed. Directorate General for External Policies of the Union (Belgium: European 
Parliament, 2010). 
18 Ariel Cohen and Conway Irwin, "US Strategy in the Black Sea Region," Backgrounder, no. 
1990 (2006). 
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Although Turkey had supported some U.S.-backed initiatives in the Black Sea 
region in the 1990s, and as the hesitation period was over, and the U.S. involvement 
attempts had raised suspicions in the region, Turkey was also on the side of the countries 
that wanted to keep the U.S. away from the Black Sea region. 
Responses to the Invasion of Iraq 
Another area of threat was the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Following the terrorist 
attacks on 9/11, the hegemonic approach of the Bush administration caused a general 
unrest among most of the allies of the U.S. While France and Russia were openly 
opposed to the invasion, Turkey chose to denial the use of its soil. Meanwhile, there were 
tensions between Turkey and the U.S. due to the arrest of some Turkish special 
operations personnel in Iraq.  
Russia, alongside France, was almost leading the opposition against the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003. Despite considering the economic relations with the U.S. at the time and 
avoiding an alliance with Europe to counter the U.S., hours after the invasion of Iraq, 
Putin was among the first leaders to condemn the act.19 The economic interests of Russia 
in Iraq was another determinant of the Russian position against the invasion.20 The 
unilateral decision of the U.S. in this period deepened the threat perception in the Middle 
East after the color revolutions in post Soviet neighborhood.   
It can be argued that the Russian opposition in the invasion of Iraq was not as 
																																																								
19 Vladimir Volkov, "Russia: Putin condemns Iraq war as an "error","  World Socialist 
Website(2003), http://cns.miis.edu/stories/030217.htm. 
20 Michael Jasinski, "Russia's Views On the Crisis in Iraq," (2003), 
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/030217.htm. 
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strong as would be expected. However, it should be kept in mind that Russia, recovering 
from the humiliation of the 1990s, was just finding its status in all these oppositions. This 
became a basis for Russia’s multi-polar diplomacy. Larson and Shevchenko note that,  
“From 1996 to 1999, Primakov pursued ‘multipolar’ diplomacy 
aimed at restoring Russia’s importance through diplomatic counter-
alliances—a strategy of social competition. Primakov promised that 
Russian foreign policy would reflect his country’s ‘status as a great 
power’ and that Russia would seek an ‘equal, mutually beneficial 
partnership’ with the West.  But Russia was too weak and financially 
dependent on the West to challenge U.S. actions, particularly given 
that the Clinton administration was prepared to act unilaterally.”21 
Seeing the “2008 Russo-Georgian war as much a turning point as a clear indicator 
of deeper trends of transformation of the security environment of the Black Sea region,” 
The European Parliament Report groups the “the threats and risks in the region” into 
three kinds: “(1) those related to competition among the great powers in the region, (2) 
the potential flashpoints which could at any time trigger a major crisis, and (3) the 
transnational threats and risks that are of concern to all Black Sea countries.”22 In this 
categorization, the U.S. attempts have been interpreted by Russia and Turkey as a threat 
for all Black Sea countries.  
Overall Threat Perception as an Explanation 
Threat perceptions could be seen in both Turkey and Russia in the period between 
2000 and 2010. However, this perception was based more on caution than direct 
																																																								
21 Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status seekers: Chinese and Russian 
responses to US primacy," International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 80. 
22 European Parliament Report, http://www.iris-france.org/docs/kfm_docs/docs/observatoire-
voisinage-europeen/bl-sea-1009-security-final-published.pdf  
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confrontation. Turkey, despite its mild relations with the U.S., did not change its overall 
policy, and most of the steps in the foreign policy seemed aimed at soothing negative 
public opinion against the U.S.  
There were objections to the invasion of Iraq throughout the western world. The 
resolve of the U.S. in the invasion and Turkish government’s pragmatic approach in the 
voting resulted in an unexpected tension in relations. Still, it would be difficult to make a 
direct connection with this common anti-American approach and the Turkish–Russian 
rapprochement. The color revolutions were more influential to the threat perception. 
Within this case, Turkey still followed a multilateral policy, if not a double-crossing one. 
While assisting the U.S., especially with its relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, 




TURKEY’S INCREASING NEED FOR ENERGY 
	
A third explanation for Turkish Russian rapprochement is Turkey’s need for 
energy and the richness of Russian sources to fulfill this need. This argument is mostly 
based on a liberal perspective that considers the connection between trade and peace. 
According to this explanation, in the democratic environment of the post Cold War 
world, the mutual dependence (heavier on the Turkish side) on each other brought these 
two states closer together.  
Liberalism as a Mainstream Theory in International Relations 
The third explanation for Turkish-Russian rapprochement has its roots in the 
liberal theory of IR. Contrary to realism, liberalism has an optimistic view of the world 
and, thus, it is a more convenient explanation of rapprochement. The basic assumptions 
of liberal theory are based on the belief that human progress and human reason will 
eventually lead to cooperation and modernization and the development of the modern 
state in international relations.1 Although labeled as utopianism in a pejorative way, 
liberalism still forms the main contradicting and alternative theory to realism in the study 
of IR. Generally, liberalism is described as a reliance on “claims about the impact of 
interdependence, the benefits of free trade, collective security and the existence of a real 
harmony of interests between states.”2 As in realism, liberalism also has several different, 
																																																								
1 Jackson, Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches: 100. 
2 Sutch and Elias, International relations: the basics: 65. 
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sometimes contradictory, strands. After a brief history of liberalism, this chapter will 
analyze how the complex interdependence of liberalism may form an explanation for 
Turkish-Russian rapprochement.  
 Very often, John Locke’s “natural law” theory is referred to in the history of 
liberalism. Seeing “political freedom and equality of mankind as divinely ordained,”3 
Locke had an optimistic view of human progress with modern civil society and a 
capitalistic state. Such a society and such a state will rise as long as the individual 
freedoms are guaranteed. The modernization process and the technological developments 
of modernity have led to the reinforcement of these expectations. As technological 
improvements caused increasing efficiency in the production of goods, the belief in 
human reason and human progress also increased. As expressed by another prominent 
figure of liberalism, Jeremy Bentham, “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” 
seemed possible. Bentham based his arguments on utilitarianism, in which the concepts 
of good and bad should be put into measurable terms.4  
The optimistic views of the late 16th and 17th centuries were politically 
represented by and defended in Kant’s approach of triangulating peace. In Kant’s view, 
the triangle of democracy, trade and cooperation would end in perpetual peace. With this 
optimistic view of international relations, Kant argued that, “we have an absolute duty to 
treat human beings as autonomous moral agents. Moral imperatives are categorical rather 
than instrumental—we act morally because we ought to and not because it brings us 
benefits.” Moving on from this argument, as states became democratic–or republics, in 
																																																								
3 Greg Forster, John Locke's politics of moral consensus  (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 27. 
4 Sutch and Elias, International relations: the basics: 67. 
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Kant’s term—and traded with each other, war would be less possible. This again means 
that human reason is expected to prevail, contrary to the Hobbesian view that “fear” will 
prevail. In Turkish–Russian relations, reason meant gaining from having more trade with 
each other, and from the Turkish perspective, it meant “benefiting from the rich sources 
of Russian energy with rapprochement steps.” 
There are several strands of liberalism, as is the case for realism. In this study, I 
will focus more on interdependence liberalism, which became more common recently, 
especially with the writings of Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane.  
Turkey’s Energy Outlook 
As would be expected, Turkey’s energy outlook is closely related to the growth in 
the Turkish economy. The dynamic Turkish economy has shown a significant growth in 
recent years, becoming 17th in the world in terms of GDP. The rise in Turkey’s GDP is 
shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7: The Rise in Turkey’s GDP (1998-2013) 
	
Source: Compiled by the Author from the World Bank Database 
Likewise, the growing Turkish population is also ranked 17th in the world.5 
Turkey, with a population of 71 million and a growth rate of 13 percent, has become an 
emerging economic power.6  
The urbanization and the industrialization in Turkey naturally has caused a 
significant increase in the demand for energy.  Figure 8 shows the rise in the industrial 
production index in Turkey. 
																																																								
5		The World Bank, Data Statistics for Turkey , 
http://www.worldbank.org.tr/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/TURKEY 
EXTN/0,,menuPK:361738~pagePK:141132~piPK:141109~theSitePK:361712,00.html.	
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Figure 8: Industrial Production Index in Turkey 
	
Source: Compiled by the Author from the Turkish Statistical Institute 
The demand for energy in Turkey is expected to nearly double between 2010 and 
2020. With a six to eight percent per year growth rate, the primary energy consumption 
of Turkey is expected to be 222 million tons of equivalent oil (toe) in 2020, up from 126 
toe in 2010.7  
Most of this demand (70 percent) is met through imports. And, the primary 
energy demand of Turkey is mostly being met by hydrocarbon resources that Turkey 
lacks in a hydrocarbon rich geography. Sixty-five percent of the total energy 
consumption in Turkey is formed by oil and natural gas. Turkey has little reserves of 
these two hydrocarbon resources. Furthermore, the alternative lignite coal that Turkey 
produces is low quality, causes a great deal of pollution, and comes with a high level of 
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humanitarian risks in its production process.8  
Turkey’s proven oil reserve has been estimated at 284 million barrels and oil 
production per year is around 46 thousand barrels.9  With a consumption of 675 thousand 
barrels per year, the gap between consumption and production is significant. 
Furthermore, while there is an increase in the consumption of oil, the production rates are 
not increasing, perhaps even decreasing since 1990.10 Thus, five-sixth of Turkey’s oil 
demand is imported from abroad. Figure 9 shows the oil consumption and production in 
Turkey from 1999 to 2009. 
																																																								
8  Havva Caha, "Energy Security of Turkey," International Conference on Human and Economic 
Resources, 2006, http://eco.ieu.edu.tr/wpcontent/ proceedings/2006/0608.pdf. 
9  U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis, Turkey Energy 
Profile, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=TU. 
10  Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Istatistik, Birincil Enerji 
Kaynaklari Tuketimi (Primary Energy Consumption), 
http://www.enerji.gov.tr/EKLENTI_VIEW/index.php/raporlar/raporVeriGir/4314/2. 
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Figure 9: Turkey's Oil Consumption and Production between 1999 and 2009 
	
Source: The U.S. EIA 
As long as the oil fields in Turkey stay the same, it is expected that by 2030, oil 
reserves there will be depleted.11 The oil suppliers for Turkey are Iran, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Syria, Italy, England, and Libya.12 
With such poor prospects for oil sources, an alternative energy source, natural 
gas, has been considered. Thus, Turkey would diversify its energy import with the help of 
newly emerging fields in Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. For the natural gas, 
geographical proximity is more important. As in the case for oil, Turkey’s own 
production of natural gas is not promising. With its environmental benefits, Turkey has 
gone through a process of transforming its power generation in the direction of natural 
																																																								
11  Turkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortakligi (Turkish Petroleum Corporation), 2008 Yili Petrol ve 
Dogalgaz Sektor Raporu (Oil and Natural Gas Sector Report of 2008), 
http://www.tpao.gov.tr/v1.4/condocs/petrol_sektor.pdf. 
12  Energy Market Regulatory Authority, Petrol Piyasasi Sektor Raporu 2008 (Oil Market Sector 
Report of 2008), 
http://www.epdk.gov.tr/yayin_rapor/petrol/2008sektorraporu/2008sektorraporu.pdf. 
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gas fired in plants instead of coal and oil fired plants.13  
Figure 10: Turkey's Natural Gas Production and Consumption from 2009 to 2009 
	
Source: The U.S. EIA 
As in the case for oil, Turkey’s natural gas production is very limited and Turkey 
needs the support of resource import in this area. Since 1976, Turkey has produced its 
own natural gas. However, since then the demand for natural gas has continued to grow. 
Turkey started to import natural gas in LNG1987 from the Soviet Union. Today, Turkey 
primarily imports from Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Algeria, and Nigeria. Imports from 
Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran are provided via pipelines and imports from Algeria and 
Nigeria are provided as liquefied natural gas (LNG).14 
																																																								
13 Brenda Shaffer, "Turkey’s Energy Policies in a Tight Global Energy Market," Insight Turkey 8, 
no. 2 (April/June 2006), 97. 
14		Turkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortakligi (Turkish Petroleum Corporation), 2008 Yili Petrol ve 
Dogalgaz Sektor Raporu (Oil and Natural Gas Sector Report of 2008), 
http://www.tpao.gov.tr/v1.4/condocs/petrol_sektor.pdf, 8–9.	
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Figure 11: Turkey’s Natural Gas Production (million cubic meters) 
	
Source: Turkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortakligi (Turkish Petroleum Corporation), 2008 Yili 
Petrol ve Dogalgaz Sektor Raporu (Oil and Natural Gas Sector Report of 2008), 
http://www.tpao.gov.tr/v1.4/condocs/petrol_sektor.pdf, 8–9. 
According to the World Trade Organization’s Trade Policy Review,15 Turkey’s 
primary energy consumption was around 80.5 million tons of oil equivalent (toe) in 2009. 
There were some declines of consumption, especially in 2007 and 2008, mostly due to 
the decline in economic activities. However, the energy market in Turkey expanded by 
four percent annually (on average) between 2000 and 2010. The great majority of the 
energy supply in Turkey is formed by fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas). 
The young population in Turkey and the speed of urbanization are other factors 
affecting this demand in energy. Furthermore, Turkey’s per capita energy consumption’s 
being still below average of industrialized countries is considered a factor in making this 
energy demand among the fastest medium- to long-term growth in energy demand among 
members of the International Energy Agency.16  With this growth, Turkey’s energy 
																																																								
15 Trade Policy Review Body, World Trade Organization, 17 January 2012 
16 IEA (2009). 
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demand is expected to be around 222 million toe in 2020.  
The demand for energy is naturally expected to bring increasing investments in 
the infrastructure of the energy sector.  Since the Turkish economy has recently focused 
on privatizing several areas, the investments in the energy sector are also expected to be 
led by the private sector. Parallel to the developments and the increasing need for energy, 
several steps have been taken by the Turkish Government to get the private sector more 
involved. As expressed in the 2012 WTO report, the Turkish government needs to 
provide a more transparent, predictable, liberalized, and competitive framework for 
privately owned operators in the energy market.17   
Actually, several reforms were accomplished in Turkey in the first decade of the 
first millennium. Turkey passed new legislation to reform the energy sector. Some of 
these reforms include the Electricity Market Law (2001), the Natural Gas Market Law 
(2001), the Petroleum Market Law (2003), the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Market 
Law (2005), the Law on the Utilization of Renewable Energy Sources for the Purpose of 
Generating Electrical Energy (2005), the Energy Efficiency Law (2007), the Law on 
Geothermal Resources and Natural Mineral Waters (2007), and the Law on Construction 
and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants and Energy Sale (2007).18   
In 2001, Enerji Piyasasi Duzenleme Kurumu (The Energy Market Regulatory 
Authority, or EMRA) was established in Turkey. The aim of the EMRA was to regulate 
and supervise the energy market and the operators in the market.  
Although there have been developments in some other aspects of the energy 
																																																								
17 Trade Policy Review Body, World Trade Organization, 17 January 2012 
18  Ibid. 
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market, when it comes to petroleum and petroleum products, the expectations of 
privatization did not proceed as expected. The market in petroleum and petroleum 
products is still dominated by either government or former government large companies. 
Mainly, these are the Turkish State Petroleum Company (TPAO), the Turkish Petroleum 
Refinery Corporation (TÜPRAŞ), and the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ). 
Although Turkey has its own resources of oil and natural gas they are very 
limited. The domestic production in Turkey meets only eight percent of demand. The 
geographical proximity of Turkey to the proven oil rich areas of the world like Central 
Asia, Caspian Basin, and the Middle East is a significant advantage for the supply of oil 
and natural gas. Its position as a bridge between the states in these regions and the 
import-dependent states (especially the European Union) provides a strategic location for 
the diversification of energy sources.   
The Turkish economy is as an energy consuming one. Turkey’s value of  0,11 
toe/1000$ GDP‘s 12 percent less than the International Energy Agency’s expectation of 
0.14 for the European region.19 The primary energy supply of 120 million toe natural gas 
is at the top of the list with 30.9 percent, and oil is second, with 25.3 percent. According 
to the primary energy demand projections, the share of oil is expected to remain around 
26 percent by 2023. However, although the supply of natural gas is expected to increase, 
its share in the overall supply is expected to decrease to 23 percent. Currently, Turkey’s 
primary energy consumption 26.3 percent in residences, 26 percent in industry, 25.7 
percent in the conversion sector, and 16.8 percent is used in the transportation sector. 
																																																								
19 Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı, "2013 Yılı Ham Petrol ve Doğal Gaz Sektör Raporu 
(2013 Sector Report for Oil and Natural Gas)," (2013). 
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Only 27.5 percent of the energy demand is met with domestic production, and, thus, 
Turkey’s foreign energy dependency is at 72.5 percent. This ratio started to increase in 
the early 1990s, and has been around 70 percent since 2000.20 
Licenses for exploration and production of oil are granted by Turkish government, 
and the state is the owner of the oil resources in Turkey. The Turkish Petroleum 
Corporation (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı, or TPAO), as a state-owned 
corporation, is in charge of almost 75 percent of domestic production of oil in Turkey. 
The remainder of the production is performed by smaller, independent upstream 
companies.  Imported crude oil (17.3 million tons in 2010) is predominantly sourced 
from Iran, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.21   
When it comes to refining, TÜPRAŞ, which was privatized in stages in 2005 and 
2006, controls nearly all the refining capacity in Turkey. While TUPRAS has enjoyed a 
monopoly in this area for some time, the EMRA has issued licenses to two enterprises to 
build new refining capacity and has provided licenses to 52 domestic and foreign 
companies.  The amount of imported petroleum products by the wholesale enterprises 
reached 8.5 million tons in 2010. By the end of 2010, the EMRA had licensed nearly 
24,000 operators to engage in importation, refining, transportation, storage, wholesale, or 
retail trade in petroleum products and LPG. Furthermore, the pricing of petroleum 
products was liberalized on January 1, 2005.22   
Since energy security is the main objective of Turkey’s energy policy, the 
																																																								
20 Ibid. 
21 "World Trade Organization Trade Policy Review 17 January 2012,"  (World Trade 
Organization, 2012). 
22 World Trade Organization ibid. 
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capacity of stockholding is limited in Turkey. Turkey has made several agreements with 
the major suppliers of energy in its vicinity. These agreements have supported Turkey’s 
role as an energy transit country. Currently, the two major international pipelines that 
cross Turkey are the Iraq-Turkey pipeline with a throughput capacity of 1.4 million 
barrels/day, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, which may transport 1.2 
million barrels/day.  With the new orientations of Turkish foreign policy, other pipeline 
projects are under consideration. 
Turkey’s outlook in terms of natural gas is not very different. The consumption of 
natural gas has significantly increased since it was first introduced as a source of energy 
in 1987. In 2008, natural gas became the primary source of energy, replacing oil. 
According to the World Trade Organization, “Of the 37.4 billion cubic metres consumed 
in 2010, around half was used in gas-fired power plants;  industrial and other commercial 
users took 32 percent, while households consumed the remaining 17 percent (district 
heating, cooking, etc.).”23 
As in the case for oil, Turkey's domestic production of natural gas is quite 
negligible and it is provided by long-term (20 to 25-year) contracts.  Turkey has made 
several sales and purchase agreements. In these agreements six supplying countries were 
the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Iran, Azerbaijan, Algeria, and Nigeria.  The 
natural gas from the Russian Federation, Iran, and Azerbaijan arrives via pipelines, and 
gas from Algeria and Nigeria is shipped in the form of LNG. For export purposes, Turkey 
has a connection with Greece. There are also planned pipeline projects that can help 




hub. The Nabucco Pipeline Project was such a project, linking consumers in Central and 
Eastern Europe with gas from the Caspian Sea in order to create a fourth supply corridor 
to Europe. In its attempts to secure its energy supply and fulfill the aspirations to become 
an energy hub in the region, Turkey supported several pipeline projects with different 
stakeholders.   
Turkey’s Pipeline Politics 
Pipelines played an important role in Turkey’s energy security. Currently, there 
are six operational natural gas and oil pipelines running through Turkey. Two of these 
pipelines are from Russia, transporting natural gas from Russia via Balkans and the Black 
Sea (also known as the Blue Stream). The third pipeline is the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum 
natural gas pipeline carrying natural gas from the Shah Deniz area of Azerbaijan to 
Turkey via Georgia. Parallel to this pipeline is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, which 
carries oil from Azerbaijan to Turkey. There is also the 1601-mile long Tabriz-Ankara 
pipeline, which carries Iran’s natural gas to Turkey. And, finally, there is the oldest, the 
600-mile long Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which carries Iraq oil. 
Turkey has considered several options in the realization of pipelines in its region. 
While some of these were not welcomed by Russia, others were. The Nabucco project 
was a pipeline project that aimed to transfer Caspian sources to Europe by avoiding 
Russia. This project was supposed to decrease Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. 
However, an alternative to this has been the Turkish Stream project, which created an 
alternative route to Europe. 
On December 1, 2014, the memorandum of understanding on the construction of 
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this pipeline was signed by Russian company Gazprom and the Turkish company Botas 
during Putin’s visit to Ankara. Within a month the feasibility study was discussed by 
Alexey Miller, Chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee and Taner Yildiz, 
Minister of Energy and Natural Resources. 
Earlier, Turkey and Russia also considered the transfer of Russian gas to the 
Middle East with the Blue Stream II project. This project also aimed to transfer Russian 
gas to India through an Israeli port in its second phase.24  While the pipeline politics 
between Russia and Turkey helped Moscow limit Western attempts to circumvent its 
energy dominance in Europe, for Turkey it did fit the zero problems policy that it tried to 
pursue.25 Turkey’s approach included both developing new pipeline projects with Russia 
and working as the facilitator of alternative routes like Nabucco that will make Russia 
less energy dominant and thus less aggressive.26 
Turkish Economy and Turkey’s Need for Energy between 2000 and 2010 
The Turkish economy saw a significant rise from 2000 to 2010. In this period 
Turkey’s GDP per capita rose from $561 billion to $1,116 billion and Turkish industry 
developed more than any other decade in Turkish history.27 
Turkey’s energy usage and import also rose in this period. Table 5 shows the 
degree to which the energy import changed in European countries and Turkey. While the 
energy import level in the EU rose 11 percent from 2002 to 2010, it increased 45 percent 
																																																								
24 Sedat Laciner, "Turkey's Pipeline Politics," Rev. Int'l L. & Pol. 5(2009). 
25 Stein, "Pipeline politics: Turkey’s Russian rapprochement ". 
26 Laciner, "Turkey's Pipeline Politics." 
27 OECD Country Statistical Profile (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-
profile-turkey-2011_csp-tur-table-2011-1-en) 
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in Turkey in the same period.28 The rise in the economy and the related rise in energy 
consumption as well as energy imports forced Turkey to consider the need for energy in 
its foreign policy choices. 
Table 5: Energy Imports in Turkey and Europe 
	
Source: EUROSTAT29 
In the Soviet period, Turkey’s main energy supplier was the Middle East. 
However, after the end of the Cold War, Turkey became more dependent on Russian 
																																																								





energy beginning in the Yeltsin period. This dependency increased during in the Putin 
period. 
Official Statements Indicating Turkey’s Need for Energy 
Although the governmental sources did not very often want to voice the 
deficiency in energy supply, especially when the energy-related projects were shared with 
the public, Turkish political leaders brought this need into public discourse. 
 In this regard, Taner Yildiz, Turkey’s minister of Energy and Natural Resources, 
mentioned how the Turkish economy had grown and that they had put in the effort to 
meet Turkey’s need for energy. He said that, “Within the last 10 years, electrical power 
duplicated in terms of facilities and consumption. We have a similar goal for the coming 
decade,” in his speech to the nuclear energy students to be sent to Moscow for education. 
30 
In a different occasion, during the 20th International Energy and Environment Fair 
and Conference (April 2014), Yildiz reminded attendees that while the energy need in the 
whole world is increasing, Turkey’s need increases in parallel to the rise in the economic 
development and wealth level in Turkey. He thus emphasized the importance of a multi-
dimensional energy politics for supply and demand security. Furthermore, Yildiz argued 
that multilateral energy agreements will strengthen the bonds between Turkey and the 
energy-rich states in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. According to him, this would also 




31 20th International Energy and Environment Fair and Conference (April 2014) 
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 Likewise, Mevlut Cavusoglu, minister of Foreign Affairs, noted that Turkey 
needs to diversify its energy sources. After detailing the use of natural gas, hydroelectric 
dams, and the use of coal, he further reminded attendees of the need for nuclear energy. 
He added that Turkey needs to continue investing in renewable energy as well. Having 
listed the need for several types of energy, the foreign minister summarized that in order 
for Turkey to grow, it has to consider its need for energy.32 
Prime Minister Davutoglu, on the other hand, said that the weakness in energy 
was due to some investments not made in time. He commented that Turkey is spending 
$55 billion for energy import. While Turkey used to produce electricity with its own coal, 
it started using natural gas that it bought from Russia and Azerbaijan and had to buy from 
instable suppliers like Iran and Iraq. Davutoglu also emphasized the rise in Turkey’s 
economy and the consequent need for energy.33 
Davutoglu also reminded attendees that the natural gas consumption of Turkey 
rose within the last decade, and that there is a need to balance production and 
consumption in these areas. He added that Turkey, being a consumer country as well as a 
transit country for the energy suppliers, needs to aspire to be an energy hub instead of a 
transit state.34 
Turkey’s new president, Erdoğan, is also concerned about the rise in Turkey’s 
need for energy. In his recent speech in Slovakia, Erdoğan stated that this need is a 







diversify the sources of energy.35  As Turkey’s need to invest more on energy increased, 
public officials became more likely to share this information with the public. 
External Factors Relating to Energy 
While the growth in the Turkish economy has made Russia an indispensable 
partner, there were also external factors. The importance of energy as a political tool 
increased between 2000 and 2010. As expressed by Debra Johnson, the rise in the oil 
prices after 1999 and “the aftermath of August 1998” have been positive factors for 
Russia’s oil industry.36  Russia’s Gazprom, which is the fourth largest energy company 
after Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch, Shell, and BP, has helped keeping the Russian economy 
stable with its exports of natural gas. Gazprom in this period earned almost a quarter of 
the budget revenues.37  In addition to the positive effect of high oil prices on the Russian 
economy, the rise in prices also made previously unattractive oil fields profitable.38  
Johnson also notes that, “despite the fact that in 2002, energy accounted for 55 percent of 
Russia’s export revenues, almost 20 percent of GDP and approximately 40 percent of tax 
revenues, Russia’s energy sector is encountering severe problems.” According to Johnson 
Debra, the main reason behind this has been the continuing legacy of the former 
economic system and an incomplete and ineffective transition to the new. 
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In his analysis of Turkey’s energy outlook, Tokuş, evaluates the energy issue in 
terms of Turkish–Russian relations and notes 
 “Turkey as an important growing energy market and Russia as the 
nearly unlimited energy provider as a neighbor for Turkey scope of 
that relationship has had many aspects accompanied with increasing 
political relationship. Through the signed natural gas agreements 
and projects like Blue Stream the amount of oil traded has created 
huge volume that has been signed in 2005 in Samsun. However, on 
the other hand, the existence of the Caspian oil as an alternative that 
would decrease dependency to Russian oil has made Putin and the 
Russian administration anxious about the issue.”  
In his view,   
“Although Turkey has an important need for Russian gas, due to the 
alternatives came to the agenda such as Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan and 
related projects on the Caspian gas, Russia and Turkey’s bargains 
behind the doors have not been so friendly as economic 
interdependence theory suggests. In case of such a situation, 
Turkey’s cost would be further limitations in supply of natural gas, 
and Russia’s cost would be loss of the huge income generated from 
Turkey and losing a secure transit partner for exporting energy not 
only to Turkey but also to the West.39” 
Russia’s Energy Policy 
Energy has always played an important role in Russia’s foreign policy, and in the 
1990s it played a significant part in relations with the West. With Putin’s coming to 
power, energy, in terms of oil and natural gas, became a central focus. This development 
stems from some changes in the Russian energy sector. Mankoff explains that Russia 
emerged “as the world’s largest producer of natural gas, with output totaling 607.4 billion 
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cubic meters (bcm) in 2007, and as the number two oil producer after Saudi Arabia, with 
9.98 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of output.”40  
Since the Putin government preferred a development model that was state 
directed, the effects of oil became more prominent in the Russian economy. As stated by 
Grace, “After the 1998 ruble devaluation and the flourishing of world oil prices, when 
Russia’s oil industry recovered, nearly single-handedly it dragged the nation out of 
depression.”41 Naturally, the consequent economic strength brought Russia more 
independence in the political arena.42 
In Russia’s relations with the West, the situation regarding energy is mostly 
mutual dependence. Russia, being the main energy provider for Europe (this is more 
valid for natural gas, and the demand for natural gas is expected to increase since it is 
cleaner and has been used for electricity production) needs the revenues of energy export 
to maintain its economic growth and to be able to support the state budget. On the other 
hand, Russia has a vulnerability due to the infrastructure of existing pipelines, which 
creates limitations on the countries to which it can export.43 
Russia’s leverage in the energy sector has served as a significant key to its great 
power status. Since it was not able to use the military nuclear power in any occasion and 
the permanent seat in the UN Security Council did not prevent the U.S. from unilateral 
actions when it was really needed, the option of energy export as a foreign policy tool has 
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become an important leverage. Thus, Russia, lacking its status as a military superpower, 
had the chance to become an energy superpower.44  With this intention, as noted by 
Smith,  
“an institute for the fuel and energy complex was set up at Moscow's 
prestigious foreign policy body, MGIMO, in 2000, so highlighting 
the increased importance that the energy factor was now playing In 
Russian foreign policy thinking. The Institute (MITEK) was set up 
in order to provide Russian oil companies with the necessary 
specialists in the fields of international law, world economy, 
finances and management, so that these companies can effectively 
defend their interests in forums such as OPEC, the International 
Energy Agency IEA, and the International Association of oil and 
gas producers.”45 
Russia’s use of energy as a foreign policy tool in the 21st century has become 
more significant in its relations with Europe, particularly Ukraine. Even the agreement 
signed in 2014 gave Russia more leverage. According to the agreement, even if Russia 
raised the price of gas arbitrarily, or cut off the supply in winter (which has already 
happened twice), there is no sanction for Russia.46 
For the buyers of energy, diversification of energy sources has always been an 
important issue. Having multiple avenues of exporting energy reduces the risk of cutting 
off the energy distribution when a technical or political crisis among producers, 
consumers, or the market occurs. The more producers of energy there are, the more stable 
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the energy market is.47 Turkey, being in an unreliable environment, and having Iraq, Iran, 
and Russia as the main exporters of energy in oil and natural gas, had to consider this 
option in its energy policy.  
However, the circumstances have forced Turkey to use Russia as the main energy 
provider, especially in terms of natural gas. On the other hand, Iran, a large provider of 
energy, was even less reliable when it came to energy. The natural gas flow from Iran has 
been interrupted several times without any warning. Furthermore, Turkish authorities did 
not receive a warm welcome when they attempted to discuss the issue with Iran.48  
Another important issue is the respective weight and effect of oil and natural gas 
in the consideration of energy dependency. While energy dependency has very often been 
considered in terms of oil and natural gas, the latter has a heavier hand in shaping foreign 
policy. As Stone notes, natural gas dependency “has a more pronounced direct correlation 
with foreign policy affinity than oil ... empirical analysis supports the assertion that gas is 
a more politically-charged commodity than oil. This stems from the fact that gas tends to 
be traded regionally, while oil is traded on a global market”. Although, very often, gas 
dependency comes with cultural and military ties, this was not the case in the Turkish-
Russian relationship. 
Overall Assessment of Energy as a Factor of Rapprochement 
Energy has been a significant factor in rapprochement in Turkish–Russian 
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relations. In this mutually beneficial relationship, while Turkey needed energy for its 
developing growth, Russia used its energy both for its economic growth (as a source of 
income) and as a political leverage.  
Although Russia was a more reliable provider to Turkey, especially when 
compared to Iran, its energy policies in Ukraine and Europe indicated that a similar threat 
was possible for Turkey. Contrary to Russia’s relations with other countries, which 
happen to be within the near abroad sphere of Russia, the relations with Turkey were not 
supported with cultural or military bonds. Thus, energy seems to have shaped the 
Turkish–Russian relationship in a manner not pertinent to, and in some cases despite, the 




TWO CASES: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE 
SOUTH CAUCASUS 
	
The previous chapters have explained how Turkey and Russia went through a 
rapprochement process after 2000. Once the significance and validity of rapprochement 
were explained, the three chapters dealt with each explanation of rapprochement, or each 
variable. All three main explanations for rapprochement were analyzed in depth with 
their respective influence on the Turkish-Russian rapprochement. 
 Since this dissertation aims to discover Turkish–Russian rapprochement from a 
predominantly Turkish foreign policy perspective, it is necessary to test the contours of 
Turkish foreign policy’s journey in other areas of interest for Turkey. In order to analyze 
Turkish foreign policy in two other regions of activism for Turkey, this chapter will focus 
on Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and the South Caucasus. This chapter 
mainly aims to detail the evolution of Turkish foreign policy in these two regions, to try 
to understand the factors that shaped Turkish foreign policy in these regions, and to draw 
conclusions on the effects of each variable that worked in Turkish-Russian 
rapprochement. 
Thus, in addition to the conclusions drawn from the analysis of Turkish–Russian 
rapprochement in the previous chapters, we will be able to test each variable as a factor 
shaping foreign policy choices of Turkey. It is difficult to argue that all these factors 
played the exact role they played in Turkish–Russian rapprochement in these two other 
regions of Turkish foreign policy activism. However, they all played a role at different 
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levels in different circumstances, and the role they played as foreign-policy factors in 
these two regions indicate a strong explanation for their role in Turkish–Russian 
rapprochement. 
This chapter finds that energy was the prominent factor that shaped foreign-policy 
making in these regions, as it has been the most powerful explanation for Turkish–
Russian rapprochement.  
In this setting the three variables had their differing influence on the foreign-
policy choices of Turkey in the region. The first variable, deterioration of Turkey’s 
relations with the West, did not have a significant impact on Turkey’s choices in the 
region. Since, with its population and economy, Turkey has been the dominant side in its 
relations with each of the countries in the region, it did not approach any of these 
countries for a balancing policy. Furthermore, none of the countries in the region had an 
anti-American status. 
For the threat perception argument, only Georgia could be a location where the 
threat perception could be observed. Since neither Armenian nor Azerbaijani 
governments were affected by the color revolutions, there was not an occasion to 
perceive such a threat. In Georgia’s case, the post-Color revolution government only 
developed stronger relations with Turkey, which Turkey also appreciated due to more 
influence in the region, extension of the “zero problems” policy, and its reinforcement for 
Turkey’s stronger role in the region. 
Energy appears to be a strong explanation for Turkish foreign policy in this region 
as well. This is seen in Turkey’s relations with the only energy-rich state in the region, 
Azerbaijan. It is not possible to explain Turkey’s strong relations with Azerbaijan with 
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energy since these two countries already had strong historical and cultural bonds as 
expressed in the “one nation two states” motto. However, Azerbaijan’s use of energy as 
leverage in Turkish–Armenian relations is the indicator in this case.  The centuries-old 
Turkish–Azerbaijani brotherhood was threatened when Turkey unilaterally opted to 
develop its relations with Armenia, disregarding the Azerbaijan–Armenia relations. 
Neither cultural nor historical bonds were sufficient to conserve Turkish-Azeri 
brotherhood in such an environment. On the other hand, Azerbaijani energy was a strong 
reminder for Turkey to consider its Armenian policy. Thus, more than developing its 
existing strong relationship with Azerbaijan, energy has played as an important factor in 
curbing Turkey’s relations with Armenia despite Azerbaijan. 
The analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the South Caucasus strongly indicates 
that, more than any other variable, energy has served as a dominant factor in shaping and 
balancing Turkish foreign policy in this region. While energy has served as the proactive 
force behind Turkey’s relations in the Middle East, it served as the reactive force in 
checking and balancing Turkish foreign policy in the region. 
Revisiting the Three Variables for the Case Studies 
This study has mainly argued that there have been three prominent factors in 
Russian–Turkish rapprochement. The underlying factors brought us to the three 
explanations: (1) Deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the West, (2) Common 
perception of the U.S. as a threat, and (3) Turkey’s increasing need for energy. In the 
analysis of Turkish–Russian relations, all three explanations appeared to be strong 
influential factors for rapprochement.  
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The period of research for this dissertation is 2000 to 2014. Within this period, 
despite some promising moments of hope, Turkey’s relations with the West did not 
develop as some people expected in Turkey. The EU accession process halted several 
times and U.S. unilateral actions in Iraq caused Turkey to be humiliated in its close 
neighborhood. The opinion polls in Turkey revealed a significant decrease in Turkish 
public opinion of the EU accession. Likewise, American popularity in Turkey 
significantly decreased in the period. All these developments provided strong reasons for 
Turkey’s reconsideration of its Eastern identity and its goal of a more powerful status in 
its Eastern neighborhood. In this new orientation, new natural partners would be China, 
Russia, and Iran. With its geographical proximity and more Western nature, Russia 
seemed to fit as the first choice for partnership and cooperation. 
The second explanation focused on “threat perception” rather than the discovery 
of a new (or long-lost) identity. Thus, in this explanation, more than frustrations and 
humiliations, a concrete threat perception played an important role. The rationale behind 
this explanation was been the unilateral American activism in the neighborhood within 
this period. Despite objections even from the European allies of the U.S., the U.S. waged 
a war in Iraq, giving the impression that it was exacerbating-if not igniting-the political 
movements in several countries and causing the encirclement of the other independent 
states in the region. For Russian–Turkish relations, this was more significant in the Black 
Sea region and the color revolutions. Thus, the second explanation argues that what 
brought Russia and Turkey together during this period is this new perception of threat. 
These two countries saw the U.S. as a threat to their independence and opted for more 
cooperation against the American threat in the region. 
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Finally, the thrust of this dissertation is on the third explanation, which focuses on 
Turkey’s increasing need for energy. This explanation tacitly depicts a pragmatist and 
economically oriented nature in Turkish foreign policy in this period. According to this 
explanation, neither Turkey’s Eastern identity nor a U.S. threat perception were as 
influential as the more pragmatic factor of energy for Turkish–Russian rapprochement. 
This explanation is reinforced by the tangible increase in the volume of the Turkish 
economy, the reliance of Turkey on Russia for oil and natural gas, and the increasing 
importance of energy in Turkey’s development. Thus, the third explanation sees Turkey’s 
need for energy as the most influential source of rapprochement between the developing, 
energy-striving Turkey and energy-rich Russia.  
First Case: Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
Since the establishment of the new Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey has always 
avoided any encounter with the Middle East.1 After the end of the Cold War, when the 
importance of the Middle East in terms of security increased, Turkish political elite 
became interested in the Middle East.2 This new activism has been represented mostly in 
relations with Iran, Syria, and Israel. Turkey and Iran had ideological confrontations in 
the 1990s, and there were tensions with Syria due to the terrorist safe havens in this 
country. Despite early cooperation with Israel in the 1990s, tensions occurred with this 
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country as well.3  
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses that “Turkey’s vision for the region 
is a permanent peace, stability, and security, along with a sustainable economic 
development. In this respect, security and stability is seen as the sin qua non for 
economic development. For this reason, Turkey’s efforts are focused on the solution of 
problems with mutual dialogue, creation of economic interdependence between regional 
states, and the strengthening of social and cultural relationships.”4 
As in relations with Russia, the first period following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was dominated by a hesitant Turkish foreign policy. While new relations were 
developed, they were not grounded in a strongly constructed foreign-policy orientation. 
Turkey, seeking an activism in the new areas of operation, took daring steps according to 
the wave of current affairs in this period.  
Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East went through unexpected stages in the 
first decade of the third millennium. Although the opposite has been true since 2010, 
there had been a celebratory environment in Turkish academic circles for the success of 
Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Turkish foreign policy has been described as 
having evolved from distance to intervention in the region.5  
In the early years of this period, as the head of the terrorist organization PKK was 
captured, a new rhetoric developed. Until then, there was an indifferent–if not hostile–
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language in Turkish foreign-policy circles when the Middle East was the issue. All the 
states to be considered in this section (Iran, Iraq, and Syria) were considered to have a 
negative influence on Turkish domestic politics. Iran, with its ideological approach, and 
Iraq and Syria with their open or covert support of terrorism in Turkey, were considered 
to be enemies in bad times, and irrelevant in good times. 
Even before AKP’s rise to power, Adana Protocol established a confidence-
building environment between Turkey and Syria. Furthermore, Turkey became more 
willing to take initiatives in this period. Such moves, as represented by Turkey’s 
diplomatic contact with Hamas after the elections, have also been interpreted as a 
diversion in Turkish Foreign policy.6 The Turkish elite’s approach was rooted in the view 
of the region’s pre-modern image and the several risks or threats seen in relations within 
the region.7  
Like Iraq, Turkey’s relations with Iran also developed during this period. While, 
throughout the 1990s, Iran was considered a hostile state covertly trying to export its 
Islamic regime, this perspective changed in the period between 2000 and 2010.  Energy, 
again, was considered an important motive behind Turkey’s developing relations with 
Iran.8 Contrary to the expectations in the West that Turkey’s increasing relations with 
Iran would influence Iran, it happened to be the other way around, and Turkey developed 
close ties with Iran.9  
Larrabee, in his explanation of the change in Turkish foreign policy, described the 
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new stance as “a response to structural changes in its security environment since the end 
of the Cold War” and commented that this might even be an opportunity for the West.10  
However, as it turned out, Turkey’s own pragmatic approach was more influential, and 
rather than seeing Iran’s nuclear program as a threat, Turkey happened to be a defender 
for Iran’s right to pursue it.11  
Within the overall assessment of Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East, it 
can be seen that, while the relations with energy-rich states and regions improved despite 
some conflicts, the relations with energy-poor states like Syria quickly deteriorated 
because of security concerns.  
Relations with Iraq 
Being deeply affected by the 2003 Iraq War, Turkey’s relations with Iraq also had 
a fluctuating journey. The invasion of Iraq, Turkey’s stance against any Kurdish 
autonomous government in the north of Iraq, and the cover supports from the authorities 
in Northern Iraq to the PKK played important roles in blocking Turkey’s attempts to 
develop cooperation with Iraq. 
In the beginning, there was a dilemma in Turkish–Iraq relations. While, for 
security reasons, Turkey was strongly against any autonomous structure in the northern 
part of Iraq, its need for energy required development of relations with the government in 
the north of Iraq. The traditional foreign policy approach in Turkey towards Iraq was 
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shaped by the Kurdish problem and the geopolitical rivalry with Iran.12 These two factors 
required support for the central authority in Iraq. However, as the distrust grew with 
Maliki’s central government in Iraq, traditional Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq was 
gradually replaced by an energy-oriented one.  
Beginning in 2008, significant developments occurred in Turkey–Iraq relations. 
First, Iraqi president Celal Talabani visited Turkey in March 2008. Within a year, Turkish 
president Abdullah Gul made a visit to Iraq. In this environment, the investments of 
Turkish businessmen in Iraq, especially in the areas of infrastructure and energy, 
developed even further.13 The importance of energy in the development of relations was 
quite significant. 
Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz indicated that, 
“Turkey’s energy import from Northern Iraq has reached 37 million barrels with 450,000 
barrels per day. And our goal is to make this 550,000 barrels per day”14 Another 
development that shaped relations with Northern Iraq was Turkey’s three-stage plan to 
end PKK terrorism. However, the details of this plan are still not clear in many official 
circles, let alone among the Turkish public.  
Several areas of cooperation came about after the visit made by then prime 
minister to Iraq, Erdoğan. During Erdoğan’s visit on July 10, 2008, the Turkey-Iraq High 
Level Strategic Cooperation Agreement was signed, and the first meetings took place on 
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September 17 and 18, 2009 in Istanbul, and on October 15, 2009 in Baghdad.15  
The issue discussed in the meetings were security, the development of mutual 
economic relations between the two states, opening of two new border gates, 
management and sharing of water sources, cooperation in the operation, and international 
marketing of energy sources (oil and natural gas). The development of cooperation in 
areas such as health, education, and culture between the two nations was also mentioned. 
In this respect, it is argued that following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, 
Turkey’s relations with Iraq moved from uncertainty to a high level of cooperation.16  
This case was reinforced by mutual visits, starting with President Gul’s visit in 
2008, and continuing with the visits of Iraq President Celal Talabani, Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Iraq Prime Minister Nuri El Maliki. Ayhan’s argument was 
also supported by his view of the four principles of Davutoglu’s approach to the regional 
states and specifically to Iraq: Common security area, high-level political dialogue, 
economic interdependence, and living together in a common cultural ground.17 
When it comes to the economic relations, a significant rise was also seen in the 
trade volume between Turkey and Iraq. Table 6 below shows the trade volume between 
Turkey and Iraq. 
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Table 6: Trade Volume Between Turkey and Iraq between 2003 and 2010 
Years Export (million $) Import (million $) 




2003 829 112 941 716 
2004 1.820 467 2.288 1.353 
2005 2.750 458 3.208 2.291 
2006 2.589 375 2.965 2.213 
2007 2.811 645 3.456 2.167 
2008 3.912 1.320 5.233 2.591 
2009 5.126 952 6.078 4.174 
2010 6.042 1.354 7.396 4.688 
Source: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs18 
However, Turkey–Iraq relations naturally experienced some elements of friction 
as well. Ayhan lists these problem areas as sovereignty, water problems, and Kirkuk.19 
One significant problem was the sovereignty issue for Iraq, particularly following the 
operations made by Turkey within Iraqi borders to chase PKK terrorists.  Another 
problem was the sharing of water sources, mainly stemming from different perspectives 
on the usage of water sources. While Iraq sees Turkey acting unilaterally on the Tigris 
and Euphrates waters, which are seen as international waters, the Turkish side sees the 
problem as waters crossing borders.20 Last, but not least, Kirkuk has always posed a 
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problem in Turkey–Iraq relations. Due to the Turkmen population living in this oil-rich 
region, Turkey has always observed the rights of the Turkish population in Kirkuk. 
Turkey’s stance, however, has always been met with suspicion by Arab and Kurdish 
populations in Irak.21 
As is the case for other relations in the region, Turkey’s relations with Iraq can 
hardly be separated from Iran’s relations with Iraq. Some Iranian scholars argue that 
Iran’s foreign policy towards Iraq is based on two pillars: establishing security and 
creating economic-cultural opportunities.22 This approach has resulted in an 
understanding of the relations as balance of interests after the invasion of Iraq.23  
Relations with Iran 
While Turkey’s relations with Iraq followed a fluctuating pattern during and after 
the U.S. invasion, relations with Iran were also affected by the status of Iran in the West. 
A general description of Turkey’s relations with Iran starts with the unchanged border for 
several centuries. By some Iranian scholars, this relationship has been described as 
“essentially peaceful, without ever being warm.”24 Turkey has two consulate generals 
(Tebriz and Urumiye) in addition to the embassy in Tehran, while Iran has Istanbul, 
Erzurum, and Trabzon consulate generals in addition to the embassy in Ankara. The 
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Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the relations with Iran are developed on 
the basis of non- intervention in internal affairs, mutual respect, and good 
neighborhood.25 
Until the 18th century, Turkish-Iranian relations were depicted by a struggle 
between the Shiism of Safavid dynasty and the Sunni orthodoxy of the Ottoman 
Empire.26 As agreements were reached between the two countries in the 1700s, relations 
became more stable and accommodating.27 Throughout the 20th century, both states went 
through modernization processes and, with threat perceptions from great powers, did not 
confront with each other. Nun and Kibaroglu describe this as an effort by the regimes in 
both states to “consolidate their domestic power and to strengthen their regimes, at the 
same time trying to pursue an independent foreign policy.”28  
This non-amicable, but without confrontation, relationship tended to change 
following the 1979 regime change in Iran. Since then, Turkey has been suspicious of 
Iranian policies regarding a regime change in Turkey. In the early 1990s, Iran was 
accused of trying to export its regime to the neighborhood and some assassinations in 
Turkey were thought to be a consequence of these attempts. Secularist journalist Ugur 
Mumcu’s assassination in front of his house was linked to an Iranian-based organization 
Kudus Ordusu (Jerusalem Army) by the prosecutor in the case.29 Other cases like Merve 
																																																								
25 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), "Iran Türkiye Siyasi İlişkileri 
(Iran - Turkey Political Relations),"  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-iran_siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa. 
26 John Calabrese, "Turkey and Iran: limits of a stable relationship," British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 25, no. 1 (1998). 
27 Mustafa Kibaroglu, ed. Iran, Turkey's Neighborhood (Ankara: Foreign Policy Insitute, 2008). 
28 Ibid. 
29 NTV MSNBC News Channel, "Keleş: Mumcu Cinayeti Çözüldü,"  
http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/16885.asp. 
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Kavakci Affair30 and the Sincan Affair, where Iran’s ambassador’s speech caused anger 
in the more secular Turks, caused Iran to be seen as the actor behind the unrest in Turkey.  
In addition to the mutual blaming in the 1990s, collapse of the Soviet Union also 
opened an area of rivalry between Iran and Turkey. Newly independent states in the 
former Soviet region had two choices: embrace a secular form of government like Turkey 
or adopt a more religious approach. For the most part, the second model came from Iran. 
Barkey sees Turkey’s attitude in this region as a more aggressive one compared to Iran.31 
However, it should be noted that Turkey had more linguistic and cultural bonds with the 
newly independent states.  
This approach seems to have changed in the 2000s. As economic relations 
between Iran and Turkey increased, Turkish public opinion became to more favorable 
toward Iran.  
German Marshall Fund’s findings, in this respect, indicate that the view against 
Iran was quite insignificant in Turkey. According to German Marshall Fund’s research, 
the vote against sanctions on Iran was not a surprise since “the plurality of Turks were 
not concerned (only 48 percent were concerned) about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. ” 
This contrast was even more significant when compared to the 86 percent in the U.S. and 
79 percent in the EU.32  The report depicts the view in Turkey on Iran’s nuclear program 
as following: 
																																																								
30 Merve Kavakci was a female member of the parliament who insisted on wearing Islamic 
headdress when it was banned in the governmental places. Eventually she was barred from 
parliament and when her dual citizenship was discovered she was stripped of her Turkish 
citizenship.  
31 Henri J Barkey, "Iran and Turkey: Confrontation across an Ideological Divide," Alvin Z. 
Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansky, Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia-Russia, 
Turkey, and Iran (1995). 
32 Transatlantic Trends, "Key Findings," German Marshall Fund (2010). 
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The intensity of concern is substantial, as 49 percent of EU 
respondents and 69 percent of Americans were very concerned 
about Iran having nuclear weapons. In Turkey, roughly one-in-three 
(36 percent) were not at all concerned and only 18 percent were very 
concerned. When presented with multiple options for dealing with 
Iran’s nuclear program, one in four Turks were willing to accept that 
Iran could acquire nuclear weapons while only six percent of EU 
respondents and four percent in the United States were willing to do 
so. Considering Turkey has extensive economic ties with Iran, 
including tourism, it is not so surprising that support for economic 
sanctions on Iran was fairly low in Turkey (24 percent) compared to 
American (40 percent) support. Most Turks did not support 
meddling with Iran’s internal politics, as only six percent said that 
providing support to opponents of the current government in Iran 
would be the best option to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear 
weapons. This option was fairly popular in the United States (25 
percent).33 
As mentioned above, the trade between the two countries certainly has played an 
important role in this perception. Following the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey and Iran’s trade 
partnerships increased. Table 7 below indicates the trade volume between the two 
countries from 2001 to 2014.   
Table 7: Turkey-Iran Trade Relations 
YEARS IMPORTS EXPORTS TRADE VOLUME 
2001 839,800 360,536 1,200,336 
2002 920,972 333,962 1,254,934 
2003 1,860,683 533,786 2,394,469 
2004 1,962,059 813,031 2,775,090 
2005 3,469,706 912,940 4,382,646 
2006 5,626,610 1,066,902 6,693,512 
2007 6,615,394 1,441,190 8,056,584 
2008 8,199,689 2,029,760 10,229,449 




Table 7 Continued 
YEARS IMPORTS EXPORTS TRADE VOLUME 
2010 7,645,008 3,044,177 10,689,185 
2011 12,461,532 3,589,635 16,051,167 
2012 11,964,779 9,921,602 21,886,381 
2013 10,383,217 4,192,511 14,575,728 
2014 9,126,133 3,412,065 12,538,198 
Source: Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade34 
The change in Turkish public opinion favoring Iran has also been explained with 
the rise of political Islam in Turkish society along with the rise in the opinion that Turkey 
should act in closer cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries.35 The report by the 
German Marshall Fund on transatlantic trends shows this change. A 2010 finding of the 
report claims that more than half of the Turkish population think that Turkey should act 
alone or act with the Middle Eastern countries. Those who think that Turkey should act 
with the countries of the Middle East has rose from 10 to 20 percent from 2009 to 2010, 
while the percentage of those who think Turkey should act alone dropped from 43 to 34 
percent in the same period.36   
Energy has naturally played an important role in Turkish-Iranian relations. Thirty-
five percent of Turkey’s crude oil and 18 percent of natural gas comes from Iran. Thus, 
Iran is the primary supplier of oil for Turkey and the second supplier of natural gas, after 




35 Sami Kohen, "Turk Kamuoyunda Eksen Kaymasi var (Theres is an axis shift in Turkish public 
opinion)," Milliyet, 16.09.2010 2010. 
36 Trends, "Key Findings." 
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Turkey. 
Relations with Syria 
The third Middle Eastern state in Turkey’s neighborhood for the analysis of the 
development of relations is Syria. Turkey’s relations with Syria have also followed a 
fluctuating pattern. Unlike Iran, during the Cold War years, Syria was in the Eastern Bloc 
camp and had very little relations with Turkey. However, in the Iran-Iraq war, Syria 
supported Iran. Syria also became a member of the American-led coalition during the 
Gulf War.37 Syria’s success in its pragmatist foreign policy was seen as a significant 
success of an irredentist fragile state, which came up as an artificial entity in the 
neighborhood of stronger states.38 
Despite the problematic environment after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria 
was able to survive the transition period in the 1990s. Assad’s foreign policy steered 
Syria away from a fate similar to that of other states like Romania and Yugoslavia.39 In 
this period, Turkey mostly saw Syria as an enemy, which protected and abated the head 
of the terrorist organization PKK.  
 Another long-lasting conflict between Turkey and Syria was the Hatay province, 
which had joined Turkey with a plebiscite in 1939 (Syria claimed the territory). As in the 
case for Iraq, the use of water has also been a problem area between the two states. 
Turkey had built new dams in the region and the decrease that this caused in the flow of 
																																																								
37 Berna Süer, "7. Syria," Turkey’s Neighborhood 1, no. 3 (2002). 
38 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a 
Penetrated Regional System  (Routledge, 2002). 
39 Barry Rubin, The truth about Syria  (Macmillan, 2007). 
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Euphrates created tensions in Turkey–Syria relations.40  
Turkey began a growing alliance with Israel in the 1990s and this left Syria more 
fragile during this period. This tension is considered to be a response to the growing 
tension between the two states, which turned into a confrontation in 1998. Assad’s 
backing down in the confrontation caused the PKK leader to leave Syria and afterwards, 
a development started in Turkey’s relations with Syria.  
Despite the betterment of relations after 1998, they could not be considered a 
partnership. Ankara and Damascus were both against the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
However, Syria did not provide logistic support to the U.S., and did not limit the 
activities of former Baathist insurgents in its territory.41  
During this period, developments in the region offered several foreign policy 
choices for both parties. As the invasion of Iraq brought the risk of disintegration of the 
country, Turkey and Syria were faced with a similar threat. Thus, the threat perception 
about a new state in Iraq caused a rapprochement for both countries. However, this was 
not sufficient to create a strategic partnership.42 
Syria, which did not support the invasion of Iraq, met with an international 
pressure to withdraw from Lebanon in 2003 and 2004.  The UN resolution in 2004 stated 
that the Security Council declared support for a free and fair presidential election in 
Lebanon and called for withdrawal of foreign forces in Lebanon.43 At this time, Turkey 
offered strong support to Syria despite the policies of the European Union and the United 
																																																								
40 Ibid. 
41 Veysel Ayhan, "Türkiye-Suriye İlişkilerinde Yeni Bir Dönem: Yüksek Düzeyli Stratejik 
İşbirliği Konseyi (A new period in Turkey-Syria Relations: High Level Strategic Cooperation 
Council)," Ortadoğu Analiz, Kasım 9(2009). 
42 Ibid. 
43 UN Resolution, "Resolution 1559 (http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sc8181.doc.htm)." 
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States to the contrary. First, then Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Damascus in December 
2004 to meet his counterpart Naci Otri. During this visit Erdoğan delivered the good 
news that more water from the Tigris river would flow to Syria, a common dam on the 
Asi river was discussed, and a deal on Arab gas was made.44  A year later, in April 2005, 
Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer visited Syria.45 This visit came at a time when 
tensions with the U.S. had escalated following the murder of former Lebanese prime 
minister Hariri and the supposed Syrian influence in Lebanon.46 
This optimism was in line with the “zero problem with neighbors” policy of 
foreign minister Davutoglu for a while. Turkey and Syria enjoyed good neighborly 
relations with several official visits and an increasing volume of trade. Table 8 below 
indicates the trade between the two countries. 
Table 8: Turkey-Syria Trade Relations 
YEAR EXPORT IMPORT TRADE VOLUME 
1996 307,778 311,459 619,237 
1997 268,753 456,282 725,035 
1998 309,044 308,002 617,046 
1999 232,210 307,001 539,211 
2000 184,267 545,240 729,507 
2001 281,141 463,476 744,617 
2002 266,772 314,770 581,542 
2003 410,755 261,193 671,948 
2004 394,783 247,551 642,334 
2005 551,627 142,585 694,212 
																																																								
44 Turan Yılmaz, "Ekonomik Partner Olduk (We Became Economic Partners)," Hurriyet, 23 
December 2004 2004. 
45 Veli Güney, "Sezer Suriye'de kahramanlar gibi (Sezer is like heroes in Syria)," Milliyet 2005. 
46 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995  
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Table 8 Continued 
YEAR EXPORT IMPORT TRADE VOLUME 
2006 609,417 187,250 796,667 
2007 797,766 259,282 1,057,048 
2008 1,115,013 323,697 1,438,710 
2009 1,421,637 221,454 1,643,091 
2010 1,844,605 452,493 2,297,098 
2011 1,609,861 336,646 1,946,507 
2012 497,960 67,448 565,408 
2013 1,024,473 84,909 1,109,382 
2014 1,636,998 103,587 1,740,585 
Source: Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade47 
The Arab Spring deeply affected Turkey’s relations with Syria. As Ankara could 
not convince Assad to develop more democratic reforms in Syria, Turkey became one of 
the states favoring a regime change in Syria. This caused deeper deterioration of the 
relations.  
Unlike its relations with Iran and Iraq, Turkey does not have an energy- related 
relationship with Syria. There was simply not enough time to develop this kind of 
relationship with Syria. Although Syria had been the eastern Mediterranean’s leading oil 
and natural gas producer once, the war caused a sharp decline in its oil production. Figure 




48 U.S. Energy Information Administration (http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=sy) 
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Figure 12: Syria, flows of petroleum and other liquids, 2003-2012 
	
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
It can be argued that the betterment of relations with Syria after 2004 was also 
based on a pragmatist approach on both sides. Thus, neither a realist rivalry nor a 
constructivist “identity conflict” (There were deep worldview differences between 
Syria’s minority-controlled secular government and Turkey’s rather conservative 
government.) prevented the two sides from developing relations. However, the external 
factors of the Arab Spring resulted in a deep crack in relations. 
	 141	
Second Case: Turkish Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus 
Another important case is Turkish foreign policy in the South Caucasus. Turkey 
had hot and cold relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The policy choices 
with these states also provide explanations for the motives of Turkish foreign policy in 
the period from 2000 to 2010. Although the relations with these states, especially 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, have deep historical routes, it can be argued that the foreign-
policy choices made with these states reveals the motives behind the making of Turkish 
foreign policy.   
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ankara’s stance was to develop much 
closer relations with the former Soviet states. This stance was supported by Turkey’s 
Western allies mostly due to the fear of spreading Iranian fundamentalism in the region. 
In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, Turkey was presented as a model in the 
region. With wind of the Western support, Turkey wanted to create a Turkish sphere of 
influence in the region. This way, its importance as a frontline state during the Cold War 
would be sustained with the modern Western model image for the newly independent 
states.49  
In Turkey’s relations with Armenia, there have been three main problem areas: 
The Armenian claims on the events of 1915, the invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh by 
Armenia, and the opening of border gates between Turkey and Armenia. Right after the 
Cold War, Turkey and Armenia developed good relations. In 1991, Turkey invited 
Armenia to be a founding member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. 
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However, the invasion of Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh in 1993 caused the end of this 
positive relationship. 
Despite some steps like the opening of a church in Turkey’s Lake Van and the 
invitation of the Armenia’s Minister of Culture to the opening ceremony, and the start of 
flights from Armenia’s capital Erivan to Turkey’s resort town Antalya in 2007, or the so 
called “cheese” and “football” diplomacies in 2008, the fragile nature of the relations did 
not allow for enduring rapprochement. The Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict has always 
dominated Turkish-Armenian relations, and the liberal explanation was not enough to 
restore relations. However, even the mentioned attempts for betterment of the relations is 
a significant clue to Turkey’s intent for more cooperation. 
On the other hand, the deterioration of relations with Armenia can also be linked 
to Turkey’s need for Azerbaijani energy rather than the historical and cultural ties with 
this country. Turkey simply could not afford the deterioration of its relations with oil-rich 
Azerbaijan.  
When it comes to Georgia, the relations were very much affected with the 
orientation of the Georgian government. Until the ousting of Gamsakhurdia, Turkey had 
an uneasy stance against Georgia, which was echoed by the pro-Abkhaz lobby in Turkey. 
The pro-Abkhaz lobby in Turkey caused Turkey to see Georgia as anti-Turkish, mostly 
due to its attitude towards Meskhetians. 
However, as a principle, Ankara was always against self-determination and 
supported the territorial integrity of the states in its region. This was a natural 
consequence of Turkey’s problem within its own borders and its fight against PKK 
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separatist terrorism.50  However, the distance toward Georgia did not last long. When 
Georgia became more pro-Western, the importance of mutual dependence was 
appreciated by both countries. When it came to the export of Azerbaijani oil, Georgia and 
Turkey became even closer.51 Additionally, Georgia is involved in the Baku–Ceyhan and 
Baku–Erzurum oil and gas pipeline projects.  
Turkey’s Relations with Armenia 
Turkey’s relationship with Armenia happened to be one of the most problematic 
issues in the region. The historical problems related to the events of 1915, some claims of 
Armenia on the Eastern towns of Turkey, and the invasion of Nagorno Karabakh after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union made the relationship between these countries quite 
complicated.52  
Turkey was one of the first states to recognize Armenia’s independence on 
December 16, 1991. Turkey also provided humanitarian assistance and actively supported 
the integration of Armenia with some regional and Euro-Atlantic organizations.53 
Likewise, Turkey invited Armenia to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation as a founding 
member although Armenia does not have a coast on the Black Sea. 
However, these positive relations halted after Armenia invaded the Kelbecer 
Rayon of Azerbaijan on April 3, 1993. Following the invasion, Turkey tried to continue 
																																																								
50 Frederik Coene, The Caucasus-An Introduction  (Routledge, 2009). 179. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Emre İşeri, Türkiye'nin Yeni Dış Politika Etkinliğinin Kafkasya'daki Sınırları: Ermenistan 
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53 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), "Relations between Turkey and 
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with a peaceful attitude and requested that Armenia stop the invasion and withdraw its 
forces. Concurrently, in order to support Azerbaijan, Turkey gradually limited its 
relations with Armenia. Not having received a positive response from Armenia, Turkey 
decided to unilaterally close its expansive border with Armenia (Alican land border gate 
and Akyaka Railway Border Gate). 
Another cause of the cessation of Turkey’s relations with Armenia was the issue 
related to some statements in Armenia’s “Independence Declaration” and “Constitution 
of Armenia.”  The Declaration of Independence of Armenia contains the statement, “The 
Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task achieving international recognition of 
the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.”54 In this period Turkey’s 
government was accused of passivism and silence against this Armenian attitude by then 
president Turgut Ozal and all opposition parties in the Turkish parliament.55  
Thus, mostly due to Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan and the manipulation of 
public opinion by several political sides in Turkey, Turkish–Armenian relations did not 
develop a great deal. However, with the belief that it would help the establishment of a 
regional cooperation environment and reinforce the stability in the region, Turkey 
unilaterally took further steps to first normalize and then develop its relations with 
Armenia. Within this framework, Turkey facilitated transportation to Armenia, provided 
flights to the Armenian capital Yerevan, and supported relations between non-
governmental organizations.  
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From 2007 on, Turkey’s efforts to develop good neighborly relations with 
Armenia have accelerated. This was in line with foreign policy advisor (later to be named 
minister of foreign affairs and prime minister) Ahmet Davutoglu’s “zero problem with 
neighbors” policy. In March 2007, the Akdamar Church in Lake Van was restored by the 
Turkish government and several Armenian bureaucrats were invited to the opening 
ceremony. Within the same year, flights from Yerevan to Turkey’s resort town Antalya 
were also started. 
In early 2008, so-called “cheese” diplomacy, and in the summer of 2008, “soccer” 
diplomacy took place. The first was project “Caucasian Cheese,” which cheese producers 
from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia started in a fair in the Turkeyish town of 
Kars.56 When Turkey and Armenia happened to be in the same group for eliminations in 
the 2010 World Cup, Armenia’s president Serzh Sargsyan, who was elected in February 
2008, invited Turkey’s president Abdullah Gul to Yerevan for the soccer match between 
Armenia and Turkey. This effort, however, did not materialize and ultranationalists on 
both sides worked to sabotage the normalization process.57   
The U.S. and the EU also affected Turkey’s relations with Armenia. Russia’s 
invasion of Georgia in 2008 deeply affected the conjecture in the Caucasus. Within this 
conjecture, Armenia and Turkey happened to take a similar stance.58 However, relations 
with Armenia could never be separated from relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan.  
As events developed, Turkey had to make a choice between preserving its 
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relations with its oil and natural gas rich brother nation Azerbaijan and developing better 
relations with Armenia with the support of the EU and the U.S. 
In this period, Turkey barely had a trade relationship with Armenia. Table 9 
below indicates the trade between Turkey and Armenia.  
Table 9: Turkey-Armenia Trade Relations 
YEAR EXPORT IMPORT 
2005 - 392 
2006 - 41 
2007 - 57 
2008 - 1489 
2009 2 1052 
2010 16 2626 
2011 218 133 
2012 241 222 
2013 83 399 
2014 - 1349 
Source: Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade59 
In Armenia’s case, Turkey did not have any motive to develop better relations 
with Armenia apart from a desire to stabilize relations in its neighborhood and to regulate 
relations with the West. Yet, there were some attempts by Turkey to develop relations 
with Armenia.  
Although there was almost no motive to develop relations there were motives to 





dealing with Turkish–Azerbaijan relations. So far, it can be argued that Turkey’s energy 
relations with Azerbaijan happened to be more powerful and the centuries-old 
brotherhood between the two countries (expressed as “one nation, two states” in several 
official and non-official meetings). 
Turkey’s Relations with Azerbaijan 
Turkey’s relationship with Azerbaijan is probably stronger than that with any 
other friendly nation. This relationship is defined as one between the two states of a 
single nation. Among other Turkic languages, Azerbaijani is the closest to the Turkish 
spoken in Turkey.  
Turkey was the first state to recognize Azerbaijan as it declared its independence 
on August 30, 1991. On January 24, 1992 the Friendship, Cooperation and Good 
Neighborhood Agreement was signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan following the 
Trade and Economic Cooperation agreement, which was signed on January 2, 1992. 
Within the same year, on November 2, 1992, an agreement regarding credit was signed 
between the two countries and the next year, on March 6, 1993 the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation, Education, Culture, Science and Communication Agreement was signed.60  
Currently, Turkey has its embassy in Baku and two consulate generals in 
Nahcivan and Gence, while Azerbaijan has consulate generals in Istanbul and Kars in 
addition to the embassy in Ankara.61 As indicated above, Turkey’s relations with 
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Azerbaijan had very rarely included problems. Despite differences of opinion, almost all 
Turkish governments had friendly relations with Azerbaijan.   
On August 16-17, 2010 Turkey’s president visited Azerbaijan and signed the 
“Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance” agreement. In September of the same year, 
at the summit of Heads of Turkish Speaking Countries, the declaration about the 
establishment of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was signed between 
Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. These two 
documents laid the legal foundation for the deepening of relations between the two 
countries.62 The first meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was held 
in Izmir on October 25, 2011 and the second was held in Gebele on September 11, 2012. 
Several agreements were signed in these two meetings. 
The two states also actively promote cooperation in their regions. In this 
perspective, there have been Tripartite Meetings of ministers of foreign affairs. The 
Turkey-Azerbaijan-Iran tripartite meeting was held on March 7, 2012 in Nahcivan, and 
the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia tripartite meeting was held on June 8, 2012 in Trabzon.  
The economic relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey were also developing day 
by day. By 2011, Turkey’s export to Azerbaijan was $2,65,166,000, while its import was 
$1,388,504,000.63 It is estimated that the total value of investment by the Turkish 
companies (their number exceeds 800) is above $3 billion. When the energy-related 
investments are also included this amount reaches more than $6 billion.64 Table 10 below 
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indicates the trade volume between Turkey and Azerbaijan. 
Table 10: Turkey-Azerbaijan Trade Relations 
YEAR EXPORT IMPORT TRADE VOLUME 
2001 225,214 78,075 303,289 
2002 231,431 64,625 296,056 
2003 315,488 122,607 438,095 
2004 403,942 135,537 539,479 
2005 528,076 208,325 736,401 
2006 695,287 296,581 991,868 
2007 1,047,668 185,500 1,233,168 
2008 1,667,469 362,835 2,030,304 
2009 1,400,446 140,599 1,541,045 
2010 1,550,479 252,525 1,803,004 
2011 2,063,996 262,263 2,326,259 
2012 2,584,671 339,936 2,924,607 
2013 2,960,371 333,748 3,294,119 
2014 2,572,180 264,856 2,837,036 
Source: Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade65 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the three consecutive governments of 
Azerbaijan had their own respective approaches to foreign policy. The first government 
of Muttalibov had a rather Russian-oriented foreign policy. His successor, Elchibey, 
preferred a policy promoting integration with Turkey and the West.66 After these two 
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balancing foreign policy. The crafty politician Haydar Aliyev designed a foreign policy 
that balanced the East, West, and Russia in a complicated manner. In this balancing 
period, Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan had its ups and downs as well.  
Yılmaz describes the permanent characteristics of the foreign policies of the three 
governments of Azerbaijan as follows: (1) The independence of the nation (2) Territorial 
integrity of the country (3) The solution of the Karabakh problem (4) Integration with the 
international institutions (5) Transition to the market economy. 
Despite the constants in foreign policy, the means for reaching these goals 
differed widely between the three governments. In terms of security, an important factor 
that affected relations was the polarized political environment in the region, particularly 
in the South Caucasus. In this context, while Armenia was supported by Russia and Iran, 
Turkey was developing constructive relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan.67 Thus, 
having its foundation in the common culture and history, Turkey’s relations with 
Azerbaijan were also affected by the security concerns in the region. 
However, Turkey’s policy of “zero problem with neighbors” made the 
relationship complicated when it appeared as a rapprochement with Armenia, whose 
invasion of a quarter of the Azerbaijani soil shaped the first three foreign- policy goals. In 
this context, Turkey could not afford to mend its relations with Armenia despite the 
strong objection from Azerbaijan. Turkey’s attempts at rapprochement with Armenia had 
come in the form of several meetings and a consequent protocol to be signed in Zurich 
for normalization of the relations. This rapprochement was strongly opposed in 
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Azerbaijan and despite Turkey’s assurances that the border gates would not be opened 
unless the Karabakh problem is solved, Azerbaijan preferred to impose some sanctions 
on Turkey. 
In order to impose sanctions, Azerbaijan first used its energy weapon and 
regulated the gas prices. In 2008, Azerbaijan requested that the price of gas be raised. The 
minister of energy Taner Yildiz did not reveal the price due to the secrecy agreement, but 
did indicate that it would be more reasonable than the Russian gas.68 This was followed 
by economic sanctions on Turkish goods, pressure on the Turkish companies operating in 
Azerbaijan, and finally even the removal of flags, including those in the martyr 
cemeteries.69  
The Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline is described as the main vein of the 
Turkish–Azeri partnership. With this energy project, Azerbaijan was able to get an export 
route for Caspian oil to the European markets. Its other options, Russia and Iran, had 
already proved unreliable, as the existing Baku-Novorossiysk route to the Russian port on 
the Black sea was economically inefficient and the Irani option carried with it American 
objections. The intergovernmental agreement in support of the pipeline was signed on 
November 18, 1999 during a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, Turkey. U.S. President Bill Clinton also participated in the 
agreement.70  
Likewise, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline was another project that reinforced 
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Turkish-Azeri relations. With this project, natural gas is transported from Azerbaijan to 
Turkey. The BTE pipeline agreement was signed in 2001. The aim of the project was to 
transport the gas produced in the Shah Deniz field of the Caspian Sea to Turkey via 
Georgia. The 690 km.-long pipeline was built between 2005 and 2007 and has been 
operational since then. The agreement was in force for 15 years and Turkey is to receive 
6.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year although the pipeline is designed for the 
capacity of 16 billion cubic meters.  
Another important project in Turkey’s energy relations with Azerbaijan is the 
Trans Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project. The two agreements for TANAP 
were signed in late October 2011 by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and Azeri President 
Ilham Aliyev during the HLSC meeting. With the first agreement, Turkey is to buy the 
Shah Deniz II gas from Azerbaijan in 2017 and with the second agreement Azerbaijan is 
to transport Shah Deniz II gas to Turkey between 2017 and 2042. These agreements were 
especially important in contributing to the energy hub aspirations of Turkey. Turkey is 
expected to obtain re-export rights in the transport deal.  
A careful look into Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan shows that within the 
realm of Turkey’s pragmatist approach and Azerbaijan’s balancing policy there were 
some problematic issues despite the overall friendly nature of the relations. As 
Azerbaijan’s friendliness was taken for granted and Turkey initiated relations with 
Armenia regardless of Azerbaijan’s concerns, Baku’s first response was with its energy 
apparatus. This also affected Turkey’s relations with Georgia and caused a Turkish-
Azeri-Georgian cooperation in the South Caucasus. 
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Turkey’s Relations with Georgia 
As the Soviet Union collapsed, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize 
Georgia’s independence on December 16, 1991. Within a few months, on May 21, 1992, 
a protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the two countries was 
signed.71 Soon, both countries opened embassies, and currently Georgia has two general 
consulates in Trabzon and Istanbul, while Turkey has a general consulate in Batumi.  
Likewise, from education to economy, from culture to energy, several areas of 
cooperation exist between the two countries. The bilateral trade volume is around $1.4 
billion and Turkey is the biggest trade partner for Georgia.72 Table 11 below shows trade 
relations between Turkey and Georgia. 
Table 11: Turkey-Georgia Trade Relations 
YEAR EXPORT IMPORT TRADE VOLUME 
2001 144,049 127,231 271,280 
2002 103,221 137,873 241,094 
2003 155,070 268,562 423,632 
2004 199,699 300,284 499,983 
2005 271,828 289,834 561,662 
2006 407,962 344,813 752,775 
2007 646,082 289,568 935,650 
2008 997,844 525,041 1,522,885 
2009 762,977 285,486 1,048,463 
2010 769,271 290,725 1,059,996 
2011 1,092,321 314,352 1,406,673 
2012 1,253,309 180,351 1,433,660 
																																																								




Table 11 Continued 
YEAR EXPORT IMPORT TRADE VOLUME 
2013 1,245,917 201,738 1,447,655 
2014 1,302,301 208,860 1,511,161 
Source: Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade73 
After making some regulations on the visa requirements between the two 
countries, Turkey and Georgia signed a protocol that allows the citizens of both countries 
to travel with national identifications.74 Thus, Batumi airport is jointly operated by 
Turkey and Georgia. Turkish citizens traveling to the nearby town of Batumi use this 
airport in their trips from the western towns of Turkey.  
The friendly environment between Turkey and Russia is very much reinforced 
with the energy relations between the two countries. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan crude-oil 
pipeline and the Baku–Tbiisi–Erzurum natural-gas pipeline have served as the leverage 
for the strategic areas of cooperation between the two countries. 
The two countries have also developed their cooperation in military areas. Turkey 
has contributed to the modernization of the Georgian Army.75  Turkey always had to be 
cautious in order to balance its relations with Georgia and Russia.76 While Turkey tried to 
develop closer relations with Georgia, in cases of Russian aggression Turkey could not 
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Azerbaijan has always been an inseparable part of Turkey’s relations with 
Georgia. As a recent conference indicated, “economic relations form the main pillar of 
the trilateral cooperation. This stems from Turkey’s demand for energy, Azerbaijan’s 
ability to supply this need, and Georgia’s geographical location, which enables the transit 
of Azerbaijan’s natural resources to Turkish as well as European markets.”77 
Thus, an overall assessment of Turkey’s relations in the South Caucasus region 
shows that all three variables shaped Turkish foreign policy in this region. Turkey’s 
identity has provided a lasting and close relationship with Azerbaijan and, to some extent, 
with Georgia. However, a threat perception for Russia was not enough to reinforce 
Turkey’s relations with Georgia. Turkey’s foreign policy attempts with Armenia were 
affected by the ongoing conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. As Turkey tried to 
develop closer relationships with Armenia, Azerbaijan’s objection, with energy as its 
impetus, was effective at halting a rapprochement. As in the case for the Middle East, the 
analysis suggests that Turkey’s relations in this region were also shaped by the need for 
energy.  
Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East and The Three Variables 
The first case for this study is Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Turkey’s 
relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors Iran, Iraq, and Syria were analyzed, revealing 
indicators for the influence of each variable on Turkish foreign policy in this region.  
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The foreign policy in the period of analysis was mostly shaped by the “strategic 
depth” notion of once advisor, then foreign minister, and lastly, prime minister Ahmet 
Davutoglu. As a consequence, stronger relations were developed with the Middle Eastern 
states, which were seen in the strategic-depth area of Turkey. However, a comparison of 
the countries provides more evidence of the effects of the three variables.  
It is difficult to argue that Turkish foreign policy in this region was affected by 
the first variable, deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the West. On the contrary, the 
developments in the region (e.g. Turkish–American confrontation in the American 
invasion of Iraq, Turkey’s support for Iran’s nuclear energy quest, etc.) played a role in 
the deterioration of relations. Turkey’s “zero problem with neighbors” policy in this 
period created areas of cooperation with its Middle Eastern neighbors, but these good 
neighborly relations did not last due to unexpected developments in the region (e.g. 
Maliki government in Iraq, Assad’s response to the uprisings in Syria, and Iran’s 
responses to the deployment of NATO Patriot batteries in Turkey).  
Unlike relations with Russia, relations with the Middle Eastern states had a 
Turkish dominance, thus rather than a post-frustration rapprochement, rapprochements 
with these countries were based on deliberate Turkish foreign policy planning, which 
seems not to have succeeded. Iran, however, may be considered an exception in this 
equation. Rapprochement with Iran seems to have been influenced by such a frustration, 
considering the declarations from the secular circles in Turkey for the consideration of 
alliance with this state alongside China and Russia.  
Although the explanation of “deterioration of relations with the West” seeks 
cooperation with other strong countries, it does not fully explain Turkish foreign policy in 
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the Middle East, except for the case of Iran. Still, because relations with Iran did not 
develop in these times of frustration but, rather, after 2010, when Turkey independently 
developed these relations, this variable still does not explain Turkish foreign policy in the 
Middle East.  
The second variable was based on the threat perception in the region. While in 
Turkish–Russian relations, this threat perception was felt in the Black Sea and the 
Caucasus regions, a similar threat perception could be observed in the Middle East where 
the U.S. had been involved for decades and preferred to act unilaterally, particularly since 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Furthermore, for the analyzed Middle Eastern countries 
(Iran, Iraq, and Syria) the issue was more than just perception. Syria and Iran did not 
have friendly relations with the U.S. for decades. Iraq has been invaded and even the 
post-U.S. invasion governments had problems with the U.S.  Thus, looking into Turkey’s 
relations with the states of the region it could be argued that “threat perception” has also 
been a significant factor in Turkey’s relations in the region. However, as seen in the 
deployment of Patriots in Turkey and the effects of the Arab Spring in Syria, Turkey’s 
threat perception regarding the mentioned Middle Eastern states was stronger than the 
perception of the U.S. as a threat in this region. Even though American presence in the 
region was not welcome, Turkey’s stance against this was not as strong as the one in the 
Black Sea and Caucasus region. 
The third variable was based on the liberal argument that claims that Turkey’s 
need for energy has been a prominent factor in Turkey’s relations with the countries in 
the region. As seen in the comparison of relations with the energy-rich Iran and Syria, 
while Turkey strongly opposed the regime in Syria, it was more accommodating to 
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Tehran. Despite the occasional aggressive rhetoric from the Iranian government, the trade 
relations between Turkey and Iran did not decrease in this period. Furthermore, although 
Turkey has always considered the existence of a Kurdish State in the north of Iraq as a 
red line in its foreign policy, energy trade with the local government in the north of Iraq 
has even deteriorated Turkey’s relations with Iraq’s central government.  
Turkish Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus and The Three Variables 
Looking into Turkey’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus, one sees that there 
have been attempts in line with the “zero problem with neighbors” policy in this region as 
well. However, the external circumstances have continuously shaped the foreign policy 
choices in this region.  
The region has been an area of rivalry between the West (mainly the U.S.) and 
Russia, which considers the region its near abroad after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy choices have been vastly affected by this rivalry. This 
region has not been as disastrous as the Middle East, however, it was mostly occupied 
with frozen conflicts. Armenia’s decade-long invasion of Azerbaijan, Georgia’s problems 
with its ethnically diverse population, and historically bitter memories in the region made 
relations within the region even more complicated. In this environment, each country in 
the region was also affected by the mentioned Great Power rivalry. Armenia was backed 
by Russia in its invasion of Azerbaijan, but, due to the Armenian lobby in the U.S., it also 
had a chance to influence American foreign policy. Georgia and Azerbaijan had relations 
with both Russia and the U.S. until the 2008 invasion of Georgia by Russia.  
In this setting, the three variables had differing influences on the foreign policy 
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choices of Turkey in the region. The first variable, deterioration of Turkey’s relations 
with the West, did not have a great influence on Turkey’s choices in the region. Since 
with its population and economy Turkey has been the dominant side in its relations with 
each of the countries in the region, Turkey did not approach any of these countries for a 
balancing policy. Furthermore, none of the countries in the region had an anti-American 
status.  
Only Georgia could be a location where the threat perception could be observed. 
Since neither Armenian nor Azerbaijani governments were affected by the color 
revolutions there was not an occasion to perceive such a threat. In Georgia’s case, the 
post-color revolution government only developed stronger relations with Turkey, which 
led to more influence in the region, extension of the “zero problems” policy, and its 
reinforcement of Turkey’s stronger role in the region.  
Energy appears to be a strong explanation for Turkish foreign policy in this region 
as well. This is seen in Turkey’s relations with the only energy-rich state in the region, 
Azerbaijan. It is not possible to explain Turkey’s strong relations with Azerbaijan with 
regard to energy since these two countries already had strong historical and cultural 
bonds as expressed in the “one nation two states” motto. However, Azerbaijan’s use of 
energy as leverage in Turkish–Armenian relations is the indicator in this case.  The 
centuries-old Turkish–Azerbaijani brotherhood was threatened when Turkey unilaterally 
opted to develop its relations with Armenia disregarding Azerbaijan–Armenia relations. 
Neither cultural nor historical bonds were sufficient to conserve Turkish-Azeri 
brotherhood in such an environment. On the other hand, Azerbaijani energy was a strong 
impetus for Turkey to consider its Armenian policy. Thus, more than developing its 
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already strong relationship with Azerbaijan, energy played an important factor in curbing 
Turkey’s relations with Armenia despite Azerbaijan.  
The analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the South Caucasus strongly indicates 
that, more than any other variable, energy has served as a dominant factor in shaping and 
balancing Turkish foreign policy in this region. While energy has served as the proactive 
force behind Turkey’s relations in the Middle East, it served as the reactive force in 




ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
	
This dissertation started with an attempt to answer one main question: What was 
the drive behind the unexpected rapprochement between Russia and Turkey after the 
Cold War. Although this question needed to be answered from two perspectives (Russian 
and Turkish perspectives) the main focus in this dissertation has been the Turkish 
perspective. As with many such questions, there were several answers. A thorough 
examination of all the answers showed that they could not be categorized into three 
groups, each of which represented a certain offshoot of the three mainstream international 
relations theories-realism, liberalism and constructivism.  
With further scrutiny, the focus of this work has settled on the liberal perspective 
that is founded on the energy relation between Russia and Turkey or, more specifically, 
Turkey’s need for energy. Thus, the main question of this dissertation manifested itself 
as: To what extent did energy play a role in Turkish–Russian rapprochement within the 
first decade of the third millennium. 
The end of the Cold War was the main force behind the rapprochement. However, 
this kind of rapprochement did not take place between every rival. Furthermore, Turkish–
Russian rivalry, if not enmity, was not limited to the Cold War. For centuries, these two 
nations experienced several conflicts and bitterly fought against one another.  
Although several scholars had accepted the existence of such a rapprochement, 
this work looked into more concrete instances to explain it. The rapprochement has been 
observed in several areas from military relations to tourism.  
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The trend in the economic development of Turkey indicates a strong motive for 
Turkey’s need for energy. And this need is predominantly met by Russian sources of 
energy. Turkey’s foreign policy choices in two other areas of significant foreign policy 
activism were analyzed as case studies in this dissertation. These two cases further 
supported the argument that energy has been a dominant factor in Turkey’s foreign policy 
choices and served as the main factor f Turkish-Russian rapprochement. 
Turkey’s Economy Before and After Rapprochement 
Turkey’s gross domestic product was around $200 billion in 2000 and increased 
to almost $800 billion a decade later. In 2000, Turkey imported predominantly from 
Europe, at around 60 percent); This decreased to 50 percent within the same decade. The 
rise in Turkey’s economy is very significant in the period of analysis. 
Turkey’s Energy Consumption Before and After Rapprochement 
Turkey’s petroleum consumption also rose during this period, from 614,000 
barrels in 2001 to 728,000 barrels in 2013. The rise was more significant in terms of 
natural gas, which Turkey primarily imported from Russia (56 percent). The natural gas 
consumption in Turkey went up from 600 billion cubic feet per year to 1.6 trillion cubic 
feet per year.  
Turkey’s Relations with the West Before and After Rapprochement 
Another significant change was in Turkey’s relations with the West during the 
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mentioned period. For the Westerners (people who see Turkey’s future in its status as a 
Western/European country) in Turkey, this has been a vicious circle. As Turkey separated 
itself from the West, it got closer to Russia, and as its relations with Russia improved, its 
distance from the West increased.  While in the early 2000s Turkey’s several attempts 
were applauded by the Western media, after a decade of multilateral relations, Turkey is 
now widely criticized by the Western media and there is a widening gap between Turkey 
and the West in the eyes of several Western observers.  
American Foreign Policy in the Black Sea and the Caucasus Before and After 
Rapprochement  
American foreign policy in the Black Sea and the Caucasus region also 
significantly increased during this period. The regime changes in the region were mostly 
interpreted as a U.S. policy. The color revolutions caused regime changes for Georgia in 
2003, for Ukraine in December 2004 and for Kyrgyzstan in March 2005. Within the same 
period the U.S. attempted to gain membership for the Ukraine and Georgia in NATO. All 
these U.S. policies were met with caution by both Turkey and Russia.  
American Image in Turkey Before and After Rapprochement 
While there have been several different opinion polls about the American image 
in Turkey, Pew Research indicates that the favorable view of the U.S. in 2002 saw a 
decline the following decade. While 30 percent of the Turks had a favorable view of the 
U.S. in 2002, this dropped to 10 percent in 2011 (see Figure 13). On the other hand, the 
view of Russia showed a steady increase and became almost equal to that of the U.S., a 
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long-time ally with Turkey see (see Figure 14). Similarly, a survey conducted by EDAM 
(Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies) in 2013 shows that a military 
intervention by the U.S. and Israel in order to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons 
comes second after the foundation of an independent Kurdish state in the southern part of 
Turkey in the order of biggest threats for Turkish public opinion.1		
Figure 13: View of the U.S. in Turkey 
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Figure 14: View of Russia in Turkey 
	
Source 1: Pew Research Center3 
Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
Within the mentioned period Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East showed 
strong indicators that energy was a predominant factor in its foreign- policy making. For 
the analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, Turkey’s relations with its three 
neighbors (Iran, Iraq, and Syria) were analyzed. All three states experienced turbulent 
times between 2000 and 2014. Iran, which has been confronting the West since the 1979 
Revolution, continued to pursue its nuclear program in this period. Iraq went through a 
devastating war and suffered threats of separation. Syria, which seemed the most stable 
country for a while, collapsed after the Arab uprisings.  
Under all these circumstances, the making of Turkish foreign policy seems to 
have been greatly affected by the need for energy. The hostile nature of Turkish–Iranian 
relations in the 1990s (mostly shadowed by Iran’s regime export policies) was replaced 
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with more amiable relations. Turkey became a defender of Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear 
program. Despite its red lines on the existence of an autonomous state in the north of 
Iraq, Turkey’s need for energy prompted cooperation with this region as well. On the 
other hand, Syria, which did not provide such opportunities in terms of energy, could not 
sustain strong relations with Turkey.  
Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus 
The three countries of the South Caucasus maintained different imperatives for 
their relations with Turkey. While Azerbaijan, with its brother nation status, was on one 
end, Armenia with its historical problems with Turkey, was on the other end.  Georgia’s 
relations with Turkey, on the other hand, were mostly shaped by the orientation of the 
government in Georgia.  
In Turkey’s relations with the South Caucasian states, energy did not become a 
determining factor. However, at certain moments, Turkish foreign- policy choices were 
also affected by Turkey’s need for energy. Armenia, which was kept out of the equation, 
did not develop any relationship with Turkey despite the pressures from the West and 
Russia’s support of improvement in the relations. 
Georgia’s good relations with Turkey were mostly reinforced by its participation 
in the energy projects between Turkey and Azerbaijan. When it comes to Azerbaijan, 
although several factors required a strong friendship between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and 
this relation was supported with energy deals, at certain moments, Turkey’s 
rapprochement with Armenia was also controlled by energy in Azerbaijan. Turkey’s 
attempts for reconciliation of its relations with Armenia were checked by Azerbaijan and 
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Turkey’s need for Azeri energy appears to have influenced Turkey’s relations with 
Armenia as well. 
Conclusion 
This study has reviewed the unexpected Turkish–Russian rapprochement from 
2000 to 2014 and has explored the motives for this rapprochement, which would reveal 
the theoretical explanation for Turkey’s relations with Russia. While each of the main 
factors (variables) appeared to have influenced Turkish-Russian rapprochement, the case 
studies on Turkish foreign-policy choices in other areas of interest for Turkey 
significantly support that Turkey’s need for energy is the main factor for shaping Turkish 
foreign policy in this period. 
Both Turkey’s relations in the Middle East and South Caucasus were in some 
degree affected by the motives that shaped Turkish–Russian rapprochement. These 
motives (deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the West, perception of the U.S. as a 
threat in the region, and Turkey’s need for energy) have worked on different levels in 
affecting the relations with specific countries in the region.  
Although every country has its own unique conditions and its relations with 
Turkey are bound to several factors, once the motives of Turkish-Russian rapprochement 
are tested in these relations, it appears that Turkey’s need for energy has served plays a 
significant role . Thus, this study argues that there is strong evidence that Turkey’s need 
for energy has served as the most significant factor in Turkish–Russian rapprochement. 
This is but one layer in what requires a multi-layered effort to understand the motives of 
Turkish foreign policy. Future work might analyze why energy has become such a strong 
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factor, whether it is related to domestic politics, and, if so, how. The need exists for 
further understanding of the contours of Turkish foreign policy in a complicated, mostly 
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APPENDIX A (THE CHRONOLOGY OF TURKISH RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
(2000 - 2014)) 
[As mentioned by the Ankara Embassy of Russia] 
09.20.2000 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Confers with Turkish 
Foreign Minister Ismail Cem 
10.05.2000 Russia's Export Capabilities-2000 Exhibition held in Istanbul, Turkey  
11.19.2001 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov 
meets with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey Ismail Cem  
10.18.2001 Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Mikhail 
Kasyanov made a working tour of the Krasnodar Krai (province) to have a look at the 
progress in constructing the Blue Stream gas pipeline. 
06.07.2001 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov's meeting with Media 
Representatives on Arrival in Ankara 
06. 08.2001 Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor 
Ivanov at Meeting with Representatives of Turkey's Business Circles, Istanbul,  
04.02.2001 Agreement on the Establishment of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation 
Task Force (Blackseafor) was signed in Istanbul. 
04.25.2001 Pro-Chechen gunmen hold 120 people, including 54 Americans, 
before surrendering after 12 hours of negotiations in Turkey. 
04.28.2001 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov 
meets with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Ismail Cem 
10.01.2001 Russia's President Vladimir Putin and President of the Republic of 
Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer Talk on the Phone 
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04.03.2002 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Razov Meets with 
Nabi Sensoy, Turkish Ambassador in Moscow 
04.09.2002 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Saltanov 
Meets Turkish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Tuigan  
05.28.2002 Russian President Vladimir Putin Sends a Congratulatory Message to 
President of the Republic of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer on Occasion of 10th 
Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty on the Foundations of Relations Between the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey 
06.05.2002 Meeting of the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov with Chief of 
the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey H. Kıvrıkoğlu 
06.08.2001 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov's 
Remarks at Joint Press Conference on Results of Talks with Turkish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ismail Cem, Ankara 
06.25.2002 Russian-Turkish Consultations Concerning a Cyprus Settlement  
07.03.2002 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei 
Razov Meets with Kurtulus Taskent, the New Turkish Ambassador to Moscow  
09.12.2002 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Meets with Turkish 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sukru Sina Gurel  
09.11.2002 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeny Gusarov Meets 
with Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Kurtulus Taskent  
09.20.2002 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Denisov Meets 
with Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Kurtulus Taskent  
09.20.2002 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Saltanov 
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Meets with Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Kurtulus Taskent  
10.14.2002 Russian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav 
Trubnikov Meets with Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Kurtulus Taskent  
10.29.2002 Statement by Alexander Lebedev, the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, 
Regarding the Terrorist Act in Moscow, October 29, 2002  
11.04.2002 Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Question from Russian Media About Turkey's Reaction to 
the Terrorist Act in Moscow  
11.11.2002 Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Question from Russian Media Concerning the Expulsion 
from Turkey of Chechen Terrorist B. Z. Arslangereyev  
11.21.2002 Decision by Turkish Authorities to Ban Entry into Country of Leaders 
of Terrorist Formations Operating in Chechnya  
12.02.2002 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Razov Meets with 
Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Kurtulus Taskent  
12.25.2002 Russian President Vladimir Putin meets Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
Leader of Turkey's Justice and Development Party, the Kremlin, Moscow, December 24, 
2002  
12.23.2002 Press Conference Organized by the "Representation of the Freedom 
and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan in Russia and the CIS"  
03.25.2003 Russian President Vladimir Putin Speaks to Turkish Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by Telephone  
05.05.2003 Russia’s statement in Connection with to Earthquake in Turkey  
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05.12.2003 Russian-Turkish Cyprus Settlement Consultations  
06.04.2003 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Meets with Turkish 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul  
07.01.2003 Gazprom CEO Yuri Kamarov’s statements regarding the Blue Stream 
project  
07.19.03 "The Chechen Republic is an integral part of the Russian Federation". 
(Article by P.Stegniy, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Turkey was 
published in Turkish Daily News, 19.07.03)  
09.16.2003 Russian Turkish high level common working group meeting.  
09.17.2003 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A.V. Saltanov 
meets A. Tuygan, Turkish Deputy Counselor of Foreign Affairs.  
10.17.2003 Russian President V.V. Putin meets Turkish President Ahmet Necdet 
Sezer in his working trip to Malaysia.   
11.12.2003 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Razov has 
an interviewed with Moscow Representative of Turkish news agency Anatolia Agency. 
11.13.2003 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Razov ‘s 
article in Turkish Daily news newspaper: “Russia optimistic on Turkish gas deal”  
11.15.2003 Terrorist bombings in Istanbul and the statement made by the Russian 
spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
11.18.2003 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Razov ‘s 
meeting with Turkish Industry and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD) members. 
11.20.2003 Completion of the talks between GAZPROM and  BOTAŞ on the  
transfer of Russian natural gas to Turkey.  
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11.20.2003 Russian President V.V. Putin talks to Turkish Prime Minister R.T. 
Erdoğan on the phone.  
12.10.2003 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S.S. Razov 
takes a working trip to Turkey.  
12.24.2003 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A.I Denisov’s 
counseling in BSEC Secretariat.  
12.25.2003 Russian-Turkish counseling.  
01.17.2004 1853-56 Memorial ceremony for the soldiers who lost their lives in 
the Crimean War (1853-56) and the Russian-Ukranian events in Turkey.  
02.26.2004 Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Gül visits Russia.  
02.26.2004 Russian President V.V. Putin talks to Turkish Prime Minister R.T. 
Erdoğan on the phone.  
02.26.2004 President of the Russian Federation Tataristan Republic R.N. 
Minnihanov visits Turkey.  
03.03.2004 Russian Ambassador to Turkey P. Stegniy addresses the participants 
of the Black Sea Forum on the business cooperation development  
03.10.2004 Russian–Turkish conference on “Cooperation in the Eurasia”  
03.30.2004 Alexander Yakovenko, the Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs makes a statement regarding Cyprus Negotiations  
04.21.2004 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Y. V. Fedotov 
meets with Turkish Ambassador to Russia K. Taşkent.  
04.21.2004 Statement by Gennady Gatilov, Acting Permanent Representative of 
the Russian Federation to the UN, Security Council Meeting on Cyprus  
	 183	
04.21.2004 Russian Federation veto in the United Nations Security Council on the 
Draft Resolution on Cyprus  
04.28.2004 Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov talks to 
Turkish Deputy Prime Minister A. Gül on the phone.  
04.30.2004 Russian Federation president V.V. Putin talks to Turkish Prime 
Minister T.T. Erdoğan on the phone.  
05.11.2004 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Y.V. Fedotov 
meets Turkish Ambassador K. Taskent.  
05.14.2004 Russian President Putin writes a letter emphasizing the importance of 
cooperation between the two countries to Turkish Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan.  
05.17.2004 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S.S.S Razov visits Turkey 
Rusya. 
06.16.2004 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. Lavrov meets Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Gül.  
06.16.2004 Interview of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
Sergey Lavrov, Granted to the Anatolian News Agency  
06.16.2004 Speech by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the 
31st Session of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference  
06.17.2004 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Meets with 
Mehmet Ali Talat, General Chairman of the Republican People's Party of the Turkish 
Cypriot Community 
06.28.2004 Foreign Ministers of the NATO-Russia Council met in Istanbul. 
Taking stock of two years of accomplishments in the NRC framework, they reiterated 
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their adherence to the goals, principles and commitments contained in the Founding Act, 
the Rome Declaration and past NRC decisions, and their determination to stand together 
against shared threats. 
11.23.2004 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Meets with 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul 
12.23.2004 Russian-Turkish High-Level Joint Working Group Meets in Regular 
Session 
12.31.2004 Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with Prime Minister of 
Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  
01.10.2005 The Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey Mr. R.T.Erdoğan's visit 
to Moscow. 
02.06.2005 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Meets with 
Turkish First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Tuygan  
  
04.19.2005 German O. Gref, Russian Minister for Economic Development and 
Trade visits Turkey. 
05.24.2005 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S.S.Razov’s 
Consultations with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Tuygan of Turkey  
06.02.2005 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yuri Fedotov’s 
Consultations with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Eder Arat of Turkey  
06.16.2005 Russian President Putin talks to Turkish Prime Minister R.T.Erdoğan 
on the phone.  
07.17-18.2005 The Meeting of the Russian President V.V.Putin with Prime 
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Minister of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Sochi, Russia  
10.04.2005 Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  
10.19.2005 President Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with Prime 
Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  
11.17.2005 The working visit of the President of the Russian Federation 
V.V.Putin to Samsun, Turkey  
11.17.2005 Opening Ceremony of the Blue Stream Gas Pipeline, Samsun, Turkey  
12.19.2005 Regular Meeting of the Russian-Turkish High-Level Joint Working 
Group (HLJWG) in Ankara  
01.23.2006 President Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with Prime 
Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  
05.06.2006 Russian Minister Of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov speaks to Turkish 
Deputy Prime Minister And Minister Of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül by telephone  
05.31.06 - 1.06.06 Official Visit of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey 
Lavrov to the Republic of Turkey  
 06.29.2006 President of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer visits Russia. The two 
Presidents discussed the outlook for settlement in Iraq and the Middle East, the situation 
with the Iranian nuclear programme, the situation in the Trans-Caucasus and the issue of 
Cyprus. 
05.13.2008 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Kislyak visits 
Turkey for political and military discussions.  
06.05.2008 Russian President Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with 
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Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  
06.17.2008 Chief of Russian Navy Admiral V.S.Vısotskiy visits Turkey.  
07.03.2008 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov visits Turkey.  
07.05.2008 Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev met Turkish President Abdullah 
Gül in Astana.  
07.18.2008 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation 
with Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  
07.18.2008 Russian warship 'Perekop's visit to Istanbul.  
08.01.2008 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation 
with Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  
08.13.2008 Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev had a telephone conversation 
with Turkish President Abdullah Gül.  
08.26.2008 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.G.Titov meets Turkish 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ü.Çeviköz  
09.02.2008 Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergy LAVROV 
makes a working visit to Turkey and has a press meeting with Turkish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan.  
10.12.2008 Patriarch of Moscow and Russia Eleksiy II visits Turkey.  
10.26.2008 Russian warships visit Turkey.  
11.12-16.2008 Turkish president of Religious Affairs Dr. Ali Bardakoğlu visits 
Russia.  
11.18-19.2008 Russian Minister of Defense visits Turkey. 
07.02.2009 Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu visits Russia.  
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07.03.2009 Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev held a telephone conversation 
with Turkish President Abdullah Gül. 
09.26.2009 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov meets with Turkish Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu 
10.22.2009 Teleconference between Erdoğan, Putin and Berlusconi (Erdoğan 
emphasized the energy cooperation between the three countries in the teleconference) 
11.09.2009 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Titov Holds 
Consultations at the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
01.13.2010 Talks between Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his Turkish 
counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Moscow. 
01.15.2010 Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Speaks to Turkish Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Davutoglu by Telephone 
01.30.2010 Dmitry Medvedev had a telephone conversation with President of 
Turkey Abdullah Gül 
03.05.2010 Consultations between First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Andrey Denisov and Turkish First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Feridun Sinirlioğlu 
04.26.2010 Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Speaks to Turkish Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu by Telephone 
05.11-12.2010 Official visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Turkey 
06.08.2010 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s working visit to Turkey 
06.09.2010 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has telephone conversation 
with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
06.27.2010 Meeting of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev with Prime Minister 
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of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
11.06.2010 Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov’s Consultations at the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry 
10.16.2010 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has telephone conversation 
with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
11.11.2010 President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev met with Prime Minister of 
Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on G20 Summit 
11.30.2010 Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov Meets with Murat Mercan, 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Turkey’s Grand National Assembly 
12.01.2010 President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev met with President of Turkey 
Abdullah Gül on OSCE Summit 
12.02.2010 Telephone conversation of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev with 
Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
12.02.2010 Agreement between Russia and Turkey on joint construction of 
Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant has been ratified 
12.08.2010 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has telephone conversation 
with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
02.10.2011 Negotiations between the Russian Minister of the Interior and the 
Turkish Minister of the Interior were Held in Moscow 
05.07.2011 Ratification of Agreement between Russia and Turkey on cooperation 
in peaceful use of nuclear energy 
05.28.2011 Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov Meets with Turkey’s Deputy 
Foreign Minister Ayse Sezgin 
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06.14.2011 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin congratulates Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the victory of his party at the parliamentary elections 
06.14.2011 Telephone conversation with Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan 
10.08.2012 Russian President V.Putin, Turkish Prime-Minister R.Erdoğan have 
telephone conversation 
11.22.2013 President of Russia V.V.Putin met with Prime Minister of Turkey, 
November 22, 2013 
11.22.2013 Meeting of High-Level Russian-Turkish Cooperation Council, 
November 22, 2013 
11.22.2013 News conference following a meeting of the High-Level Russian-
Turkish Cooperation Council 
02.07.2014 President of Russia V.V.Putin met with Prime Minister of Turkey 
03.04.2014 President of Russia V.V.Putin held telephone conversation with Prime 
Minister of Turkey 
03.31.2014 President of Russia V.V.Putin held telephone conversation with Prime 
Minister of Turkey 
04.17.2014 President of Russia held telephone conversation with Prime Minister 
of Turkey, R.T.Erdoğan 
05.16.2014 Telephone conversation between President of Russia V.Putin and 
Prime Minister of Turkey T.Erdoğan 
05.30.2014 Russia President V.Putin, Turkey Prime Minister R.T.Erdoğan had 
telephone conversation 
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08.11.2014 Telephone conversation between President of Russia Vladimir Putin 
with President-elect of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
08.22.2014 Telephone conversation between President of Russia and President-
elect of Turkey 
09.27.2014 Meeting between the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, and 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu 
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